• Albania

    header1 Country Overview

    Albania will hold its April parliamentary elections under a newly amended electoral code. Passed in October 2020, the changes include a reduced vote threshold for parties to enter parliament, a restructuring of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), and alterations to the way coalitions put forth candidates. The United States, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) initially supported for electoral reforms but criticized the ultimate outcome and the exclusion of the opposition from the process. A joint opinion from the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR described the procedure as “extremely hasty” and “against the most basic rules of democratic law-making.” The opinion also called for further reforms after the April parliamentary election.  

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Albania has a record of generally competitive elections, despite criticism of the CEC for its lack of transparency and concerns about vote-buying and corruption. The PS and the Democratic Party (PD), the main opposition party, dominate the political landscape, while numerous smaller parties have little opportunity to gain power. April’s parliamentary elections are under additional scrutiny following the PD’s boycott of the 2019 local elections and 2017 parliamentary elections. The media environment is highly concentrated, and owners use outlets to push narratives supporting their political and financial interests. Intimidation, including pressure from the government, leads many journalists to self-censor, and efforts to pass harsh anti-defamation legislation in 2019 and 2020 reinforced concerns about government hostility towards independent media.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Numerous laws allow users to be punished for online speech, including criminal penalties for defamation, which is frequently used against journalists and media outlets. Authorities have made multiple arrests in recent years for “knowingly [distributing] false information with the intention of spreading panic.” In 2019, Xhuliana Aliaj was detained for three days for Facebook posts asking the government assess damage caused by an earthquake and urging people to leave the area for their safety. The case against her was dropped after 11 months. In 2020, an online media company, Nova Media, was reportedly referred for prosecution for causing panic related to the pandemic. This pattern of legal interventions sets a worrying precedent for how the Albanian government can limit politically sensitive speech, particularly as the government’s pressure on media has ramped up more generally.
    • Blocking of websites: The Albanian government has shown greater willingness to block online content. In April 2020, the Audiovisual Media Authority required ISPs to block several websites, including the entire Medium.com domain. The Medium block was reportedly in response to a copyright complaint and was reversed after less than a week, but the decision to block the entire site, rather than only the relevant content, raises concerns about the proportionality of restrictions imposed by the government. After the 2019 earthquake, the Electronic and Postal Communications Authority (AKEP) blocked an online news outlet’s website and the Facebook page of another. In addition, the proposed anti-defamation package included a legal mechanism for blocking websites.
    • Cyberattacks: Online media and the Albanian government have occasionally fallen victim to cyberattacks in recent years. A malware infection in April 2020 rendered Exit, a news site, inaccessible to users and administrators for 24 hours while a malware infection attempted to delete content. Though the website was restored and no content was lost, the incident represented a worrying escalation against an independent media outlet that has faced threats and legal harassment in the past. Also in 2020, an attack on Albanian intelligence, believed to be perpetrated by Turkish authorities, compromised the personal information of hundreds of people. Similar breaches ahead of Albania’s election could negatively impact the election environment, including by obstructing access to information or interfering with elections infrastructure or personal data, and even unsuccessful attacks could fuel doubts about electoral integrity.

    Albania has a score of 68 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a generally strong environment for political rights despite challenges to rule of law and free expression. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 67 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and as a transitional or hybrid regime in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 47 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Albania country reports in Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Albania’s overall score fell in the 2021 edition of Freedom in the World, reflecting a charged political atmosphere that gave rise to several violent confrontations between police and protestors. Read the Albania report.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      68 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 25, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      70.35%
    • Population

      2.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Angola

    header1 Country Overview

    Angola has a score of 46 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects elections that are not regarded as free and fair. Voters do not directly elect a president in Angola; instead, the head of the national list of the political party receiving the most votes in general elections becomes president. In December 2021, the ruling MPLA announced that president João Lourenço would again be the party’s presidential candidate in 2022. Lourenço was first elected to the presidency in 2017, succeeding former president José Eduardo dos Santos, who had been in power for 38 years. Opposition parties disputed the 2017 results, alleging irregularities at the National Election Commission. In November 2021, Lourenço signed into law an amendment to general election law that will centralize vote counting, a move that some organizations have criticized as decreasing the amount of civil society oversight. Laws criminalizing online activities and the threat of cyberattacks against civic actors are the two main digital risks to elections in Angola. The country is rated Not Free in the Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 30 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 62/100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Angola country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Angola

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    • Global Freedom Score

      28 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      59 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      August, 24 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      31.00%
    • Population

      32.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Argentina

    header1 Country Overview

    Argentina has a score of 80 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects competitive elections and robust civil society, though judicial corruption and violence from police and drug-related criminal organizations persist. Some laws assign harsh penalties for online activities, but they are rarely used, and users can generally access online content without legal or extralegal consequence; cyberattacks during recent elections and a trend of disproportionate content removals from civil lawsuits threaten the digital sphere. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 84 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 71 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Argentina country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Argentina

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    • Global Freedom Score

      85 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      73 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 24, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      77.43%
    • Population

      45.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Argentina

    header1 Country Overview

    On October 22, 2023, Argentines will vote in the country’s next general election. Voters will select the next president, 24 members of the Senate, and 130 members of the Chamber of Deputies, in addition to several provincial and local offices. The country’s president is elected for a four-year term, and presidential candidates must win 45 percent of the vote to avoid a runoff, which would take place on November 19. The center-left incumbent, President Alberto Fernández, announced in April 2023 that he would not seek a second term, despite being eligible to do so. Presidential candidates will be officially selected in an August 13 primary (commonly referred to as the “PASO”), and opinion polls have suggested a competitive race between candidates from the governing Union for the Homeland (UP) coalition, formerly known as the Front for Everyone, the opposition center-right Together for Change (JxC) coalition, and the right-wing Freedom Advances (LLA) coalition, led by libertarian candidate Javier Milei.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Argentina is a vibrant representative democracy, and the country has a clear and relatively fair framework for conducting elections, which are administered by the National Electoral Chamber (CNE) in conjunction with the National Electoral Directorate (DNE), a department of the Interior Ministry. Argentine voters will head to the polls amidst considerable economic, political, and social upheaval. With the incumbent president not running for reelection, much remains unclear about which candidates will appear on the October ballot, and how the new government will address the country’s serious challenges once elected.

    Economic concerns are likely to be top of mind for Argentine voters. The Fernández administration has struggled to alleviate the country’s severe economic crisis in recent years, with annual inflation reaching 114 percent in May 2023, the highest rate recorded since 1991. Argentina is deeply polarized, and voters remain divided over which political coalition will most effectively reverse the current economic situation—creating an opening for candidates outside the political mainstream, such as Milei. Meanwhile, the traditional political coalitions have struggled ahead of the PASO. JxC, affiliated with former president Mauricio Macri, who also decided against running again in 2023, has been slow to unite behind a candidate ahead of the election. Minister of Economy Sergio Massa, who UP preemptively selected as its sole presidential candidate ahead of the PASO, has led Argentina’s recent loan negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has staked his candidacy on pragmatic leadership. However, UP, which is aligned with the country’s often-dominant Peronist working-class movement, lost its long-held congressional majority in the November 2021 midterm election, weakening its electoral standing ahead of the 2023 general election.

    Argentina’s democracy also continues to suffer from deeply entrenched corruption, which has reached officials at the highest level of government in recent years and fueled instability. Vice President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who served as president between 2007 and 2015 and is not related to current president Fernández, was sentenced to six years in prison and permanently banned from holding public office after being convicted on corruption-related charges in December 2022, though the sentence will not take effect while an appeals process is in progress. Fernández de Kirchner, who has repeatedly claimed that the court’s decision was politicized, is considered the leader of modern Peronism in Argentina and a dominant force behind current president Fernández’s victory in 2019. She confirmed in May 2023 that she would not seek the presidency in October’s election, despite speculation that she would run.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Harassment and intimidation: Physical violence in reprisal for digital activities is rare in Argentina, though journalists and activists, including those who work online, have been subject to intimidation, harassment, and smear campaigns on social media. Online gender-based harassment poses a prominent threat to women offline. After the attempted assassination of Vice President Fernández de Kirchner in September 2022, the alleged perpetrator was reportedly linked to Rouzed, an online forum that has been known to host hate speech and extremist content. This climate of online hostility, particularly against women, is likely to continue in advance of the October election, and in isolated instances could create a risk of offline harms.
    • Information manipulation: Manipulated content has appeared online during previous elections in Argentina, and seemingly organized digital behavior has been connected to political campaigns. Ahead of the 2019 general election, reputation-management agencies reportedly developed tailored social media campaigns for presidential candidates that used trolls and bots to promote negative narratives about opponents. In the past online disinformation tactics in Argentina have often lacked sophistication, such as the spread of crudely manipulated images, or have been quickly disproven, such as claims that former president Macri misspelled “November” in personal notes. While these efforts have had a limited effect on the online information landscape in Argentina, it is possible that more effective information manipulation strategies could emerge before October’s vote.
    • Technical attacks: Government entities in Argentina remain particularly vulnerable to ransomware attacks, and digital media outlets have suffered cyberattacks in recent years, creating the potential for digital interference ahead of the October election. Before the previous general election, in October 2019, fact-checking organization Chequeado disclosed that it experienced an alleged denial-of-service (DoS) attack during a presidential debate, forcing the platform to temporarily restrict access to its website for users outside Argentina. More recently, in May 2023, reports emerged that the data of 11 million Argentine citizens had been leaked online, potentially from a previous electoral register. In an electoral context, cyberattacks could undermine Argentines’ ability to access trusted information about the election—either from government or media sources—and create additional vulnerabilities for personal data protections.

    Argentina has a score of 80 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a robust electoral system that is stable and generally regarded as free and fair, but where severe economic troubles, corruption, and political polarization have continued to pose challenges for the country’s democracy. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 85 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 71 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Argentina country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Argentina

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    • Global Freedom Score

      85 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      73 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 22, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      87.20%
    • Population

      46.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Bangladesh

    header1 Country Overview

    In January 2024, Bangladesh will hold a parliamentary election for 300 seats in its national legislative body, the Jatiya Sangsad (JS). These elections occur every five years and are administered by the Bangladesh Election Commission (EC). The political party that secures a majority of seats in the JS gains the right to appoint the prime minister. The 50 remaining seats in the legislature, which are reserved for women, are assigned proportionally based on parties’ overall performance in the polls. The incumbent Awami League (AL) is led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who has held power since 2009 and is seeking to be reelected for a fourth time. The AL has consolidated power through sustained harassment of the opposition, and the main opposition faction, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), is boycotting the election and demanding that a caretaker government oversee the voting process, citing the EC’s lack of independence. Several members of the banned Jamaat-e-Islami party, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist political faction, are expected to run in the election as independents, along with other members of smaller parties. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Bangladesh’s last election in 2018 was characterized by harassment, violence, and arrests throughout the election cycle, notably of the opposition and government critics, making it difficult for opposition candidates to campaign freely and hold political rallies. The BNP claimed that 6,000 of its supporters and 10 of its candidates were arrested ahead of the election. One of those arrested was Khaleda Zia, the BNP’s leader, who was convicted and jailed on corruption charges and later banned from participating as an electoral candidate, which significantly harmed the party’s competitiveness on voting day. The BNP also accused AL supporters and law enforcement agents of ballot stuffing and polling station intimidation. Moreover, the government’s failure to issue visas and credentials to most international and domestic election monitoring missions effectively prevented independent observation. 



    Political violence has continued in the lead-up to the 2024 elections. At recent BNP rallies, at which participants demanded Prime Minister Hasina’s resignation and that the election be held under a caretaker government, police arrested and injured thousands of attendees. The possibility of another election cycle marred by harassment and violence has concerned several democratic countries and bodies, including the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU), and United Nations, who have called upon the government to conduct the upcoming vote with integrity. The United States also announced a new policy to restrict visas “for any Bangladeshi individual believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh” in hopes of promoting a free and fair election.

     

    While polls show that most Bangladeshis approve of the prime minister, the opposition’s approval ratings have risen as voters have become increasingly frustrated by the country’s economic crisis, inflation rate, and endemic corruption.  The election’s outcome could have far-reaching impacts on Bangladesh’s domestic politics: if the upcoming vote is not conducted in a free and fair manner, Bangladesh could endure another five years of polarization and political violence. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Social media and website blocks: Social media platforms, websites, and online news outlets that are critical of the government or supported by opposition parties are often blocked by the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC), especially during politically tense periods. In December 2018, the BTRC blocked 58 news sites for publishing “fake news” ahead of the last election. More recently, in January 2023, the BTRC canceled 191 news website domains for allegedly publishing “misleading antistate content.” Similarly, in June 2023, Bangladeshi authorities closed down the offices of two privately owned social media–based platforms, CplusTV and C Vision, and seized their broadcasting equipment, stifling their coverage of political and human rights ahead of the upcoming election.  Authorities have also restricted access to other social media platforms, including Facebook and Facebook Messenger, during periods of political unrest. These restrictions, which limit access to voting information and opportunities for political discussion, are expected to increase, as the BTRC aims to enact several new expansive censorship laws before election day, including the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission Regulation for Digital Social Media and OTT Platforms, 2021. 
    • Internet shutdowns: Partial restrictions of internet and communication services during protests, elections, and tense political moments have become common in Bangladesh. Throughout the previous election period in 2018, the BTRC throttled mobile services and made both third and fourth generation (3G and 4G) service for mobile devices unavailable in the run up to and on election day. Similarly, since August 2022, there have been several reports of internet throttling as the BNP and its affiliates launched nationwide protests in response to inflation and corruption. In October and November 2022, the BTRC reportedly ordered mobile service providers to shut down 3G and 4G service during major opposition rallies. Should such restrictions continue, online and in-person political discussions and rallies will be curtailed, and journalists, civil society members, and election observers’ ability to report on the election will be hindered. 
    • Harassment and intimidation: Journalists, activists, and opposition politicians who speak out against the government are subject to harassment and intimidation both online and offline. In the first three months of 2023, 56 journalists were reportedly targeted, harassed, and threatened by the AL and its supporters for their online reporting that criticized the government. Ahead of the upcoming elections, several journalists have been assaulted while reporting, including at political rallies.  As a result, a fear of assault is contributing to the country’s growing self-censorship, and the suppression of critical voices is limiting access to independent and diverse information ahead of election day.   
    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activity: Members of opposition parties, the media, and civil society who criticize the government online are regularly arrested and imprisoned under the Digital Security Act (DSA). Between January 2020 and February 2022, at least 2,244 individuals were reportedly accused of violating the DSA, with the majority identifying as politicians, followed by journalists. A 2021 survey of 668 DSA cases found that a majority were filed by AL activists against critics of the party’s leaders. Similarly, in May 2023 alone, 27 the of 28 individuals arrested under the DSA were affiliated with the BNP. Since the judicial process moves slowly in DSA cases, those arrested under the act often undergo long pretrial detention periods. These legal repercussions also contribute to the country’s growing self-censorship and could limit transparency around the election.



    Bangladesh has a score of 41 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a restrictive online and offline environment for opposition groups, civil society organizations, and journalists; a history of content removal that is critical of the government; and network interference and restricted connectivity during political events. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 40 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 43 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Bangladesh country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net. 

     

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Bangladesh

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    • Global Freedom Score

      40 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      41 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      January 7, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      38.90%
    • Population

      171.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Belarus

    header1 Country Overview

    On February 25, Belarus will hold a legislative election for the bicameral National Assembly, the first national elections since the rigged 2020 presidential vote, which spurred a wave of mass protests and a crackdown on civil society and independent media. In the most recent parliamentary elections in 2019, virtually all the seats in both the Council of the Republic and the House of Representatives went to loyalists to Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has held the presidency since 1994, with “independent” candidates unaffiliated with any political party winning most of the seats. In 2023, the independents, who are closely aligned with Lukashenka, formed the Belaya Rus party, which now holds a supermajority in both chambers. Since Lukashenka’s brutal response to protests over his reelection to a sixth term in 2020, the major democratic opposition, led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, has operated in exile and does not consider the elections legitimate. Supporters of the opposition remaining in the country have faced severe repression. The judiciary and other institutions lack independence and provide no check on Lukashenka’s power.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The parliamentary elections are expected to be neither free nor fair. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the 2019 parliamentary contest featured an “overly restrictive” registration process, severe limits on freedom of assembly and expression, and an election administration process partial to the incumbent government. These conditions have only worsened in the interim. Following the 2020 protests, Lukashenka further consolidated his control over the country, eliminating critical media outlets and the remaining opposition. A 2022 constitutional referendum, which featured widespread electoral fraud, once again expanded the president’s powers. Then, in 2023, Lukashenka introduced stricter rules for operating a political party and banned an array of remaining parties, including the Belarusian Popular Front Party, the Green Party, Republican Party, and Social Democratic Party of People’s Accord, effectively reducing the number of registered parties to four, all fully controlled by and loyal to the Lukashenka regime. The electoral process in 2024 will be even more tightly controlled; recent amendments to the electoral code banned the practice of photographing a completed ballot and removed the turnout threshold after opposition calls for a boycott. 

    Lukashenka’s regime has also supported the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine since February 2022, when the Russian military launched a portion of the full-scale invasion from Belarus. Although the Belarusian government did not deploy troops in Ukraine, the administration has ramped up defense spending and has reportedly been complicit in the kidnapping and “reeducation” of Ukrainian children living in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine. The authorities have made “armed pacifism” a key tenet of their messaging ahead of the parliamentary elections and the ensuing presidential vote in 2025. The Belarusian government United States- and European Union-led sanctions continue to negatively impact the Belarusian economy, which already suffered from the departure of much of its tech sector following the 2020 protests. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Website blocking and content removal: Lukashenka’s government has blocked websites of most independent media outlets, civil society organizations, and Ukrainian news sites, as well as links to Telegram channels and crowdfunding platforms. As of June 2023, the Belarusian Internet Observatory reported that upwards of 9,000 websites were blocked. When media websites have begun operating again in exile, authorities have also blocked their “mirror sites.” For instance, the state blocked the new website of Brestskaya Gazeta, a media outlet that had its original website blocked prior to launching a new website abroad. The government also invokes a wide range of “anti-extremism” legislation to mandate the removal of content, including news articles and comments on websites, and persecute those who share it. The Lukashenka regime is likely to employ these tactics against any criticism of the electoral process or results. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Individuals who have criticized Lukashenka and his government’s policies routinely face lengthy prison sentences, often under “extremism” or “terrorism” charges. The government has sought to make an example out of those who participated in the protests against Lukashenka in 2020. In June 2023, a Belarusian court sentenced activist Yana Pinchuk to 12 years in prison for her role in managing the critical Telegram channel Vitsebsk97%. Several other bloggers, Telegram channel administrators, and those who helped campaign against Lukashenka in the 2020 elections have faced similar sentences. The government could detain and prosecute individuals who question the integrity of the parliamentary elections in 2024. 
    • Harassment and intimidation: Authorities have conducted raids and launched smear campaigns against activists, journalists, civil society representatives, and ordinary citizens who have criticized the government online. Additionally, authorities torture and publicly humiliate those who they have imprisoned on trumped-up charges. Security agencies have made a practice of releasing forced confession videos, where they coerce individuals who have been arrested to “admit” to their crimes and reveal personal information, including intimate images. Publicly government-aligned social media channels, like Zheltye Slivy (Yellow Plums), harass and intimidate critics. The government will continue to retaliate against perceived opponents ahead of the election.
    • Internet shutdowns: The government initiated a three-day nationwide internet shutdown during the mass protests that followed the 2020 presidential vote. In the following months, the government launched localized internet shutdowns to hamper organizing as people took part in weekly Sunday protests, which it had previously done in 2019 and earlier in 2020 at rallies ahead of the election. The government could use the upcoming election as a pretext to restrict internet connectivity, though its use of widespread website blocking since early 2021 and the evisceration of the political opposition may make a full-scale internet shut unlikely. 

    Belarus has a score of 13 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects widespread website blocking, severe intimidation and harassment, and the continued arrest of those who criticize the regime online. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 8 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 25 out of 100; and as a Consolidated Authoritarian Regime in Nations in Transit 2023, with a score of 2 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Belarus country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Belarus

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    • Global Freedom Score

      8 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      25 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      February 25, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      86.90%
    • Population

      9.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Brazil

    header1 Country Overview

    Brazil’s four-year election cycle calls for voters to take to the polls on October 2 to choose a president, vice president, and legislative representatives—including one-third of the country’s 81-member Senate and all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies. The presidential contest is the most consequential in recent history for the country’s democratic trajectory. Incumbent Jair Bolsonaro of the far-right Social Liberal Party faces a strong challenge from popular former president Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva of the leftist Workers’ Party. Lula, as he is commonly known, returned to the political fray after serving three years of a 12-year prison sentence for his involvement in the “Operation Car Wash” corruption scandal. He maintains that the corruption investigation was politicized, and the UN Human Rights Committee recently concluded that the judge overseeing the case had not been impartial and violated Lula’s rights. Should no candidate secure 50 percent of the votes in the first round, the presidential election will head to a runoff on October 30.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Bolsonaro—who has used antidemocratic rhetoric, tripled the number of military personnel in civilian posts, and spread misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic—regularly warns that he might not accept unfavorable election results. He and his allies have cast doubt on the security of electronic voting machines and made allegations of an impending “rigged” election a centerpiece of his campaign. Bolsonaro loyalists have signaled support for these unfounded fraud claims, including by raising concerns about election vulnerabilities, calling for the use of paper ballots, and proposing a parallel, military-led audit of the vote. Some analysts have indicated that in the event of a close or drawn-out contest, Bolsonaro might refuse to concede and could even resort to extralegal attacks on election officials and political opponents. Specifically, there are fears that he will use false claims about electoral fraud to incite his followers to violently disrupt the democratic transfer of power.

    Brazil is a democracy that holds competitive elections, and the political arena, though polarized, is characterized by vibrant public debate. However, independent journalists and civil society activists risk harassment and violent attack, and the government has struggled to address high rates of violent crime as well as disproportionate violence and economic exclusion affecting certain segments of the population—including Black, Indigenous, and LGBT+ Brazilians. Corruption is endemic in government and politics, contributing to widespread disillusionment with traditional political parties.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to monitor ahead of the election period: 

    • Information manipulation and disinformation: Candidates, parties, and their supporters—most often those aligned with Bolsonaro—manipulate online content in service of false and misleading narratives. While the messaging platform WhatsApp was a major vector of election disinformation in 2018, Telegram has emerged as a new hub for Bolsonaro’s camp. Supporters are often directed to prominent Telegram channels via hyperlinks posted to other social media platforms by high-profile Bolsonaro associates. Disinformation narratives in Brazil frequently intersect with online harassment of marginalized communities, such as LGBT+ people, women, and Afro-Brazilians. Given his sagging poll numbers, some experts expect Bolsonaro to double down on false narratives that include attacks against his perceived opponents that invoke these protected characteristics. However, observers also expect disinformation in this election to focus on the technical mechanics of voting. Bolsonaro has openly asserted that Brazil’s electronic voting system is unreliable and seeded the idea that fraud is inevitable in October. The system has been the object of previous disinformation campaigns, with federal police determining that Bolsonaro had a “direct and relevant” role in spreading disinformation about electoral processes in 2018. This year, both Bolsonaro and the military have called for parallel recounts and the use of printed ballots, an option that is not currently available, as Brazil’s direct recording electronic voting machines do not leave a paper trail. However, research has shown that the adoption of the electronic voting system in 1996, overseen by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), dramatically reduced election fraud. In order to protect Brazilian voters and the integrity of October’s elections, social media companies, media outlets, and Brazilian federal institutions must quickly distinguish between valid complaints of electoral fraud and baseless allegations designed to disrupt the democratic process.
    • Online blocking and content removal: In past elections, politicians have attempted to use legal mechanisms to compel social media and messaging platforms to remove content. The Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism (Abraji) recorded at least 500 such attempts during the 2018 election campaigns and warned against the trend of politicized content removals. Bolsonaro was among the most active complainants during the 2018 elections, according to Abraji. More broadly, the proliferation of disinformation has meant that platforms’ content moderation practices have been subjected to increased scrutiny. In March 2022, Telegram was banned for two days after it failed to comply with court orders demanding the removal of content and cooperation with Brazilian authorities. The ban was linked to a larger Supreme Court investigation targeting disinformation in the lead up to the October elections. In response to the restriction, Telegram complied with requests to remove content, including messages from Bolsonaro and an account affiliated with a prominent supporter, and appointed its first in-country legal representative. Telegram also indicated that it would establish a communication channel between itself and the court to receive reports on election-related disinformation. The court has signed similar cooperation agreements with Twitter, TikTok, Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Instagram, YouTube, and Kwai.
    • Harassment: Journalists, bloggers, politicians, activists, members of marginalized communities, and ordinary users have reported harassment on social media platforms in response to their identities, occupations, and online activities—including sharing views that are critical of Bolsonaro and the government. Some of these attacks are launched from inside the administration, at times by Bolsonaro himself. For example, in February 2020, the journalist and disinformation researcher Patrícia Campos Mello was subjected to misogynistic online attacks by users including the president’s son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, who serves as a member of the Chamber of Deputies. Online harassment could lead to self-censorship on topics related to the elections and act as a barrier to political participation by potential candidates and voters alike. Bolsonaro’s tenure as president has also featured the revival of old fear-mongering narratives about the threat of a communist takeover and the crucial role of the military in preventing such an event. The recent murder of a member of the Workers’ Party, coupled with physical attacks on Lula campaign events by Bolsonaro supporters, suggest that political tensions could erupt into violence with a sufficient catalyst. Online accusations of communist affiliation are part of a harmful trend that exacerbates political polarization and recalls the era of anticommunist violence associated with Brazil’s military dictatorship, which endured for two decades until the restoration of democracy in the 1980s. 

    Brazil has a score of 66 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a track record of elections that are generally regarded as free and fair, coupled with an online environment marred by disinformation, hyperpartisanship, harassment, and intimidation. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 73 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 64 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Brazil country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

     

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Brazil

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    • Global Freedom Score

      72 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      64 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      October 2, 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      74.09%
    • Population

      212.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Bulgaria

    header1 Country Overview

    Bulgaria will hold parliamentary elections in April against a backdrop of democratic deterioration and antigovernment protests. The vote is seen as a test of the ruling coalition, which is composed of the center-right Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party and its junior partner, the nationalist United Patriots alliance. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the main opposition, holds the second-most seats in parliament, followed by the centrist Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS).

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Anticorruption protests began in the summer of 2020 and continued into the winter, with demands ranging from judicial reform to snap elections and the resignation of the government, including Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and chief prosecutor Ivan Geshev. In October, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Bulgaria’s “significant deterioration in respect for the principles of rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, including the independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, the fight against corruption and freedom of the media.” Legal changes in 2019 allowed unlimited private financing for political parties, opening the door for increased oligarchic influence and vote buying. In September 2020, the electoral code was amended to allow polling places to use a combination of electronic and paper ballots, instead of switching to electronic voting as planned. The use of mixed voting mechanisms could compound a lack of trust among voters.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: Multiple factors may negatively impact the online information environment ahead of the elections. Concentrated media ownership, which extends to online outlets, allows the government and oligarchs to exert extensive influence over reporting. Political parties have been linked to social media influence operations in the past, leading several parties to sign an agreement in 2015 against the use of these campaigning tactics. Nonetheless, recent research has documented separate domestic and Russia-based influence operations to bolster attitudes on Russia or spread divisive and misleading content about Bulgarian politics. These combined media factors may disrupt voters’ ability to engage with reliable information ahead of the election. 
    • Cyberattacks: Government agencies have been targeted by cyberattacks in recent years, including a 2019 breach of the National Revenue Agency, and DDoS attacks on the Central Election Commission (CEC) in 2015 and 2013. Following these attacks, the CEC identified DDoS attacks as a main technical risk during elections, along with personal data leaks and other compromising cyberattacks. In January 2021, a platform for a volunteer ballot monitoring initiative was hacked, and the personal data of thousands of Bulgarians was uploaded to the initiative’s online recruitment platform. 

     

    Bulgaria has a score of 76 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of credible elections, despite concerns about state capture and declining media freedom. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 80 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and as a semi-consolidated democracy in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 59 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Bulgaria country reports in Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Bulgaria

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    • Global Freedom Score

      78 100 free
    • Date of Election

      April 4, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      66.03%
    • Population

      6.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Burkina Faso

    header1 Country Overview

    Burkinabè will vote in November in the second presidential and legislative elections since Blaise Campaoré’s 27-year regime was overthrown in 2014. Over 20 candidates filed for the first round of the 2020 presidential contest, including numerous prominent figures such as incumbent president Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, whose People’s Movement for Progress (MPP) party holds a plurality in parliament; Zephirin Diabré of the opposition Union for Progress and Change (UPC) party; and former prime minister Yacouba Isaac Zida, who now lives in Canada and could face charges for desertion should he return to Burkina Faso.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The election takes place amid a deterioration in security that, as of August 2020, has forced over a million Burkinabè to flee their homes. Insecurity —driven in large part by militant groups operating in the north and east of the country—is a major challenge to the electoral environment, making it unsafe to campaign and limiting access to polls in some areas. The government has responded to the security situation by criminalizing speech that “demoralizes” the security forces. A new law allows the Constitutional Court to certify election results based on incomplete returns in cases of “force majeure or exceptional circumstances,” potentially disenfranchising thousands of people residing in northern rural areas where voting is likely to be disrupted due to violence. These regions are also home to large populations of ethnic and religious groups that have been historically underrepresented in politics and government.

    Burkina Faso has a score of 65 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerable in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Burkina Faso’s score reflects generally credible and competitive recent elections and a relatively robust environment for media and civil society, despite significant security challenges that threaten the democratic gains made in recent years. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 56 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about this annual Freedom House assessment, please visit the Burkina Faso country report for Freedom in the World.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Individuals are sometimes arrested for their online activity, including in relation to a 2019 revision of the penal code that criminalized the dissemination of information related to terrorist attacks and speech that “demoralizes the defense and security forces.” Given the close ties between security and elections issues, the use of this law could hinder election-related media coverage and online discussion.
    • Blocking websites: The recently amended penal code permits the blocking of websites or email addresses that disseminate alleged false information. The provision is subject to judicial oversight, but any legal avenue for blocking is cause for concern and the Burkinabè judiciary sometimes suffers from political interference.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Burkina Faso

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    • Global Freedom Score

      27 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      November 22, 2020
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      17.50%
    • Population

      20.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Cambodia

    header1 Country Overview

    On July 23, 2023, voters in Cambodia will head to the polls for the country’s general election, which is held every five years. Cambodia is a de facto one-party state: the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which has ruled the country since the fall of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, currently holds all 125 national assembly seats, and party leader Hun Sen has served as prime minister since 1985. Though candidates from several opposition parties are contesting the July election, the ruling party’s steady quashing of the political opposition has meant that these groups have struggled to gain traction. International election monitors and democracy-focused civil society organizations do not expect this election to be free and fair.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Cambodia’s last general election was held in 2018 in a severely repressive environment. In the run-up to the polls in 2017, Cambodia’s Supreme Court issued a ruling dissolving the then main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP). The ruling also imposed a five-year political ban on 118 CNRP members, many of whom were imprisoned and some of whom have since fled the country. In 2018, the National Election Commission (NEC)—on which the CPP controls all nine seats—sought to aid the ruling party by threatening to prosecute figures who urged an election boycott. The NEC also informed voters that criticism of the CPP was prohibited. The CPP ultimately won the 2018 election in a landslide victory.  

    Since 2018, the CPP has continued to attack opposition politicians. Ahead of local elections in June 2022, several members of the Candlelight Party (CP), Cambodia’s largest and most prominent opposition party, were removed as candidates from the NEC list and threatened with criminal charges. Similar harassment and intimidation of the opposition has persisted in 2023 ahead of the July general election. In January, CP vice president Thach Setha was arrested for allegedly falsifying bank checks; the CP has condemned his arrest as politically motivated. The same month, Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to sue the CP after its leaders accused the CPP of political persecution.  

    Hun Sen has also openly promoted a dynastic succession plan for the Cambodian government. In December 2021, the CPP endorsed the prime minister’s son, Hun Manet, as “future prime minister.” While Hun Sen has stated that this transfer of power would be enacted through an election—possibly in 2028—Cambodia’s downward democratic trajectory, characterized by the ruling party’s tight political control, systematic attacks on the media, and the country’s shrinking civic space, signals that another carefully controlled election environment may be replicated to ensure such a succession

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:  

    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activity: Prime Minister Hun Sen and the CPP have increasingly penalized critical online speech in Cambodia. Throughout 2021 and 2022, dozens of activists and political leaders were prosecuted for their online activities, with many receiving lengthy prison sentences for criticizing the government on social media. In February 2022, CNRP activist Voeurn Veasna was sentenced to a year in prison for making Facebook posts criticizing the government’s COVID-19 response and stating that Prime Minister Hun Sen sought to appoint his son as his successor. Journalists have also faced criminal charges and imprisonment for their online work, especially as it relates to government corruption. In September 2021, a Cambodian journalist was arrested and sentenced to one year in prison after reporting on a land dispute allegedly involving high-ranking government officials. In May 2022, a producer for Facebook-based TCN TV was arrested and charged with defamation and incitement to discriminate for making corruption allegations against government officials on a Facebook livestream. By criminally charging and imprisoning opposition figures, activists, and journalists, the CPP encourages self-censorship and thus limits voters’ ability to access diverse and reliable information. This trend could worsen in the coming months, as lawmakers have entered the final stages of drafting a cybercrime law that would impose harsh criminal penalties on speech that the government deems adverse. 
    • Website blocks: News and other websites have been periodically blocked in Cambodia, particularly those that disseminate information that could be perceived as a threat to the government. In July 2018, the government ordered the temporary blocking of 17 websites, including the Phnom Penh Post, Voice of America (VOA), and Voice of Democracy (VOD), for 48 hours before that year’s general election. Authorities justified the decision by invoking an electoral law that prohibits campaigning in the 24-hour period before the polls open. However, news outlets perceived as less critical of the government were not blocked. Internet service providers also reportedly blocked VOD’s website after the government revoked its license in February 2023. Blocking websites limits people’s ability to access information needed to inform their voting choices and stay up-to-date on the election process.  
    • Content removal: Online content is susceptible to removal at the government’s behest, and the government regularly revokes the licenses of online media outlets in apparent retaliation for their content. In February 2023, the government revoked the operating license of VOD’s parent organization, the Cambodian Center for Independent Media (CCIM), effectively shutting down VOD—one of the country’s last independent news outlets—and blocking its website over its reporting on Hun Manet’s role in the government. Further content restrictions are expected ahead of election day in July, limiting people’s access to both information about the election and campaigning from sources other than state media.  
    • Information operations: The sharing of false and misleading information online has been a growing concern in Cambodia in recent years. Government agencies, politicians, and political parties have all reportedly used coordinated cybertroops to manipulate information on social media. The government has also conducted online disinformation campaigns against the CNRP. In 2019, the online outlet Coda Story reported that opposition supporters were forced to make videos “confessing” that they helped former CNRP leader Sam Rainsy return from self-imposed exile. At least one such video was shared by a progovernment news outlet. There are concerns that false and misleading information—especially misinformation appearing to discredit the CP—may permeate the online environment ahead of this year’s election.

     Cambodia has a score of 29 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a tightly restricted political and media landscape where free expression and assembly are severely suppressed on and offline, and independent media and civil society are often targeted for their critiques of those in power. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 24 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 43 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Cambodia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.  

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Cambodia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      23 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      44 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      July 23, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      65.70%
    • Population

      15.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Chad

    header1 Country Overview

    President Idriss Déby Itno is running for a sixth term in office in a tightly controlled political environment. His Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) and allied parties control the National Assembly; members of the body have not faced an election since 2011 due to repeated postponements. Though opposition parties are legally permitted, their leaders face legal and physical harassment for their political organizing. Over a dozen candidates will contest the election, including opposition leader Saleh Kebzabo and Theophile Bebzoune Bongoro, who has the backing of Alliance Victoire, a new coalition comprising 15 opposition parties.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Constitutional reforms passed in December included the creation of a vice president position appointed directly by the president, as well as formation of a second legislative chamber elected by provincial and municipal councilors. The opposition was largely excluded from the reform process, and the changes are widely viewed as a further entrenchment of power by the Déby and his allies. In February 2021, authorities placed a ban on public demonstrations and arrested numerous activists and opposition members who defied the measure in the following days. The government tightly controls the media environment, and members of the media self-censor to avoid reprisals. Access to information is further limited by low internet penetration and high illiteracy rates. Despite these obstacles, the internet remains an important avenue for access to information, making it a target for government interference.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Blocking websites and social media: The Chadian government has a history of restricting access to online content surrounding politically consequential events. Beginning on July 22, 2020, authorities blocked WhatsApp for at least two months in an apparent attempt to prevent the circulation of images and videos of extrajudicial violence between a member of the Chadian military and civilians at an N’Djamena market. A 15-month social media blackout began in March 2018, affecting WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other platforms. While authorities justified the blocking on security concerns, its implementation coincided with tensions surrounding constitutional reforms that allow Déby to serve additional terms as president. The 2016 presidential election also saw largescale blocking of social media, messaging apps, and several websites.
    • Internet shutdowns: The 2021 presidential election brings an increased risk of connectivity restrictions. The internet was inaccessible for eight months following the 2016 presidential elections and has been disrupted several times since then. More recently, the internet was throttled or inaccessible in many parts of the country from July 22 through August 18, 2020, coinciding with the blocking of WhatsApp. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Individuals are often punished for critical online commentary about the government. In January, a journalist was fined and sentenced to prison on defamation charges after criticizing a local judicial system in a Facebook post. In addition to defamation, Chadian laws criminalize the publishing of “outrages” against government institutions or their members; disseminating information in violation of national security interests; and praising or provoking terrorist acts, with especially harsh punishment reserved for internet-related offenses. The vague nature of these laws makes them particularly vulnerable to abuse, including politicized application to critics, members of the media, and opposition figures. For example, in February the head of the Chadian Organization for Human Rights received a three-year prison sentence and a fine for “violation of the constitutional order” in relation to a Facebook post about Déby’s allegedly ill health.

    Chad has a score of 30 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a restricted digital sphere, an uncompetitive electoral environment, and the regular violation of a range of human rights. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 17 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Chad country report in Freedom in the World.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Chad’s overall score did not change in the 2021 edition of Freedom in the World, but legislative elections were delayed for the fifth time, the government adopted new constitutional reforms, and the country continued to face multiple insurgencies. Read the Chad report.

    On Chad

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    • Global Freedom Score

      15 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      April 11, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      10.25%
    • Population

      16.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Chile

    header1 Country Overview

    Chile has a score of 91 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects democratic stability and competitive elections, though Indigenous Mapuche people are underrepresented politically and occasional corruption scandals arise. Chile’s broad respect for civil liberties is undercut by abuses from national police and discrimination against Indigenous and LGBT+ people. Despite some laws that assign harsh penalties for libel and slander that could be applied to online activities, internet users can generally access and share online content without legal or extralegal consequence. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 93 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about this annual Freedom House assessment, please visit the Chile country report in Freedom in the World.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country report listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Chile

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    • Global Freedom Score

      94 100 free
    • Date of Election

      November 21, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      82.21%
    • Population

      19.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Colombia

    header1 Country Overview

    Roughly a year after mass protests—sparked by an unpopular tax reform but ultimately encompassing discontent about economic despair, inequality, police brutality, and a rise in armed violence—swept the nation, Colombians will take to the polls to elect their new president. The first round of the vote to replace President Iván Duque, who is constitutionally limited to one term, will fall on May 29; should no candidate win a majority of votes, a runoff between the two candidates with the highest number of votes will be held on June 19. Voters’ dissatisfaction with the right-wing president, whose public approval rating stood at only 20 percent in February 2022, and his party may prompt a broader political shift away from historically conservative leadership. Interparty consultations held on March 13 seemingly signaled public support for such a change: the consultations, which function as primaries to narrow the candidate pool, yielded an important win for leftist Senator Gustavo Petro, who had previously lost to President Duque in the 2018 presidential runoff. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Colombia is among the longest-standing democracies in Latin America, but one with a history of widespread violence and serious human rights abuses. Public institutions have demonstrated the capacity to check executive power, and the country’s main left-wing guerrilla group signed a peace accord in 2016. Nonetheless, Colombia faces enormous challenges in consolidating peace and guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties outside of major urban areas.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Harassment and violence: Online journalists, and digital media personnel more broadly, face attacks and harassment by state and non-state actors in connection with their reporting. Security forces deployed violent force against digital media personnel covering 2021 protests, for instance, and journalists sometimes receive death threats for reporting on corruption. Paired with Colombia’s history of electoral violence, the dangerous climate for online journalists may encourage self-censorship around political issues, limiting the electorate’s access to objective reporting and hindering the public’s ability to make informed decisions surrounding the vote.
    • Cyberattacks: Online outlets, journalists, and government institutions have occasionally fallen victim to cyberattacks in recent years. In March 2020, a cyberattack rendered online news outlet La Oreja Roja inaccessible shortly after it published an article discussing deceased drug trafficker José Guillermo “Neñe” Hernández’s suspected involvement in a vote-buying campaign during the 2018 presidential election. Earlier, in the lead-up to 2018 parliamentary elections, more than 50,000 cyberattacks were recorded against the web platform of the country’s national voter registry. Cyberattacks targeting outlets and journalists could limit access to information about voting or independent reporting on candidates, while breaches of elections infrastructure may compromise actual or perceived electoral integrity and sensitive voter data. 

    Colombia has a score of 66 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a democracy bolstered by well-administered and competitive elections, but encumbered by rule of law deficits, restrictions to assembly, and pressures on media. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 65 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 65 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Colombia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Colombia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      70 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      65 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      May 29, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      65.71%
    • Population

      49.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Costa Rica

    header1 Country Overview

    Costa Rican voters, who enjoy a competitive and credible electoral environment, will head to the polls in February to elect their president, two vice presidents, and all 57 Legislative Assembly deputies. The upcoming vote will feature a diverse array of presidential candidates along a wide political spectrum. Thirty parties have registered nationally as of September 2021 and more are registered at the provincial and municipal levels, potentially resulting in a record number of presidential candidates and a legislature composed of more parties than ever (seven parties won legislative seats in the 2018 elections). Registered parties include the historically dominant National Liberation and Social Christian Unity parties, as well as the governing Citizen Action Party and the increasingly popular evangelical National Restoration Party (PRN).

    header2 Preelection assessment

    This wealth in electoral choice is partially due to waning trust in leadership from well-established parties. Recurring corruption scandals have contributed to dissatisfaction and distrust in elected officials for over a decade, while the uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic pressures have also fostered disillusionment. Indigenous and Afro-Costa Ricans, meanwhile, are underrepresented in the political sphere, though gender parity is generally upheld. Despite these challenges, Costa Rican democracy is buttressed by a long history of stability, robust protections for freedoms of expression and association, and respect for the rule of law. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: Online media outlets are largely independent and prominent sources are considered credible. However, the 2018 electoral period featured activity by “cybertroops” who disseminated false or misleading information on social media, particularly Facebook, Twitter, and, increasingly, WhatsApp. Political actors and private individuals—notably conservative politicians linked to the PRN, the New Republic Party, and the National Integration Party—spread xenophobic, homophobic, and populist narratives while making false claims about corruption, government initiatives, immigration, and abortion. Similar efforts to manipulate information ahead of the 2022 elections could present an obstacle for voters seeking to inform themselves and their political choices with factual and objective information.

    Costa Rica has a score of 91 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects stable political and electoral systems, protections for civil liberties in law and in practice, and one of the world’s most open online environments. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 91 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 87 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Costa Rica country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Download the pre-election assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Costa Rica

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    • Global Freedom Score

      91 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      85 100 free
    • Date of Election

      February 6, 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      78.63%
    • Population

      5.1 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Côte d'Ivoire

    header1 Country Overview

    President Alassane Ouattara has backtracked on an earlier promise to step down after completing two terms. The reversal came after Ouattara’s preferred successor, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, died suddenly in July. Opponents have criticized the move as unconstitutional, whereas Outtara and his Rally of the Republicans party have argued that the adoption of a new constitution in 2016 reset his terms in office. The move has sparked political unrest: at least a dozen people have died and over one hundred were injured during clashes, while dozens have been arrested.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Recent political fractures make for a competitive and contentious election. Presidential candidate (and former president) Henri Konan Bédié, who belongs to the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire, split with Ouatarra in 2018. Outtara first won the presidency in 2010, but then-president Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede, plunging the country into a crisis that left more than 3,000 dead. In 2019, the International Criminal Court acquitted Gbagbo of crimes against humanity allegedly committed during the post-election conflict. He is now on conditional release and while the verdict is appealed by the prosecutor.

    Meanwhile, Gbagbo and Guillaume Soro, a former ally of Ouattara and rebel commander during the Ivorian Civil War, have both been barred from running in October. Gbagbo’s party, the Ivorian Popular Front, nominated former prime minister Pascal Affi N'Guessan as their candidate. In September, Bédié called for civil disobedience ahead of the vote and for Gbagbo and Soro to return to Côte d’Ivoire. Civil disobedience and protests may result in violence, given security forces’ frequent use of force against protesters and the especially tense political environment.

    Côte d’Ivoire has a score of 54 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on selection of key election-related indicators. Côte d’Ivoire’s score reflects relatively weak rule of law and strained political and electoral conditions. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 51 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about Freedom House’s annual assessment, please visit the Côte d’Ivoire country report in Freedom in the World.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Hate speech and violence: The heightened political tensions create a high-risk environment for hate speech and incitement to violence. Given the ongoing intercommunal and ethnic conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the history of electoral violence in 2010-11, the potential for election-related incitement along ethnic lines should be closely watched.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: The June 2019 criminal code includes a provision criminalizing false news “that results or could result in disturbance to public order” or “causing offense to the president or vice-president.” The vague nature of the provision and personalized exception to free expression make this law ripe for abuse and politicized application, particularly during a tense electoral period.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Côte d'Ivoire

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    • Global Freedom Score

      49 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      October 31, 2020
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      44.89%
    • Population

      25.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Cuba

    header1 Country Overview

    Cubans will take to the polls on March 26 to vote for the country’s unicameral National Assembly, in line with the country’s five-year election cycle. Elections are tightly controlled by the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), the country’s only party, and rarely beget political change. Voters will be presented with a single candidate for each of the 474 seats: half of the candidates are put forward by civic groups allied with the PCC, including labor unions and students’ associations. The other half of candidates will be proposed by municipal assemblies, the elections of which are the only polls that offer voters a choice of more than one candidate. However, campaigning for municipal assembly seats is banned and opposition candidates routinely face pressure from the government. The final list of National Assembly candidates will ultimately be determined by the PCC-controlled National Candidature Commission. Those who receive more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast are deemed elected. The National Assembly, a rubber-stamp legislature in practice, in turn chooses the nation’s president and vice president.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Political rights are not on the ballot in Cuba: A lack of fundamental freedoms was one of many grievances that sparked nationwide antigovernment protests in July 2021, the largest in the country since the 1959 revolution. The state’s frequent repression of political dissent and tightly controlled electoral context preclude voters’ ability to alter the nation’s political landscape. However, the March election will be the first since 1976 in which neither former president Fidel Castro nor his brother, former PCC first secretary Raúl Castro Ruz, are involved.

    Cuba’s one-party communist state outlaws political pluralism, bans independent media, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The government continues to dominate the economy despite recent reforms that permit some private sector activity. The regime’s undemocratic character has not changed despite a generational transition in political leadership between 2018 and 2021 that included the introduction of a new constitution.

     

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Internet shutdowns: Restricting connectivity during times of political upheaval has become a go-to tactic for the Cuban government to quell dissent. Internet shutdowns bar residents from accessing reliable voting information, engaging in political discourse, or mobilizing during the election. Selective connectivity restrictions—those targeting the mobile and fixed-line connections of specific dissidents—have routinely enabled Cuban officials to silence individual voices. Widespread disruptions were most recently imposed by the government during July 2021 demonstrations and in the aftermath of an earlier historic protest in November 2020.
    • Website and social media blocks: Cuban authorities routinely block a host of independent news websites and occasionally block social media platforms during politically tense periods, which could inhibit residents from accessing independent commentary about the election, criticism of the government, and information about voting. In addition to restricting connectivity in response to the July 2021 protests, authorities temporarily blocked WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal; these blocks, and the long-standing ones affecting news sites, severed the protest movement from its connections to independent news outlets and Cubans based abroad, who had rallied support for the demonstrations on international social media platforms.
    • Information manipulation: The government manipulates the online information landscape to maintain the dominance of progovernment news outlets and narratives and to discredit independent sources of information. Many actors within Cuba, including government agencies, employ coordinated networks that spread disinformation, amplify progovernment content, and troll dissenting voices on social media. State efforts to manipulate the online information landscape could further prevent residents from finding independent commentary on the vote, muddy public discourse in favor of the current government, and limit voters’ access to reliable reporting or guidance about the elections. Such tactics have featured in past elections: the Cuban Democratic Directorate, a Miami-based nongovernmental organization, found that dozens of automated “bot” accounts had posted progovernment messages on Twitter during the 2018 parliamentary and provincial election period. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Online activity is subject to punishment under a variety of laws and penalization is common, usually in the form of short-term detentions, interrogations, fines, legal harassment, and travel bans. Cuba’s new penal code, approved in May 2022, added “using social networks” to organize gatherings, meetings, or protests to the list of established crimes often used to target dissidents, like “disrespect,” “public disorder,” and “sedition.” Resolution 105, enacted in August 2021 following the July protests, outlines online offenses including the dissemination of “false news” and content defaming the country’s prestige. Decree Law 370, approved in 2019, prohibits the use of foreign servers to host vaguely defined “sites” and outlaws the spread of information against “the social interest, morals, good customs, and integrity of people,” through “public data transmission networks.” Using these repressive laws, officials could arrest or prosecute journalists who report on elections online, impeding access to information. Concerns about such arrests or legal liability could also drive people to self-censor reports on and discussions about the polls more generally. Authorities have increasingly targeted independent journalists, influencers, and online activists using these laws. In March 2022, for instance, protester Yoan de la Cruz was sentenced to six years in prison for live-streaming one of the early July 2021 antigovernment protests on Facebook, though he was released on appeal two months later. 

    Cuba has a score of 14 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The Cuba score reflects a tightly restricted political space where free expression is suppressed online and offline, and independent media and civil society face legal pressure from the government limiting their ability to criticize those in power. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 12 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 20 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Cuba country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Cuba

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    • Global Freedom Score

      12 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      20 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      March 26, 2023
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      68.13%
    • Population

      11.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Ecuador

    header1 Country Overview

    February’s legislative and presidential elections are widely seen as a determining moment for the trajectory of Ecuadorian democracy. President Lenín Moreno faces a dismal approval rating and will not run for a second term. The political field is highly fractured; no less than 17 candidates are vying for the presidency and a coalition of several parties will be necessary for control of the National Assembly. Legal disputes, economic mismanagement, and policy failures around the COVID-19 pandemic have compounded to create a highly contentious climate ahead of the vote.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The previous president, Raphael Correa, remains a highly influential figure in the political scene, despite his self-exile in Belgium and a tenure marked by attacks on civil society and the media. Correa is prohibited from running for president by a 2018 referendum that reinstated term limits only four years after the pro-Correa legislature voted to remove them. In April, a court sentenced him in absentia to eight years in prison and a ban on engaging in politics for 25 years over bribery and corruption, throwing his vice presidential bid into doubt. The legislative contest is also mired in legal uncertainty. The National Electoral Council suspended the registration of four political parties in July, including Correa’s Social Commitment Movement, only for the decision to be overturned by the Election Dispute Tribunal in August.

    Ecuador has a score of 61 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects limitations on free expression online and offline, but a relatively strong environment for elections and activities of political parties. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 65 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 57 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Ecuador country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: False and misleading content is likely to proliferate ahead of the election, given a history of influence operations by the country’s current and former political leaders. Correa and his allies reportedly used messaging groups to coordinate the dissemination of false and doctored content about the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the use of paid progovernment commentators is reduced under the Moreno administration, Twitter removed a network of inauthentic accounts linked to the ruling party in 2019.
    • Content removal: Copyright law is frequently exploited for political censorship, with the government requesting several news sites be removed by their hosting companies. The government also has a history of seeking content and account removals on social media platforms. Politicized targeting of news outlets could impact voters’ access to information ahead of the election.
    • Harassment and violence: Political tensions will likely exacerbate instances of harassment against media workers and candidates representing marginalized groups ahead of the election. In February 2020, unknown assailants detonated an explosion inside the home of the founder of a political news channel on Facebook. Women candidates and Afro-Ecuadorians are disproportionately subject to harassment online.
    • Cyberattacks: Media outlets and numerous candidates were targeted with cyberattacks during the 2017 campaign period, and media outlets have been hacked in the years since. Digital security remains a potential vulnerability ahead of the 2021 election.

     

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    Incident Alert

    Presidential elections are headed to a runoff on April 11th after economist Andrés Arauz won the first round with too few votes to secure the presidency. Arauz will face either Guillermo Lasso, a conservative banker, or Yaku Pérez, an Indigenous environmental activist; the contest between Lasso and Pérez remains too close to call. Source.

    On Ecuador

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    • Global Freedom Score

      67 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      64 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      February 7, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      68.14%
    • Population

      17.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Egypt

    header1 Country Overview

    Egypt has a score of 22 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a highly restricted political and media environment where freedom of expression and assembly are severely suppressed, and digital activism or political mobilization efforts are highly restricted. Pervasive online censorship of political, social, and religious speech has significantly limited the diversity and reliability of the online ecosystem, and expressions of dissent or criticism of the government online or offline can draw criminal prosecution and imprisonment. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 18 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 28 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Egypt country reports in Freedom in the World, and Freedom on the Net

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Egypt

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    • Global Freedom Score

      18 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      28 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      December 10-12, 2023
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      72.20%
    • Population

      103.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • El Salvador

    header1 Country Overview

    The February legislative elections have major implications for President Nayib Bukele’s authority for the remainder of his term, which so far has been marked by hostility towards democratic institutions. The vote, which takes place alongside local elections, will test the viability of newer and smaller parties and coalitions. Bukele, of the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA) party, was elected in 2019, defeating the long-dominant Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) and Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) parties. His election marked the first time a third-party candidate won the presidency since the end of the civil war in 1992. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    El Salvador has a history of generally free and credible elections, and the media environment remains vibrant in the face of interference by the government and violence against journalists who report on sensitive issues, such as corruption and gang activity. In February 2020, Bukele deployed troops to the El Salvadorian parliament in a bid to coerce lawmakers to pass a funding bill that was part of his anti-crime agenda, and throughout the year his administration defied numerous court orders. Administration officials and members of law enforcement have intimidated independent journalists, prevented them from attending press conferences, and limited their access to protests and other political events. Bukele has repeatedly harassed independent media for their investigative reporting on government activities and has made unsubstantiated claims that specific reporters and outlets are under investigation for money laundering.

    El Salvador has a score of 73 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a strong track record of election credibility and political participation despite corruption, challenges to media freedom, and widespread activity of criminal groups. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 66 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the El Salvador country report in Freedom in the World.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: Domestic political actors have regularly manipulated online discourse and may do so ahead of the February election. A July 2020 report from the International Crisis Group identified coordinated domestic influence operations on Twitter, in favor of and in opposition to Bukele. Earlier in the year, the government alleged that the FMLN was running an influence campaign. During his candidacy in 2018, Bukele was linked to an effort to imitate the websites of media outlets while publishing misleading information. 
    • Harassment and violence for online activity: Journalists consistently face harassment on social media for criticizing Bukele, including frequent threats of sexual violence against women journalists. Through his Twitter account, Bukele has disparaged journalists and accused them of propagating “fake news.” Escalating political discourse ahead of election day could encourage a parallel rise in harassment. Given the history of offline intimidation and violence against reporters in El Salvador, it is possible that digital harassment for online activity could escalate into physical attacks.
    • Cyberattacks: Media outlets and civil society organizations are potential targets for cyberattacks during the electoral period. Independent outlet Revista Factum, whose journalists faced escalating harassment online and were banned from attending one of Bukele’s press conferences in September 2019, was targeted by a cyberattack in October 2019 that left their website inaccessible for a week. The Salvadoran Network of Women Human Rights Defenders reported attempts to hack their Twitter account in September 2020.

     

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    Incident Alert

    In the wake of the killing of two FMLN supporters, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) has called on the United Nations, the European Union, and the Organization of American States to deploy international election observers earlier than planned. Observers are scheduled to arrive one week before the election day, but the TSE’s February 2 statement urges advanced deployment “in order to monitor, prevent, and denounce any act of political violence.” Source.

    Incident Alert

    The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued a statement on February 4 calling on El Salvador’s government to protect 34 journalists at the investigative online news outlet El Faro. Since Bukele took office, journalists for the platform have reported receiving threats from government institutions, facing anonymous smear campaigns, and being blocked from accessing government events. Source.

    On El Salvador

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    • Global Freedom Score

      53 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      February 28, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      46.41%
    • Population

      6.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Estonia

    header1 Country Overview

    Estonia has a score of 93 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects strong democratic institutions, wide respect for political rights and civil liberties, and a robust environment for internet freedom. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 94 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 93 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Estonia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Estonia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      95 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      93 100 free
    • Date of Election

      March 5, 2023
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      90.33%
    • Population

      1.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Ethiopia

    header1 Country Overview

    The parliamentary elections planned for June are understood as a test of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s stated commitment to democratization. It is the first election since Abiy, a former military officer, was appointed to replace Hailemariam Desalegn, who led an openly authoritarian state until he resigned in 2018 amid mass protests. The previous parliamentary elections, held in 2015, took place in a tightly controlled environment that featured voter intimidation and barriers to registration. All 547 seats in the parliament’s lower house were won by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of parties dominated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and its allies. In December 2019, rising tensions with the TPLF led to the dissolution of the EPRDF. Most coalition members came together to form the Prosperity Party, which is headed by Abiy; the TPLF refused to join. The federal government revoked the TPLF’s registration in January 2021, after Abiy accused the party of initiating the conflict between the central government and the Tigrayan forces. Over 45 parties are expected to campaign in the June elections; though all 547 seats were set to be contested, voting in some constituencies may not take place because of the Tigray conflict and other threats to security. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Several crises related to Ethiopia’s ethnicity-based federal structure threaten the stability of the elections, and potentially their credibility. The elections were originally set for August 2020 but postponed by the election board due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thousands of people have been killed in the Tigray conflict since it began in November 2020, though reports of the number of casualties are contested. Human rights groups allege that all sides perpetrated war crimes. Meanwhile, the federal government has imposed a counter-insurgency zone in western Oromia and some parts of southern Oromia, and imprisoned prominent Oromo politicians. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Internet shutdowns: The Ethiopian government frequently restricts the internet to accomplish its political aims or in response to unrest. Since January 2020, authorities have imposed connectivity restrictions in the Oromia counter-insurgency zone, nationwide amid mass protests over the death of an Oromo activist and singer, and in Tigray during the conflict. Demonstrations during or after the campaigning period or an escalation of the security situation could prompt the Abiy government to turn to connectivity restrictions.  
    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activities: Abiy presided over a relative opening of online free expression in Ethiopia early in his term, but that progress is increasingly at risk. During the Tigray crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, online journalists affiliated with the TPLF were arrested and charged in relation to reports made on social media. Several laws criminalize online speech, including an overly restrictive hate speech and disinformation law passed in February 2020. Journalists and online commentators alike risk arrest for their social media activities during the electoral period, particularly those aligned with Tigrayan and Oromo political movements.   
    • Influence operations: A degraded information space may make the online environment more vulnerable to coordinated manipulation aimed to sway online discourse during the elections. Online misinformation is rife, exacerbated by the Tigray conflict. Both pro- and antigovernment internet users share false or misleading content and accuse others of spreading disinformation. The TPLF reportedly coordinates party loyalists to shape the social media environment, while previous governments were known to employ online commentators. Disinformation campaigns ahead of the election may also impede voters’ access to reliable information. 
    • Blocking of platforms and websites: The government maintains the technical capability to block social media platforms and websites, and has done so during periods of unrest. After Amhara regional officials were assassinated in June 2019, Ethiopian authorities imposed an internet shutdown and later blocked social media platforms. Protests or instability during the electoral period could prompt similar restrictions. 

    Ethiopia has a score of 30 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of elections marred by undemocratic practices and internet restrictions. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 24 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 29 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Ethiopia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Ethiopia’s overall score declined in the 2021 edition of Freedom in the World, reflecting mass arrests of high-profile politicians and increased violence between ethnic groups that has caused mass displacement. Read the Ethiopia report.

    Incident Alert

    Ethiopian authorities announced that the June 5 election would be postponed by approximately two to three weeks, citing logistical needs. Source.

    On Ethiopia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      20 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      26 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      June 5, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      17.87%
    • Population

      114.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • France

    header1 Country Overview

    The first round of the 2022 French presidential election will be held on April 10; should no candidate secure an absolute majority in one round, a second round will be held between the top two candidates on April 24. President Emmanuel Macron, a centrist who is expected to announce his reelection campaign in early 2022, won his first term in 2017 after defeating far-right opponent Marine Le Pen in a two-round contest. Macron will again face Le Pen as the nationalist hard-right movement remains potent, but they will also be joined on the ballot by far-right television commentator Éric Zemmour. Zemmour, known for his anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric and a past conviction for inciting racial hatred, has become increasingly popular even before officially announcing his candidacy in late November. Other candidates have also joined the race. Among them is Valérie Pécresse, head of the Île-de-France region and a Nicolas Sarkozy–era minister, who was nominated by the center-right Republicans as their presidential candidate in early December.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    French voters benefit from vibrant democratic processes and strong protections for civil liberties and political rights. However, successive governments have responded to deadly terrorist attacks in recent years by curtailing constitutional protections and empowering law enforcement to infringe upon personal freedoms. Anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment are rife throughout the country.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Removal of online content: In an attempt to combat election-related disinformation, Parliament passed a law in November 2018 that empowers judges to order the removal of “fake news” within three months of an election. Judges have 48 hours to decide whether appealed content qualifies as false news after receiving a referral from an elected official or everyday citizen. Critics worry that the law, which was twice rejected by the Senate before ultimately passing, could lead to politically motivated takedowns during electoral campaigns.
    • Cyberattacks: Macron’s campaign team was targeted with multiple cyberattacks ahead of the 2017 presidential election. Thousands of internal emails and documents from the Macron-led En Marche! (Forward!) movement were leaked online that May, two days before the runoff, as part of a coordinated hacking attack meant to destabilize the race. In a separate incident that April, a hacking group linked to the Russian government reportedly targeted the campaign with a phishing operation. Similar cyberattacks during the 2022 contest could disrupt the political landscape.

    France has a score of 85 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a robust democracy with a vibrant media sector and an open online environment, but that nevertheless struggles with police violence against protesters, migrants, and refugees, and antiterrorism legislation that diminishes due process. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 90 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 78 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the France country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On France

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    • Global Freedom Score

      89 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      April 2022
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      85.46%
    • Population

      64.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Georgia

    header1 Country Overview

    Georgia’s October election is expected to be highly competitive, despite recent democratic backsliding. It is the first election under a new, mixed proportional-majoritarian system, which is intended to reduce polarization and level the playing field for opposition parties. United National Movement (UNM), the former ruling party, is widely seen as the most serious challenger to the ruling Georgian Dream party.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Informal power plays a significant role in the Georgian political landscape as demonstrated by the influence of oligarchs, former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s continued leadership of Georgian Dream, and former president Mikheil Saakashvili’s control of the UNM. The impact of informal power is clearly seen in the media, which is highly partisan. The October vote is likely to feature many of the challenges reported in previous elections, including the misuse of administrative resources and various forms of vote buying and intimidation.

    Georgia has a score of 68 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Georgia’s score reflects relatively well-administered elections; politicized institutions, including the media and judiciary; and inconsistent respect for the right to protest. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 61 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Free in Freedom on the Net 2019, with an internet freedom score of 75 out of 100; and as a transitional or hybrid regime in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 38 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Georgia country reports for Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: There is substantial evidence that the government and other domestic and foreign political actors have carried out online influence campaigns, particularly during politically sensitive moments. Ruling and opposition parties were involved in online influence campaigns during the 2018 presidential election. More recently, in April 2020, Facebook removed hundreds of Facebook and Instagram accounts, groups, and pages affiliated with the Georgian Dream and UNM. Several influence operations have been tied to the Russian government and pro-Russian actors. Influence campaigns are highly likely during the 2020 election, but the potentially broad range of sources makes their impact difficult to predict.
    • Cyberattacks: The Georgian government, private websites, the media, and financial institutions have been targeted by numerous high-profile cyberattacks from domestic and foreign sources in recent years. An attack in October 2019 that affected over 2,000 government and private websites was subsequently linked to Russia’s GRU. Despite the Georgian government’s efforts to combat hacking and other cybersecurity threats, digital security remains a potential flashpoint in the pre-election period.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Georgia’s net score did not change in the new edition of Freedom on the Net, but the report documented increases in the number of cyberattacks and in domestic content manipulation. Read the Georgia report.

    On Georgia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      58 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 31, 2020
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      63.81%
    • Population

      4.0 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Georgia

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

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    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      58 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 2024
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      78.70%
    • Population

      3.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Germany

    header1 Country Overview

    Germany has a score of 89 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of well-conducted elections and of upholding rights in law and practice, though women, long-term residents, and citizens with immigrant backgrounds are underrepresented politically. Germany’s online environment remains free, despite recent regulations on freedom of expression online that have resulted in controversial content removals. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 94 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 80 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Germany country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      93 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      77 100 free
    • Date of Election

      September 26, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      89.31%
    • Population

      83.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Ghana

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

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    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      80 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      65 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      December 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      69.80%
    • Population

      34.1 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Honduras

    header1 Country Overview

    Honduras has a score of 49 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects systematic violations of rule of law, media freedom, and free association by authorities. Elections are held routinely but are marred by irregularities and outsized influence of political and economic elites. These problems negatively impact the online environment as well. Political actors, including the government, use fake and automated social media accounts in an attempt to support or detract from political narratives and candidates, and digital journalists reporting on corruption and criminal activity face retribution for their work, including deadly violence. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 44 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about this annual Freedom House assessment, please visit the Honduras country report in Freedom in the World.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country report listed above.

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    B Electoral System and Political Participation

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    • Global Freedom Score

      48 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 27, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      37.30%
    • Population

      9.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Hong Kong

    header1 Country Overview

    December’s Legislative Council (Legco) elections will be the first since prodemocracy candidates overwhelmingly won district council elections during antigovernment protests in 2019, dealing a blow to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing responded to the challenge to its rule by imposing a restrictive National Security Law (NSL) in June 2020 and major changes to the electoral system in March 2021. As a special administrative region within China, Hong Kong is led by a chief executive selected by a small committee of politically loyal elites, and a legislative body where a minority of members are chosen through direct elections. Under the new system, only 20 out of the 90 seats will be directly elected (compared with 35 of 70 previously), corporations and professional groups will elect 30 members, and the unelected Election Committee will send 40 of its members. All candidates must undergo a screening process conducted by Hong Kong national security police and a government-appointed body. These changes are intended to ensure the pro-Beijing camp consolidates control and make it likely that the opposition camp (comprised of prodemocracy and localist parties) will be eliminated during the screening process. The election was initially scheduled for September 2020 but postponed purportedly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, even though pandemic-related deaths were relatively low.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The upcoming Legco election could be a catalyst for further restrictions on internet freedom and human rights in Hong Kong, as people may protest Beijing’s increased control over the territory in the run-up and aftermath of the polls. Hong Kong’s previously vibrant media and civil society face increasing restrictions after the passage of the NSL and a ban on demonstrations ostensibly due to public health. Several civil society organizations have been disbanded or face national security investigations under the NSL, and authorities charged 47 people with “conspiracy to commit subversion” for taking part in a primary election for prodemocracy candidates in July 2020. Authorities have jailed many prodemocracy activists, former Legco members, or district councilors and others fled into exile, significantly reducing the potential pool of candidates. Credible information about candidates, the elections, and the broader political environment may not be available, and self-censorship may impact debates, opinion polling, and electoral coverage.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Cyberattacks: There have been numerous cyberattacks linked to the Chinese state, originating in China, or from unidentified actors on websites and platforms used by protesters and civil society in Hong Kong. Telegram and LIHKG.com, used by protesters to organize and communicate online, suffered massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks during the 2019 protests. The Amnesty International Hong Kong office, local universities, and Android and iOS users in Hong Kong were targeted by malware. Candidates, prodemocracy supporters, journalists, digital media sites, and civil society organizations face further cyberattacks to disrupt campaigning, information sharing about the elections, and the organization of protests. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activity: The 2019 prodemocracy protests sparked an expansion of prosecution for online activity, a pattern that is likely to carry into the electoral period. Authorities prosecuted individuals using a range of provisions, including “conspiracy to commit a seditious act” and “conspiracy to incite others to commit arson.” Use of the NSL ahead of the election is particularly concerning, as it includes charges that could potentially impose life sentences for online activities. Several prodemocracy activists have already been arrested under the NSL on charges ranging from subversion and secession to “colluding with foreign forces” for pro-independence statements or calls for international sanctions against Hong Kong officials on Facebook and Twitter. A new electoral law passed in May 2021 criminalized inciting someone to spoil or leave blank their ballot; analysts worry the law could be used to target online organizing. Candidates, their supporters, and the general public discussing the elections or civil disobedience strategies related to the polls face a high risk of arrest for online activity. In May, the government announced plans for new bills on doxing and “fake news,” which may lead to further arrests for online activity.
    • Blocking websites: In January 2021, Hong Kong authorities blocked access to a website for the first time, justifying the move under the NSL. Since then, four more websites, all with Taiwan-based IP addresses, have been blocked, though two sites became accessible after three days. Some had clear links to the protest movement, such as the site of a Taiwanese church that raised donations for Hong Kong protesters, but the others were websites of Taiwan’s ruling party, a military recruitment platform, and the transitional justice commission. Websites—including news sites—or social media platforms are at risk of being blocked for hosting content that calls for protests during the electoral period, supports particular candidates, fundraises, or criticizes the electoral process and Hong Kong and Chinese governments.
    • Content removal: In February 2021, Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the public broadcaster that has increasingly fallen under government control, removed of all its content older than one year on YouTube and Facebook, a significant erasure of news information produced for the public ahead of the election. In 2019, Apple removed an app from its app store that was used to track police movements during the protests under pressure from the government. Google removed a separate app related to the protests for violating its policy of “capitalizing on sensitive events.” Facebook has removed several popular pages run by prodemocracy and pro-police groups without explanation. The elections may trigger further removal of online media content and increased pressure on tech companies to remove content. 

    Hong Kong has a score of 48 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a controlled electoral system, limitations on political organizing and assembly, and restrictions on free expression, both online and offline. The territory is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 52 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. Please visit the Hong Kong report in Freedom in the World to learn more about this annual assessment and the China Media Bulletin for ongoing monitoring of media and internet freedom in Hong Kong.

    Note: Hong Kong is a territory as opposed to an independent country. Freedom House sometimes assess territories separately if they meet certain criteria, including boundaries that are sufficiently stable to allow year-on-year comparisons.

     

    Download the preelection assessment PDF in English香港选前评估 Simplified Chinese, or 香港選前評估 Traditional Chinese.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    In the news

    The upcoming election could spur new digital restrictions and rights violations in Hong Kong, and companies must act to help protect internet freedom. Read new Freedom House analysis in The Diplomat.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      41 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      December 19, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      90.92%
    • Population

      7.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Hungary

    header1 Country Overview

    A broad opposition coalition, whose members range from the social-liberal Democratic Coalition to the far-right-turned-conservative Jobbik, will challenge Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s ruling Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) in Hungary’s upcoming parliamentary elections. The six-party United Opposition held primaries in September and October 2021, electing Péter Márki-Zay, the conservative mayor of Hódmezővásárhely, as their candidate for the premiership. The United Opposition is the largest and broadest coalition to oppose Fidesz in a national election, and coalesced amid a years-long trend of democratic backsliding in Hungary under Orbán.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    After taking power in 2010 elections, Fidesz pushed through constitutional and legal changes that have allowed it to consolidate control over the country’s independent institutions. These include electoral redistricting procedures that have favored its candidates; media laws that politicized registration processes; and changes to the court system that allowed Fidesz to more easily place allies on the benches. The Fidesz-led government has also moved to institute policies that hamper the operations of opposition groups, journalists, universities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who criticize it or whose perspectives it finds unfavorable. Reporting in 2021 identified Hungarian journalists, lawyers, and opposition figures as among the potential targets of surveillance using NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware. The reporting, including the revelation that three journalists had Pegasus spyware installed on their devices in 2019, raised concerns about domestic surveillance by the Hungarian government, which eventually admitted to using the spyware, though it did not confirm the targets.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch for ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: The government has consolidated control over media outlets in recent years, including online outlets, increasing the likelihood that the upcoming election could be marred by online information manipulation. According to an investigation by journalists at hvg.hu, Facebook ad summaries showed 54.2 million forints' ($174,835) worth of spending during October 2021 on sponsored posts suggesting that former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány wields influence over Márki-Zay, or that questioned his conservative credentials. The report attributed the spending to Fidesz politicians and other influential progovernment figures. Additionally, the government’s national consultations, or surveys that ask for citizens’ opinions on political issues, often contain charged partisan language or mischaracterizations of opposition parties’ positions. Separately, during the 2019 municipal elections, government-affiliated news outlets spread disinformation implying the opposition had made deals with Soros and the European Commission to allow more migrants to enter the country, a conspiracy theory the government had previously referenced in its national consultations. These efforts disrupt the information landscape, can hinder voters’ access to reliable information, and impact public discourse. 
    • Cyberattacks: Cyberattacks have already been documented in the lead-up to the 2022 elections. In September 2021, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks during the opposition’s primaries temporarily shut down the voting system, though access was eventually restored and citizens were given additional time to vote. Some members of the opposition accused Fidesz of involvement, while others speculated about involvement by the Chinese Communist Party. Orbán denied involvement, and the perpetrator remains unknown. Cyberattacks have also targeted Orbán’s government. In March 2020, the state-operated website for information on the COVID-19 pandemic experienced a DDoS attack, while a January 2021 cyberattack temporarily prevented access to a number of government websites. 

    Hungary has a score of 70 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects pressure on rule of law, the opposition, and free expression. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 69 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 70 out of 100; and as a transitional or hybrid regime in Nations in Transit 2021, with a score of 45 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Hungary country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      65 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      69 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 3, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      81.69%
    • Population

      9.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Iceland

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

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    B Electoral System and Political Participation

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    • Global Freedom Score

      94 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      94 100 free
    • Date of Election

      June 1, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      99.00%
    • Population

      0.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • India

    header1 Country Overview

    The 2022 elections offer India’s opposition parties an opportunity to challenge the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its dominance of the central government—and by extension, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is expected to again seek the premiership in 2024. Voters in five battleground states—Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand—take to the polls to elect representatives to their respective state legislative assemblies in February and March 2022. State legislative assemblies across India will vote to select members of the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Parliament, throughout the spring and summer. In July 2022, an electoral college composed in part by members of the state legislative assemblies and the Rajya Sabha will vote to select a president, a largely ceremonial role now held by Ram Nath Kovind.  Four of the states with legislative elections in spring 2022 are governed by the BJP, and are expected to be fiercely contested by opposition parties, particularly in Uttar Pradesh, often considered a key indicator for national politics.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    While India is a multiparty democracy, the government led by Prime Minister Modi and the Hindu nationalist BJP has presided over discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. The constitution guarantees civil liberties including freedom of expression and freedom of religion, but harassment of journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and other government critics has increased significantly under Prime Minister Modi. Muslims, scheduled castes (Dalits), and scheduled tribes (Adivasis) remain economically and socially marginalized.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of the election period: 

    • Internet shutdowns: India is a global leader in restricting internet connectivity. The frequency, geographic distribution, and duration of such restrictions have increased in recent years. Shutdowns are most often imposed during times of perceived unrest, such as protests, or as purported precautionary measures. For instance, authorities restricted connectivity in several states during the spring 2019 general election. State officials or local police could impose internet shutdowns during polls or alongside mass mobilizations relating to the elections, limiting free expression and cutting prospective voters off from critical information and discussion.
    • Website blocks and content removals: Government actors regularly order platforms to remove online content, and sometimes block websites outright. The scope of such restrictions has increased in recent years, and stands to grow further: regulations passed in February 2021 impose new obligations for large social media companies to moderate and censor online content at the government’s demand. The limitations sometimes touch on political speech, such as the orders issued to Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to remove criticism of the government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic in April 2021. Officials could seek to impose website blocks or order tech companies to remove content during the election period, potentially suppressing commentary about the elections, information about voting, or criticism of the government.
    • Information manipulation: Political parties—particularly the BJP and, to a lesser extent, the opposition Congress party—seek to manipulate online content. The BJP hosts networks of paid and volunteer commentators who seek to shift partisan narratives on social media, which are active during elections: for instance, pro-BJP Twitter users coordinated to spread misleading information that favored the BJP during the spring 2021 elections in West Bengal. Such partisan efforts to manipulate the online information space could limit voters’ access to reliable reporting or guidance about the elections.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Journalists, activists, and ordinary social media users risk arrest and prosecution for online activities that officials deem objectionable, especially during major political events. Ahead of the spring 2019 elections, for example, Congress’s social media head was arrested for sharing a meme that called Prime Minister Modi a thief, while numerous online commentators were arrested throughout 2021 for social media posts criticizing the government’s response to the pandemic. Officials could arrest or prosecute journalists who report on elections online, impeding access to information, or could target candidates and party-linked figures, threatening the integrity of election outcomes. More generally, concerns about such restrictions could drive users to self-censor discussions about the polls.
    • Harassment: Journalists, politicians, activists, members of marginalized communities, and ordinary users who post reporting or views critical of the government often experience coordinated online abuse, frequently deploying misogynist and anti-Muslim language. Some harassment campaigns appear to be connected to BJP supporters or directly involve BJP officials. For instance, a January 2022 investigation found that BJP-linked networks used an app called Tek Fog to coordinate online abuse directed at women journalists through Twitter and Facebook posts, and by hijacking unused WhatsApp accounts. Targeted online harassment could drive internet users to avoid sharing content about the elections, further degrading online expression and access to reliable information.

    India has a score of 64 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects elections generally regarded as free and fair, a closing space for freedom of expression, rising violence and discrimination against Muslims, and an online environment marred by censorship and manipulation. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 67 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 49 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the India country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      66 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      50 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      Spring & Summer 2022
    • Type of Election

      Presidential & Assembly
    • Internet Penetration

      32.54%
    • Population

      1.40 billion
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • India

    header1 Country Overview

    India’s next general election, in which voters will select 543 of 545 members of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, is expected to be held between April 19 and June 1, 2024, before the five-year tenure of the current Lok Sabha ends in June. President Droupadi Murmu will subsequently appoint the country’s prime minister from the party or coalition that achieves a majority in the Lok Sabha. Incumbent prime minister Narendra Modi, who leads the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is favored to win a third term. Over 25 opposition parties have formed a big-tent coalition, the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), with the aim of defeating Modi and the ruling government. Although the Indian National Congress (INC), the major national opposition party, is a member of INDIA, several prominent regional parties left the alliance in January.

    This assessment was last updated on March 27, 2024.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Opinion polls conducted throughout late 2023 project that voters are likely to award the governing BJP–led coalition a majority of Lok Sabha seats. In the most recent statewide elections, held in late 2023, the BJP won three of five state legislatures. The BJP and its coalition partners now lead 17 of India’s 27 states and 8 union territories. Modi himself remains enormously popular.

    The independent Election Commission of India, which administrates the balloting, is generally considered to be free from undue political interference. However, politicized decisions relating to citizenship, such as the forthcoming implementation of the discriminatory Citizenship (Amendment) Act and a long-controversial citizenship register in Assam, may undermine access to the balloting for marginalized groups, particularly Muslims.

    India has faced serious democratic backsliding in recent years. Prime Minister Modi has presided over the imposition of discriminatory policies and a rise in persecution affecting the Muslim population. Prominent critics of the BJP face increasing legal and extralegal retaliation for their statements. Rahul Gandhi, former leader of the INC, was initially disqualified from holding office in March 2023 as a result of a politicized defamation lawsuit; the Supreme Court intervened several months later to reverse his disqualification. Authorities have raided media outlets—including Indian news sites like Newslaundry and NewsClick, as well as international outlets like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)—in apparent retaliation over their reporting and commentary on the government and Prime Minister Modi. Meanwhile, evidence continues to emerge that opposition politicians and journalists have been targeted with Pegasus spyware, though the government denies any role.

     

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Website blocks and content removals: Indian authorities frequently order the removal of online content about political or social issues, and sometimes block websites. Opposition politicians are sometimes targeted. For example, in March 2023, the government ordered Twitter to restrict over 120 accounts in India, many of which belonged to journalists, politicians, and activists who criticized an internet shutdown that month in Punjab or the government’s related effort to arrest Khalistani separatist Amritpal Singh. Indian authorities have asserted an increasing mandate to order large social media companies to moderate and censor online content at the government’s demand, particularly since the passage of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Blocking websites or removing online content about politics, including criticism of the government, ahead of the election could limit people’s access to information about the balloting and candidates.
    • Information manipulation: Political parties manipulate online narratives in their favor, including by coordinating with social media volunteers and partnering with hyperlocal influencers. The BJP reportedly manages one of the most sophisticated apparatuses for such manipulation, known as the Information Technology (IT) Cell. During the 2019 Lok Sabha election, for example, researchers found that information manipulation on Facebook, including the use of bots and fake accounts, benefited the BJP. Similar manipulation efforts during recent state-level elections in late 2023 sought to paint candidates in a false light, as with a video altered to depict Bollywood star Amitabh Bachchan criticizing the Madhya Pradesh government’s agricultural policy. Such efforts, including those using generative artificial intelligence (AI) services, may distort voters’ understanding of the issues at hand in the election and impede access to reliable information.
    • Internet shutdowns: Local law enforcement officials regularly restrict internet connectivity, citing the need to restrict protests, quell communal tensions, or stop the spread of disinformation. Shutdowns have occasionally been imposed during election periods, as in several states during the spring 2019 general election. Connectivity restrictions imposed during election periods limit people’s ability to express their views on or access information about voting online, along with widespread economic and social repercussions.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Journalists, activists, and ordinary social media users often face arrest or prosecution over online activities that officials have deemed objectionable, including about political or social issues. Media professionals are especially at risk: in 2023 alone, journalists were arrested for reasons that included publishing a report on social media noting that a Haryana lawmaker had been accused in gambling case; posting a tweet that criticized the unabated ethnic violence in Manipur; and reporting on allegations of anti-Muslim bias in the Kerala police force for an online outlet. Such arrests during the electoral period impede access to information and press freedom, fuel self-censorship, and can threaten the integrity of election outcomes if candidates and party-linked figures are targeted.
    • Online harassment: People who criticize the government often experience online abuse, especially journalists, politicians, activists, and members of marginalized communities. Such attacks are often coordinated: for example, a YouTube journalist who investigated the violent misogynistic harassment directed at her over her reporting in 2023 found that it appeared to originate from a loose network of Facebook groups and YouTube channels. Online harassment campaigns can drive people to avoid expressing their views about political or social issues, limiting their participation in election-related discussions online.

    India has a score of 62 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects that elections are generally free and fair, though held in an environment in which freedom of expression is shrinking. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 66 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 50 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the India country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      66 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      50 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 19-June 1, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      48.70%
    • Population

      1.42 billion
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Indonesia

    header1 Country Overview

    On February 14, 2024, in the largest single-day election in the world, 205 million people will be eligible to cast ballots for Indonesia’s president and legislature, made up of the 575-member House of Representatives (DPR) and the 136-member House of Regional Representatives (DPD). Three candidates are vying to succeed term-limited president Joko Widodo (known as Jokowi): Prabowo Subianto, the current defense minister and former special forces commander, backed by the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) Party; Ganjar Pranowo, the former governor of Central Java, backed by the ruling Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P); and Anies Baswedan, the former governor of Jakarta, who was nominated by a coalition of three parties, including the National Democratic Party and the conservative Prosperous Justice Party. If no candidate for the presidency receives a simple majority of the vote, the two candidates with the largest vote shares will compete in a runoff election in June 2024.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The upcoming election could play a decisive role in determining whether Indonesia will hold on to its democratic gains or face further backsliding. Although proposals floated by some senior officials to delay elections or allow Jokowi to seek a third term did not move forward, the outgoing president has sought other ways to cement his legacy. He stated publicly that he would meddle in the election to ensure a smooth transition of power. More recently, Jokowi has taken steps to ally himself with other elites and build his own political dynasty: his former rival and defense minister, Prabowo, announced Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as his running mate in October. Thirty-six-year-old Gibran’s eligibility was determined earlier the same month by the constitutional court, which ruled that individuals already serving as elected officials are exempt from the minimum age requirement of forty. The court was headed by Jokowi’s brother-in-law, who was later dismissed for failing to recuse himself despite his conflict of interest.

    Prabowo, the frontrunner in the presidential race as of November 2023, has previously supported policies with authoritarian elements. During his 2014 campaign, he signaled his intent to roll back democratic reforms, including direct elections. After both his 2014 and 2019 losses, he refused to accept the election results, claiming the vote tallies were fraudulent. In 2019, these claims were amplified by supporters online and off, spurring protests in Jakarta that left ten dead and hundreds injured. Prabowo has also faced allegations of human rights violations under the Suharto regime, including the kidnapping and torture of pro-democracy activists in 1998. He has denied these allegations. 

    Indonesia has made impressive democratic gains since the fall of an authoritarian regime in 1998, enjoying significant political and media pluralism and undergoing multiple peaceful transfers of power. Significant challenges persist, including systemic corruption, discrimination and violence against minority groups, conflict in Papua, and the politicized use of defamation and blasphemy laws.

    Indonesia’s elections are generally considered free and fair, with limited irregularities reported during the 2019 elections. Elections are administered by the General Election Committee (KPU) and the General Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu), a separate body that oversees the conduct of elections and resolves electoral disputes between the KPU and candidates. Disputes that are filed with Bawaslu may then move to the constitutional court or other appropriate bodies for resolution.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: Recent elections in Indonesia have been marked by teams of “buzzers”—people and groups hired, including by state actors and political parties, to use networks of inauthentic accounts with large social media followings to spread narratives that favor a particular political campaign or issue, often incorporating false or misleading information. Previously, buzzers have also flooded the online space to mobilize support for and counter criticism of government policies, and to spread hate speech to exploit ethnic and religious tensions. The antigovernment hashtag #MahasiswaBergerak (“students on the move”) and progovernment hashtag #SayaBersamaJokowi (“I’m with Jokowi”) rose to prominence in April 2022 as students protested the potential postponement of the 2024 general elections; both hashtags may have been supported by automated accounts. Online information manipulation is expected to surge ahead of election day, which could increase political polarization, make it difficult for voters to access independent sources of information, and undermine public confidence in the electoral process.
    • Content removal: In January 2023, electoral authorities, the Ministry of Communications and Information, and a police cyber team formed a social media taskforce to monitor and request the removal of content deemed false, inflammatory, or polarizing ahead of the election. Free-expression advocates have criticized the taskforce’s lack of multi-stakeholder inclusion and called for transparency into both the criteria and the process for content takedown orders. Indonesian authorities have previously restricted access to online content critical of the government, and experts worry that the taskforce could limit access to speech protected under international human rights standards.
    • Website and social media blocks: Websites are frequently blocked for hosting what the government defines as “negative” content, a broad term used to describe material that is defamatory or that violates social or moral norms. Amid the violence that followed the 2019 elections, authorities also ordered service providers to block social media and communications platforms. Blocks on websites and social media platforms would limit people’s ability to report on conditions on the ground, share reliable news, and express their support for candidates during the pre- and post-election period.
    • Harassment and intimidation: Journalists in Indonesia regularly face harassment and intimidation in retaliation for their online activity, particularly for their critical reporting on government figures or corruption allegations. In 2019, for example, an online journalist was doxed after publishing an article that included a quote from a leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) calling for people to vote against incumbent president Jokowi. Similarly heightened levels of online harassment of journalists and government critics in 2024 could drive many to self-censor to avoid such attacks, restricting people’s ability to freely express their views and make their voices heard online.

    Indonesia has a score of 58 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of elections that have been considered free and fair by international monitors; problems with due process, equal treatment, and physical security; a wide range of restrictions on online political and social content; and a legal environment that harshly punishes people for online activity. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 58 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 47 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Indonesia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Indonesia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      57 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      47 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      February 14, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      77.00%
    • Population

      275.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Iran

    header1 Country Overview

    Iran’s presidential election will take place in a tightly controlled political environment. Political power ultimately lies in the hands of the country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the undemocratic institutions under his control. The unelected Guardian Council vets all candidates and has the authority to disqualify those that are deemed insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment. Approved candidates will not be announced until a month before the election. Voter turnout dipped to a record low in the February 2020 parliamentary elections, a sign of widespread disillusionment with the electoral system. President Hassan Rouhani will leave office amid a crippling economic crisis, the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, and continuing civil unrest, all of which may exacerbate voter apathy.  

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Despite the fact that Rouhani often employed more moderate rhetoric, he fell far short of fulfilling campaign promises to improve Iranians’ personal freedoms. Tens of thousands of websites are blocked, including content about human rights, criticism of the government, and religious expression. Access to major social media platforms remains restricted, including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. During repeated mass protests, the government has restricted access to additional platforms and, at times, cut off internet traffic entirely. The state dominates the information landscape through state-run media, strict controls on reporting, and paid progovernment commentators. As a result, Iranians often struggle to access independent sources of information and tools for online campaigning, thus contributing to a restrictive preelection environment. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:  

    • Blocking and filtering websites: There was evidence of election-related blocking and filtering during the 2016 midterm elections; the parliamentary monitoring platform Majlis Monitor was filtered shortly before the election. In the lead up to the 2013 elections, Iranians noticed that online posts or websites that contained certain words, such as candidates' names or slogans, were temporarily blocked or taken offline. Iran’s history of extensive blocking, including around elections, suggests that more sites could be blocked ahead of the vote. Websites and online platforms used for independently monitoring election results or fact-checking candidates could be targeted for censorship.  
    • Influence operations: Iranian authorities have been linked to numerous influence operations in recent years. In October 2020, the US government disrupted a disinformation campaign involving dozens of Iranian-backed websites posing as independent media outlets and targeting countries in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In 2019, Twitter announced the removal of nearly 5000 accounts linked to the Iranian government for coordinated manipulation targeted at international and domestical audiences. While research on domestic operations remains scant, Iran's extensive foreign campaigns demonstrate the existence of a sophisticated covert influence apparatus that could also be deployed domestically. Iranian authorities regularly manipulate the domestic information environment in other ways, issuing coverage guidelines and pressuring journalists and the media to avoid “government red lines” when covering sensitive topics, including elections.  
    • Internet shutdowns: The state maintains legal and technical control over the internet backbone, facilitating any restrictions on internet connectivity. Authorities disrupted access for one week in response to massive antigovernment protests in November 2019. Shutdowns have continued intermittently; in February 2021, in Sistan and Baluchistan in February 2021, when the government suspended access in Sistan and Baluchistan amid protests. Protests before or after the June election could trigger similar restrictions by the authorities. Any sign or suspicion of public upheaval around the June election could trigger similar shutdowns by the authorities. 

    Iran has a score of 17 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a tightly controlled electoral system and high levels of online censorship and propaganda. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 17 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 15 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Iran country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Iran recorded a score decline in the new edition of Freedom in the World due to the government’s restriction of information on a series of major events. At the same time, hard-line politicians cemented power in the February 2020 parliamentary elections, following the disqualification of many reformist and independent candidates. Read the Iran report.

    Perspective

    Authorities have responded to the threat of boycotts and protests by suppressing dissent on social media, underscoring the country's unfree electoral conditions. New Freedom House analysis looks at the regime's tightening control over online space.

    On Iran

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    • Global Freedom Score

      11 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      11 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      June 18, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      73.26%
    • Population

      84.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Iran

    header1 Country Overview

    The Islamic Republic of Iran holds regular elections, but they fall short of democratic standards. Political power ultimately lies in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the undemocratic institutions under his control. In March, Iranians will vote to select the 290 members of the country’s parliament. A record number of people have registered to appear on the official ballot. However, the unelected Guardian Council vets all candidates and has the authority to disqualify those deemed insufficiently loyal to the clerical establishment. As of early January, the Council had disqualified around 30 percent of all candidates, including more than 20 incumbent lawmakers.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Voters will also select representatives for the Assembly of Experts, the 88-member body that chooses the Supreme Leader. Former president Hassan Rouhani as well as his more conservative successor President Ebrahim Raisi have both signaled intentions to run for the Assembly of Experts. While the Assembly of Experts typically wields little political influence, the body elected in 2024 – who would serve for the next eight years – could have the consequential responsibility of choosing Khamenei’s replacement given his advanced age. One of the top choices for the job is Khamenei’s second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who would likely follow in the footsteps of his hardline father. To accede to Supreme Leader, he would need support from two thirds of the Assembly of Experts, and currently only half the seats are controlled by hardliners. 

    Voter turnout is expected to be low in 2024, although growing dissatisfaction with the regime could inspire more voters to turn out on election day. However, a change from the political status quo remains unlikely given Iran’s highly manufactured electoral processes, such as the Guardian Council’s practice of disqualifying many moderate or reformist candidates, benefit those aligned with the conservative establishment. In past elections, reformist candidates and parties have often boycotted the vote in protest of Iran’s fundamentally unfair election process. During this election, the political establishment is counting on low turnout and the marginalization of reformist candidates to further cement their control of the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. A reformist boycott could pave the way to an easy win for Khamenei’s hardline allies, but it would also further damage the regime’s claims of holding legitimate elections. 

    The election will take place amid ongoing economic challenges and social unrest, and will be the first vote since massive antigovernment protests broke out in September 2022 following the death in custody of Mahsa Amini.  The regime responded with disproportionate violence, internet shutdowns, and increased repression of women and Iran’s Kurdish population in the wake of the Mahsa Amini protests. Hundreds of demonstrators have been killed since September 2022, and the regime continues to carry out protest-related death sentences. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:  

    • Information manipulation: The online media environment is tightly controlled by Iranian authorities. The national broadcaster, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), serves as a vehicle for state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, which may impact the reliability of election-related information. The regime relies on its extensive cyber army to amplify progovernment disinformation, counter criticism, and smear political opponents, including during election periods. State-affiliated online outlets have already accused the opposition of participating in pre-election fraud and manipulation. Iranian authorities also issue guidelines and pressure the media to avoid “government red lines” when covering sensitive topics. Ahead of the June 2021 presidential election, several journalists received judicial warnings about election coverage, with some reporting harassment from security forces and the IRGC’s cyberunit.
    • Website blocking: Authorities operate a highly sophisticated online censorship system that restricts access to thousands of websites, particularly those of international news and information services, the political opposition, ethnic and religious minority groups in Iran, and human rights organizations. Websites promoting reformist candidates were blocked and filtered during the 2016 elections; the parliamentary monitoring platform Majlis Monitor was filtered shortly before the election. Iran’s history of extensive blocking, including around elections, suggests that more sites conducting fact-checking and independent election monitoring could be blocked ahead of the vote.
    • Arrests and prosecution for online activity: The Iranian regime routinely arrests journalists and social media users for their online activities, which will likely encourage self-censorship ahead of the vote. In September 2023, Majid Tavakoli, a prominent intellectual and staunch opponent of the regime, was sentenced to 5 years in prison with a subsequent 2-year social media ban on charges of spreading propaganda after his commentary supporting the political opposition was circulated on social media. Throughout 2023, multiple online journalists have been arrested, detained, or sentenced to prison for their critical reporting. Even journalists working with state-affiliated online news outlets have been summoned for investigation or arrested in recent months, signaling a growing crackdown on online journalism ahead of the elections.
    • Internet shutdowns: The state maintains legal and technical control over Iran’s internet backbone, facilitating restrictions on connectivity. Localized internet shutdowns are often used to immobilize protests and have been repeatedly used to hinder demonstrations in Iran’s predominantly Kurdish provinces since September 2022. While no internet shutdowns were reported during the June 2021 presidential election, any sign of public unrest around the March election could trigger restrictions by the regime.

    Iran has a score of 10 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a significantly authoritarian environment where basic political rights are restricted and an online space rife with censorship and disinformation. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 14 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 16 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Iran country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Iran

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    • Global Freedom Score

      11 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      11 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      March 1, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      78.60%
    • Population

      88.6 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Iraq

    header1 Country Overview

    Iraqis will elect 328 individuals to the Council of Representatives on October 10 amid a pandemic, economic crisis, and popular unrest. Widespread anti-government protests in October 2019 resulted in an agreement to hold early elections in June 2021. The government postponed the vote for four months ostensibly to allow the Independent High Electoral Commission more time to prepare. As of January 2021, 260 parties registered to take part. Among the 60 new entrants are numerous pro-reform parties established by some of the protest leaders. Iraq’s fragmented political field has been dominated by several coalitions. The four largest coalitions are all led by Shiite parties but feature some degree of sectarian diversity. Kurdish parties, Sunni-led coalitions, smaller parties, and independents also hold seats in the Council of Representatives, which elects the country’s president and prime minister. An activist-led boycott contributed to low voter turnout in the 2018 election. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The electoral environment is fraught with insecurity. Armed groups attack prodemocracy activists and journalists with impunity, resulting in calls to boycott the October 2021 elections, particularly among the new youth and activist-led political parties. Iraq remains a dangerous environment for journalists and activists, who frequently experience harassment, physical attacks, and criminal penalties in retribution for their online activities. While few websites are blocked, the Iraqi government often responds to civil unrest by disrupting access to the internet and social media. The pervasive intimidation of journalists and activists has resulted in high levels of self-censorship. Despite these risks, Iraq benefits from a relatively vibrant civil society and somewhat diverse media environment.



    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of the election:

    • Network shutdowns: Iraqi authorities have resorted to network shutdowns during politically sensitive events. In October 2019, authorities responded to antigovernment protests with a week-long, near-total shutdown that impacted most of the country. Ahead of the 2018 elections, there were reports of localized shutdowns. Protests or calls for boycotts ahead of the 2021 vote could prompt similar restrictions. Access to the internet is critical in the days and months ahead of an election, as people often get their news and information about political parties online and through social media.
    • Social media blocks: The Iraqi government frequently blocks popular social media platforms during times of political unrest in an attempt to stifle online mobilization. During the 2019 protests, the government required ISPs to restrict access to Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other platforms. The blocks lasted much longer than the contemporaneous network shutdown, with some regions unable to access social media sites for 50 days. In July 2018, authorities instituted a two-week block of social media networks, including Facebook and Instagram, during nationwide demonstrations against high unemployment and a lack of public services. 
    • Information manipulation: Political parties, Iranian-backed groups, and powerful people with ties to the government spend large amounts of money to spread false or misleading information online, often with political or sectarian goals. In May 2020, Facebook removed 324 pages, 72 accounts, 5 groups, and 31 Instagram accounts that were tied to individuals associated with Kurdistan Regional Government intelligence services in Iraqi Kurdistan. The network used fake accounts to impersonate political parties and politicians and posted about local and political news including Kurdish government policies and criticism of non-Kurdish politicians. Additionally, the government frequently issues gag orders and reporting guidelines around politically sensitive events, such as the 2019 protests, the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Islamic State occupation in 2014. As political parties continue to campaign ahead of the elections, it will be important to watch for disinformation online or reporting guidelines directed by the government that could influence voters’ perceptions.
    • Harassment and violence: Journalists, activists, and social media users who publish or post content about corruption, criticism of the government, and taboo subjects are subject to harassment, intimidation, physical violence, kidnappings, and even assassinations, often by armed groups with government ties. In April 2020, a political organizer and government critic was intimidated and beaten by plainclothes intelligence officers after posting allegations to Facebook that a local health department was making a profit from face masks. In August 2020, unknown assailants killed Reham Yakob, an activist who led all-women protests and harshly criticized the government and pro-Iranian militias through social media. Additionally, women candidates have suffered harassment online and on social media, and in some cases, people have posted fake, salacious photographs and videos of them with the intent of harming their campaigns. The pattern of attacks and impunity for perpetrators has led to an increase in self-censorship and could silence journalists and activists online ahead of the election.

    Iraq has a score of 38 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects Iraq’s competitive elections, as well as rule of law deficits and frequent efforts to stifle political unrest online and offline. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 29 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. Iraq will be covered by Freedom on the Net 2021 for the first time, and the country report and internet freedom score will be available in September 2021. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Iraq country report in Freedom in the World.

    Download the pre-election assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Iraq

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    • Global Freedom Score

      30 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      43 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      October 10, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      68.59%
    • Population

      39.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Japan

    header1 Country Overview

    Japan has a score of 89 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a robust democracy and strong respect for human rights online and offline, though progovernment commentators and political bots disrupt the online information environment. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 96 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 75 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Japan country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      96 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      77 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 31, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      90.22%
    • Population

      126 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Jordan

    header1 Country Overview

    Jordan’s parliamentary elections will take place following a year of tumultuous anti-government protests, which were tamped down by the country’s COVID-19 restrictions. The upper house of parliament, the Senate, is appointed by the king, while the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, is up for election.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Candidates typically run as independents and are often tribal figures or businesspeople considered loyal to the monarchy. Despite the dissolution of the Jordanian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in July, its political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), remains the country’s largest opposition party and will participate in the November elections. The IAF won 10 seats in the 2016 election after having boycotted the previous two votes.

    Jordanians regularly self-censor when speaking publicly on sensitive political topics and the monarchy. Organizers of the protest movement have been arrested and prosecuted over the past year. Journalists are sometimes targeted with harassment and assault in response to their reporting, and the government has pressured editors of news websites and online activists to delete articles and social media posts. Jordan’s COVID-19 response may further impact these rights ahead of the election, as emergency provisions have introduced new limits on free expression and movement. Recent attempts to amend the punitive Cybercrime Law to criminalize vaguely defined terms including rumors, false news, and hate speech also demonstrate the government’s continued pressure on free expression.

    Jordan has a score of 40 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerable in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Jordan’s score reflects a broadly restrictive environment for free expression, assembly, and political engagement. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 37 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 49 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Jordan country reports for Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Cyberattacks: Multiple politically consequential cyberattacks have occurred in recent years, including the hacking of social media accounts belonging to the deputy head of the teachers’ union in 2019 and the speaker of the House of Representatives in 2018. In July 2019, the official website of the Constitutional Court was compromised by an “international hacker.” This history of politically related cyberattacks suggests similar incidents may be seen during the electoral period.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: There are several laws, including criminal defamation and lèse-majesté, that can be used to punish nonviolent political and social expression ahead of the election, and the government sometimes issues gag orders that restrict reporting on sensitive subjects. Numerous activists and critics have faced charges of insulting the royal family and undermining the regime in the past year for social media posts that criticized Jordanian leadership.
    • Connectivity disruptions: Jordanian authorities may have interfered with internet access in the past. In July, NetBlocks reported that Facebook’s live-streaming service was restricted for a few hours during protests. Facebook Live allegedly experienced disruptions during demonstrations in December 2018 and January 2019 as well. These incidents may signal a willingness on the part of the government to repeat similar restrictions during politically tense moments or demonstrations related to the elections.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Freedom House released the new edition of Freedom on the Net, which found that internet freedom in Jordan improved slightly. Read the Jordan report.

    On Jordan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      33 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      47 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 10, 2020
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      76.90%
    • Population

      10.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Jordan

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Jordan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      33 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      47 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 2024
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      91.00%
    • Population

      11.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Kenya

    header1 Country Overview

    Five years after a highly contentious rerun election that resulted in the reelection of President Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenyan voters are set to choose Kenyatta’s successor in the August 2022 general elections. William Ruto, the current deputy president, and Raila Odinga, former prime minister and now opposition leader, are the frontrunners in the presidential race. Though Ruto was once widely considered Kenyatta’s likely successor, Kenyatta instead offered his support to rival-turned-ally Odinga in a power-sharing agreement that sparked concerns that Kenyatta would try to remain involved in government under an Odinga presidency. Ethnicity and tribalism are salient factors in Kenyan elections, and elections have historically been flashpoints of conflict, as in 2007 and 2017. The close competition and growing tensions between the leading presidential candidates suggest that the 2022 election could similarly spark electoral violence. In addition to electing a new president, voters will also be choosing candidates for the National Assembly, Senate, and local executive positions. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Kenya has held regular multiparty elections since 1992. Pervasive corruption and brutality by security forces remain serious problems. The judiciary is generally independent, as seen in 2017, when the Supreme Court annulled the initial election results and ordered a rerun to ensure free and fair elections. The country’s media and civil society sectors are vibrant, even as journalists and human rights defenders remain vulnerable to restrictive laws and intimidation. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation and disinformation: The Kenyan online information landscape is manipulated by state and nonstate actors who pay users, especially bloggers with significant clout, to share distorted information on politically sensitive topics. Such tactics have increased since the last election cycle in 2017. Ahead of the election, coordinated Twitter accounts are already amplifying content aimed at discrediting both candidates. In January 2022, for example, bloggers allied with Ruto posted a slideshow containing pictures of politicians who Odinga allegedly betrayed during his political career.  Political parties, campaigns, and candidates are likely to further mobilize supporters and coordinated networks to spread narratives discrediting opponents, reducing the reliability of the online media space and increasing the potential for violence sparked by misinformation and hate speech.
    • Harassment and violence: Intimidation and harassment are increasing concerns in Kenya’s online environment. During the last election cycle, women candidates in legislative and local elections faced online intimidation accompanied by sexual harassment and violence. Police officers also destroyed journalists’ phones to suppress reporting on election-related human rights violations. The climate for online speech may become more dangerous for politicians and journalists, who may face online and offline harms as a result of their election-related posts.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Bloggers and social media users continue to be arrested or summoned for questioning. During the 2017 election season, numerous bloggers were arrested for posting alleged hate speech. More recently, in April 2021, human rights defender Mutemi Wa Kiama was arrested for making social media posts calling on the IMF to halt loans to the Kenyan government, and in August 2020, Charles Gichuki was arrested for launching a website to track corruption during the Kenyatta regime. Bloggers and online journalists may be arrested or prosecuted for posting election-related content, and those who are not allied with a candidate may choose to self-censor instead.   

    Kenya has a score of 55 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects competitive elections, an independent judiciary, and an online environment marred by disinformation and online manipulation. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 48 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 66 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Kenya country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Kenya

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    • Global Freedom Score

      52 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      66 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      August 9, 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      31.28%
    • Population

      53.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Kyrgyzstan

    header1 Country Overview

    Kyrgyzstan’s upcoming elections are the first national contest since a protracted political crisis, as well as constitutional amendments that effectively changed the country from a parliamentary to presidential system. Two days after the October 2020 parliamentary elections, the Central Election Commission unilaterally annulled the election amid allegations of vote buying, intimidation, and misuse of administrative resources. Opposition parties had failed to pass the threshold necessary to gain seats in the October election; the parties that performed well were linked to then-president Sooronbay Jeenbekov and Raimbek Matraimov, a former government official and subject of recent, largescale money-laundering case. Mass protests opposing the results continued after the annulment, prompting the resignation of Jeenbekov and the dissolution of the government. The parliament subsequently postponed new elections, instead extending its own mandate in a process that lacked a clear legal basis. Sadyr Japarov, a formerly imprisoned nationalist-populist politician with links to organized crime, briefly assumed the position of prime minister and acting president before being winning the January 2021 presidential election. Japrov’s controversial ascent to the newly empowered presidency may signal a return to strongman rule and a diminished role for the parliament.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The upcoming vote takes place in a climate of heightened volatility and restrictions on civic space. Over 600 people were injured in post-election clashes between the police, Japarov supporters, and the opposition, leading to the brief imposition of martial law in Bishkek. Journalists who covered the elections and ensuing protests were also intimidated, detained, and attacked for their work. Last year, the government proposed problematic reporting requirements for nongovernmental organizations and a law “On Information Manipulation,” which would allow the government to block websites and shut down social media networks for disseminating “false or uncredible information.” Though neither measure was enacted, they set the stage for future efforts to curb expression and civic engagement in the country.



    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: The persistent manipulation of online news and social media compromises the information space, a key component of a resilient electoral environment. Owners of news sites, some of which are owned by politicians or powerful business interests, sometimes exert editorial pressure to push their own political interests. Individuals are often secretly paid to influence online discussions about politicians and political issues. Networks of fake accounts supporting Jeenbekov, former president Almazbek Atambayev, Matraimov, and Japarov been identified in recent years. After the corruption scandal that embroiled Matraimov, analysts found that approximately 80 percent of social media profiles publicly supporting him were fake. Pro-Japarov commentators were identified during his bid for power in October 2020 and hundreds of fake accounts supporting Jeenbekov were removed from Facebook in December 2020. 
    • Arrests for online activity: Numerous vague laws facilitate the arrest of social media users and online journalists. In 2019, Aftandil Zhorobekov, the administrator of a Facebook group devoted to discussions of arbitrary governance in Kyrgyzstan, was arrested on apparently politically motivated charges related to calling for mass protests and inciting national hatred. The proposed “On Information Manipulation” further demonstrates the political appetite for quelling protected speech online. 
    • Harassment and violence: While average users are not subject to a significant level of harassment or violence for their online activities, some isolated incidents occur, often involving contributors to online media outlets. The violence directed at journalists during the October protests underscores this risk. Investigations into powerful politicians and coverage of protests or election-related controversies ahead of the election could prompt similar offline violence and harassment.
    • Cyberattacks: Politically motivated cyberattacks are a significant problem, and put the safety and work of journalists, critics, and activists at risk. In March 2020, a Telegram group planning a demonstration was compromised and deleted. The previous year, most independent news and fact-checking sites were disabled by DDoS attacks following the publication of the Matraimov investigation. Critical activists and journalists also report attempts to break into their social media accounts.
    • Internet shutdowns: Kyrgyzstani authorities occasionally disrupt internet connectivity during politically sensitive moments. Notably, mobile and broadband internet were throttled as protests broke out following the October election. Connectivity was disrupted locally the previous year when clashes broke out surrounding the arrest of Atambayev. Similar restrictions during election-related demonstrations could restrict access to information and provide the government with cover if it instituted a violent crackdown on protesters.

    Kyrgyzstan has a score of 44 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects problematic elections, significant levels of corruption, and weak rule of law, including a politicized judiciary. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 39 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 56 out of 100; and as a consolidated authoritarian regime in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 16 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Kyrgyzstan country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    In the 2021 edition of Freedom in the World, Kyrgyzstan’s status was downgraded from Partly Free to Not Free after fraudulent parliamentary elections trigged a political crisis that enabled a nationalist firebrand to seize the levers of state power. Read the Kyrgyzstan report.

    On Kyrgyzstan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      27 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      52 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 28, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      42%
    • Population

      6.6 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Lebanon

    header1 Country Overview

    After more than a year of political deadlock, Lebanon’s next parliamentary election is due in March 2022. This election, which will determine who holds the National Assembly’s 128 seats, comes amid an economic crisis and ongoing political and sectarian unrest. Major establishment parties—which are formed along sectarian lines—have together held over 90 seats since the 2018 poll. Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced a new cabinet in September 2021, which observers considered too weak to address the country’s crises. Instead, the announcement was perceived as an attempt to provide a preelectoral boost for incumbent parties. The establishment will face an opposition bloc emboldened by public mistrust in the government, anger over economic woes, and mounting calls for reform.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Voters contend with a political system that ensures representation for officially recognized religious communities but limits competition and impedes the rise of cross-communal or civic parties. Individuals enjoy some civil liberties but also face pervasive corruption and major weaknesses in the rule of law, which could influence their ability to choose next March. This will be the first election since months long mass protests, prompted by economic stagnation, corruption, and sectarianism, began in October 2019. The subsequent political crisis was made worse by new corruption and mismanagement revelations that followed the August 2020 Beirut port explosion. Supporters of Hezbollah and Amal, the country’s two main Shiite parties, called for the dismissal of the judge investigating the explosion in an October 2021 demonstration, which turned violent when they were fired upon. Furthermore, the economic crisis has led to food and fuel shortages as well as rolling blackouts that could cause internet outages, potentially impeding voters’ ability to access accurate information. 



    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of the election:

    • Information manipulation: Lebanese media outlets are highly partisan and are controlled by politico-sectarian actors who seek to advance a particular political or religious message. Elite, politically active families own several prominent outlets, while Hezbollah also maintains significant media holdings. Politicians have been known to offer bribes to the country’s few independent outlets and journalists, particularly during electoral periods. Accessing reliable information is also made more difficult by the rise of online disinformation. For example, the armed wing of Hezbollah has orchestrated defamation campaigns against its opponents and has sought to disseminate and promote sectarian and partisan content online. Though bots have not been extensively documented in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia–based bots may have amplified the “Hassan Diab Is a Thief” hashtag popular in early 2020, when then prime minister Diab formed his cabinet. As the electoral campaign progresses, elites and political parties may disseminate more disinformation meant to influence voter perception.
    • Harassment and violence: Political parties and armed groups have been known to target critics through online harassment and intimidation campaigns, sometimes leading to offline attacks. A number of online users have received threats from Hezbollah supporters via the social media application Clubhouse or have been targeted directly for criticizing the militia. In March 2021, journalist Mariam Seifeddine was violently assaulted and her family received death threats; Seifeddine attributed the incident to her widely published criticism of Hezbollah. A month before, political activist and prominent Hezbollah critic Loqman Slim was assassinated, allegedly for criticizing political parties and militias including Hezbollah. Slim was active on social media and was frequently quoted by news outlets. This pattern of harassment, intimidation, and physical attack has led to increased self-censorship, a trend that may persist as the election approaches. 
    • Forced removal of online content: Security officials frequently pressure individuals and internet service providers to remove online comments, mainly those criticizing government officials or the army. In March 2021, the Cybercrimes Bureau summoned Ragheb al-Shoufi for Facebook posts that were deemed insulting by a former interior minister. He was released after being asked to delete the posts and sign a pledge promising to refrain from similar activity in the future. In October 2020, Saeed Abdullah was arrested and detained for 47 days for Facebook posts criticizing the government. He was charged with insulting the president and insulting religion and was forced to delete content. Government officials may seek to remove more online content ahead of the polls.

    Lebanon has a score of 51 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a fractured media environment, high levels of self-censorship, and the use of legal and extralegal measures to silence online users. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 43 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 51 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Lebanon country report in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Lebanon

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    • Global Freedom Score

      42 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      50 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      May 15, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      78.20%
    • Population

      6.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Mexico

    header1 Country Overview

    Mexican citizens will take to the polls on June 6 to elect all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as 15 governors and thousands of local positions. The vote is seen as a test of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s popularity and that of his National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). It will also determine whether he can retain control of the Chamber after his party secured a majority with the help of its coalition allies in the 2018 elections. The three main opposition parties, the National Action Party (PAN), the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), have formed an unlikely and ideologically incongruous alliance known as Go for Mexico (Va por México) in an effort to wrench the majority away from the current left-wing populist government.  

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The 2018 election was seen as a repudiation of the incumbent political establishment and was marred by unprecedented levels of election-related violence, as well as allegations of illegal campaign financing, vote buying, and the misuse of public funds. Paired with budget cuts to the National Electoral Institute (INE) and accusations that Obrador’s government has sought to lessen electoral oversight and roll back government transparency, these issues raise concern about the administration of the upcoming election. The COVID-19 crisis has further complicated the electoral environment, as the country finds itself with the world’s third-highest death toll. Mismanagement of the pandemic response sparked antigovernment protests in the months leading up to the election, which were further fueled by a recent economic recession, record-high homicide rates, and dissatisfaction with Obrador’s public comments on gender-based violence. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Harassment and violence: Mexico is the most dangerous country in the Western hemisphere for journalists, and reporters for online and offline platforms regularly face threats and sometimes deadly violence in retribution for their work. Those who cover organized criminal groups or sensitive political topics are particularly at risk, including journalists attacked in connection with their reporting on the 2018 election. Obrador’s frequent anti-press rhetoric has also contributed to a threatening environment in which critics often face harassment on social media. Political tensions ahead of the election could exacerbate existing trends of intimidation and violence in response to online speech. 
    • Cyberattacks: Technical attacks, including malware infections and DDoS attacks, have been deployed during recent elections and been used regularly to suppress freedom of expression for journalists and activists. The National Action Party website was targeted with a DDoS attack two weeks ahead of the 2018 election after publishing content that was critical of Obrador. On election day, predictive polling website, Oraculus, was rendered inaccessible to the public due to a cyberattack. Cyberattacks against journalists and activists are regularly paired with the use of spyware software Pegasus, which provides attackers full access to victims’ devices. The targeting of activists, journalists, and political figures could increase self-censorship and lessen critical engagement during the election period, when maintaining accurate reporting and robust civil society is most crucial.   
    • Influence operations: Supporters of President Obrador have historically used automated bot accounts to target critical journalists and everyday users with smear campaigns. Other political parties have also been found to instrumentalize fake accounts and partisan bots in the most recent elections. Bots have been used for political purposes in the country as far back as at least 2010, and may continue to impact online discourse in Mexico’s increasingly digital pre-election context. 

    Mexico has a score of 61 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects extreme violence from organized crime, severe rule of law deficits, government corruption, and a highly dangerous atmosphere for online and offline journalists, all within a relatively robust political and electoral environment. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 62 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 61 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Mexico country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    The new edition of Freedom in the World found that the Mexican government obstructed efforts to address gender-based violence and continued to grapple with entrenched corruption. Read the Mexico report.

    On Mexico

    See all data, scores & information on this country or territory.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      60 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      62 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      June 6, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      67.14%
    • Population

      127.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Mexico

    header1 Country Overview

    Voters in Mexico will head to the polls on June 2, 2024, when they will select the country’s next president, all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies, all 128 members of the Senate, 9 governors, local legislators in all 32 federal entities, and thousands of local officeholders. With more than 20,000 positions being contested nationwide, June’s general election will be the largest in Mexico’s history.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The presidential election’s top contenders are both women, all but ensuring that the country’s first woman president takes office on October 1. Leftist incumbent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, founder of the ruling National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), is constitutionally prohibited from seeking a second term. Former Mexico City mayor Claudia Sheinbaum, the candidate for the MORENA-led Let’s Keep Making History (SHH) coalition, has maintained a comfortable lead in polling over former senator Xóchitl Gálvez, who leads the ticket for the Broad Front for Mexico (FAM) opposition alliance. Former congressman Jorge Álvarez Máynez of the center-left Citizens’ Movement remains in a distant third place.

    López Obrador has dominated Mexican politics as president, and his governing legacy is expected to hang heavily over the election. In February, López Obrador, who remains widely popular, introduced a series of reforms meant to foreground MORENA’s election platform. The reforms, most of which would require significant constitutional amendments, include controversial proposals to significantly reduce the number of seats in Congress, provide for the direct election of Supreme Court justices, and eliminate seven independent regulatory bodies, including the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) and the National Institute for Transparency, Access to Information, and Personal Data Protection (INAI). Analysts have criticized the reform package for targeting autonomous institutions and potentially undermining checks and balances within the country’s political system. While it remains unclear whether Sheinbaum will depart from López Obrador’s positions on other key issues, she has indicated her support for the president’s proposals.

    Even before introducing the reform package, López Obrador and his allies have tried to weaken the National Electoral Institute (INE), Mexico’s independent electoral body, over several years. In separate rulings in May and June 2023, the Supreme Court struck down a controversial electoral law—known as “Plan B”—that would have reduced the INE’s budget and diminished its ability to guarantee free and fair elections. “Plan B” prompted major protests upon its initial passage last February. In February 2024, after López Obrador proposed his most recent reform package, protesters marched nationwide to object to the electoral-law changes contained within.

    Freedom in Mexico also remains under serious threat from ongoing criminal violence. While Mexico has been a competitive electoral democracy since 2000, with power routinely changing hands between political parties, organized criminal groups exert significant influence in much of the country. June’s general election may play a pivotal role in how the government addresses this threat over the next six years.

    Mexico has a score of 60 out of 100 on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, where 100 represents the most resilience to digital election interference. The score reflects an environment where competitive elections are held regularly, but where institutional shortcomings, entrenched criminal violence, and a weak rule of law pose significant challenges.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: Under López Obrador, coordinated online networks have been found to spread progovernment narratives and launch coordinated smear campaigns against the president’s perceived rivals. Investigative researchers have also documented the López Obrador administration’s apparent efforts to use public resources to manipulate online discourse, amounting to an “official propaganda apparatus.” False and misleading information has already spread in relation to the election. After Gálvez announced her campaign in 2023, MORENA supporters shared a Facebook video that used clips from a López Obrador press conference to misrepresent Gálvez’s position on federal pensions. Online content has also been manipulated to make false claims about López Obrador and Sheinbaum. In February 2024, a network of YouTube channels was revealed to have shared unsubstantiated claims linking López Obrador and Sheinbaum to organized crime. These tactics may become more prominent as the campaign continues, potentially distorting the online information sphere and making it more difficult for voters to find reliable information ahead of polling day.
    • Harassment and violence: Mexico remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists, particularly those who cover organized crime and other politically sensitive issues. Throughout his term, López Obrador has regularly used his morning press conferences to harass members of the press. At a February 2024 press conference, López Obrador publicly revealed the personal phone number of a journalist who had reported on US efforts to examine alleged ties between the president’s allies and drug cartels. Political candidates also face lethal violence. As of mid-February, at least 17 candidates contesting the June elections had reportedly been murdered. More killings have occurred since; in late February, two mayoral candidates—one belonging to MORENA and the other to the opposition National Action Party (PAN)—were shot and killed in the city of Maravatio. Criminal groups often use social media to threaten and intimidate critics. Additionally, women candidates are frequently subjected to online threats or harassment: During the 2018 elections, at least 62 women candidates faced online mistreatment, ranging from discriminatory statements to the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images and, in some cases, stalking.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: In Mexico, threats of both criminal and civil legal action are frequently issued in response to online allegations about public corruption and wrongdoing. While defamation and slander have been decriminalized at the federal level since 2007, a small number of states maintain criminal penalties for these offenses, which could lead to the arrest and detention of journalists and other critical commentators in those areas. Other journalists have been targeted with potentially costly civil lawsuits. In April 2023, Pío López Obrador, one of the president’s brothers, sued journalist Carlos Loret de Mola and his digital outlet, Latinus, for a combined 400 million pesos ($24 million) after Loret de Mola published videos that appeared to show Pío illicitly accepting cash. The threat of criminal or civil lawsuits may encourage self-censorship online and discourage critical reporting about political candidates and public officials.
    • Content removal: State and nonstate actors have increasingly used legal threats and other methods to pressure social media platforms and individual users to remove content in recent years. A recent civil society investigation found that the INE has engaged in the “systematic and widespread use” of precautionary measures to order the removal of online content since 2016. While such measures have been used to remove speech that is not protected under international human rights standards, the investigation found that political criticism was often removed. Authorities may issue more of these orders amid the fraught electoral environment. 

    The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2024, with a score of 60 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 62 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Mexico country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Mexico

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    • Global Freedom Score

      60 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      62 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      June 2, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      78.60%
    • Population

      131 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Moldova

    header1 Country Overview

    Moldovans will vote this November in the country’s second presidential elections since the country switched back to a direct electoral system in 2016. Igor Dodon of the Socialist Party (PSRM) is running for reelection against former prime minister Maia Sandu of the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), and other, less-popular candidates. The PSRM and PAS were recently allied in an unlikely coalition government, which was formed in 2019 to remove the oligarchic regime built by the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) since it came to power in 2015. PDM leader and oligarch Vladimir Plahotnuic fled the country after stepping down.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Despite the removal of Plahotniuc’s kleptocratic government, Moldovan democracy remains characterized by corruption, a politicized judiciary, and limited transparency. Oligarchic influence affects the electoral environment through the poorly regulated media sphere, where ownership and control is concentrated, reporting is highly partisan, and journalists self-censor. TV is the dominant source of news, so partisan manipulation of traditional media marks the overall information environment. Moldova’s highly politicized relationship with Russia and Europe is also reflected in the media sphere. The November vote is likely to feature many of the issues seen in past elections, including vote buying, misuse of public resources, and tension around voting access for residents of Transnistria, a breakaway territory.

    Moldova has a score of 65 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerable in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Moldova’s score reflects weak institutions and rule of law. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 60 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and as a transitional or hybrid regime in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 35 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Moldova country reports for Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • False or misleading information: Propaganda and disinformation have been observed in past elections and should be expected during the 2020 electoral period, both from domestic and foreign sources. A study by the Center for Media, Data and Society found that misinformation often originates from the mainstream media and official channels, such as government officials or influential business people, rather than inauthentic websites. A number of the accounts that Facebook removed for spreading false and misleading information ahead of the 2019 parliamentary elections belonged to government officials. The significant number of Russian-speakers in the country also increases the potential reach of Russian-language misinformation.
    • Influence operations: A 2019 report by the Oxford Internet Institute identified online manipulation campaigns by government agencies and political parties. So-called “cyber troopers” took to Facebook and Instagram to support particular narratives, attack the political opposition, and stoke division. Various influence operations have also targeted discourse about Moldova’s relationship with Russia and Europe. Inauthentic accounts on Facebook and Instagram that originated in Moldova engaged in manipulative tactics during the 2019 parliamentary elections, and Russian-backed online media manipulation has also been reported. Similar domestic and foreign online influence campaigns are likely during the 2020 electoral period.
    • Cyberattacks: Cyberattacks are a frequent concern for civil society and electoral bodies. During the 2019 parliamentary elections, the Central Electoral Commission was targeted with DDos attacks, apparently in an attempt to interfere with the publication of preliminary election results. Election-related cyberattacks are likely in 2020, given the overall prevalence of digital security threats and their deployment during past elections.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Moldova

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    • Global Freedom Score

      61 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 1, 2020
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      73.56%
    • Population

      3.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Morocco

    header1 Country Overview

    Moroccans will head to the polls in September to vote in legislative, municipal, and regional elections. This marks the third general election since the 2011 constitutional reforms, which require the king to name a prime minister from the largest party in Parliament, among other constitutional changes. Many major policy decisions and key cabinet positions remain under the purview of King Mohammed VI. The Justice and Development Party (PJD) has led a fragile coalition since the 2011 elections. Other parties include the center-right Istiqlal Party, the center-left Socialist Union of Popular Forces, and several parties aligned to the royal palace. Despite the 2011 reforms, the palace has often intervened to weaken the PJD, its coalition, and its ability to govern.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Among the key issues in the election are the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the related economic crisis, and the recent decision to normalize relations with Israel. Nonetheless, the perceived ineffectiveness of elected officials has contributed to a strong sense of apathy among voters; turnout in the 2016 election reached a record low. Grassroots activism, such as the Hirak Rif movement against inequality that began in the Rif region, has been met with harsh repression of free expression and civic organizing online and offline. Space for independent media has also shrunk in recent years, and many outlets have been shuttered by harsh licensing laws and advertising restrictions. Surveillance, arrests, and pressure on journalists has deepened self-censorship, especially when reporting on protests, corruption, the monarchy, and other politically sensitive issues.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of the election:

    • Online content manipulation: Morocco’s online information environment is distorted by influential actors, sometimes through surreptitious means. Facebook’s 2021 report on coordinated inauthentic behavior noted the removal of 385 accounts, 6 pages, and 40 Instagram accounts that were used to comment on progovernment stories from various outlets. The accounts criticized popular dissidents, domestic human rights organizations, and people who voiced opposition to the king. They also praised the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many news outlets are either tied to the government or political elites, who informally pressure advertisers to financially support outlets that promote their interests and box out those that are more critical of the government or royal family. The proliferation of progovernment information online has led to a biased media environment that may impact how voters obtain information online ahead of the elections.
    • Harassment of journalists and critics: Journalists, activists, and critics of the royal family are frequently harassed and intimidated on social media. In 2020, online news outlets with close ties to government intelligence services published a smear campaign about Soulaiman Raissouni, a journalist and newspaper editor, who was later arrested. In 2017, Nasser Zefzafi, a prominent leader of the Hirak Rif movement who is currently serving a 20-year prison sentence for his involvement in the protests, was the subject of defamatory articles published by progovernment news sites. This atmosphere of intimidation and harassment could impact independent outlets and journalists ahead of the elections.

    Morocco has a score of 42 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects Morocco’s multiparty electoral system and a trend of censorship and restrictions on media freedom. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 37 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 52 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Morocco country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.  

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Morocco

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    • Global Freedom Score

      37 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      53 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      September 8, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      68.79%
    • Population

      36 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Myanmar

    header1 Country Overview

    Myanmar held its first open and competitive elections in 2015. After decades of military rule, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) handily defeated the military-linked Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Suu Kyi is barred from the presidency under citizenship rules but serves as de facto leader and heads several key portfolios. Under the constitution, the military controls 25 percent of legislative seats and oversees the country’s ministries of defense, home affairs, and border affairs.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    General elections scheduled for November 2020 will see the NLD again face the USDP, as well as numerous ethnic parties. Harassment, prosecution, and surveillance of the media and civil society contribute to a tenuous electoral environment, as well as doubts over the independence of the election commission, the reliability of voter rolls, and early voting procedures. Buddhist nationalism features prominently in Burmese politics, and the country’s citizenship and electoral laws disenfranchise many members of ethnic minorities, including the predominantly Muslim Rohingyas. Over 700,000 Rohingya refugees fled to neighboring Bangladesh in response to the military’s ethnic cleansing campaign in 2017. Ongoing conflict between the military and various ethnic armed organizations remains a threat to peaceful election administration in several areas of the country. Internet penetration stands at approximately 35 percent, leaving many voters reliant on progovernment television and radio outlets for news and information and exacerbating the digital divide, particularly in rural areas.

    Myanmar has a score of 35 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Myanmar’s score reflects limits on free expression and ongoing conflict and human rights abuses against religious and ethnic minorities. It is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 30 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net, with an internet freedom score of 36 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Myanmar country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Hate speech and violence: The internet is an important vector for violence and hatred against Myanmar’s marginalized groups. Investigators concluded that false rumors and incendiary speech shared on social media, notably Facebook, played a role in the atrocities against the Rohingya. Political leaders, the military, and religious extremists may continue to stoke hatred and violence online in the lead-up to the election, heightening tensions in Myanmar.
    • Shutdowns: A partial internet shutdown in villages in Rakhine and Chin states has been in place for over a year. The shutdown hinders residents’ access to electoral resources, and may signal a willingness on the part of the government to extend similar shutdowns to other parts of the country during a political crisis.
    • Influence operations: The military has a record of surreptitiously manipulating online discourses in Myanmar. An influence campaign by the military was reported around the 2018 by-elections, while nearly 700 military officers allegedly participated in a multi-year Facebook operation. The prevalence of information campaigns in past years suggests they are likely to occur during the 2020 election.
    • Censorship: Having previously refrained from blocking online content, in March 2020 the government ordered service providers to restrict access to several independent and regional news outlets known for reporting on developments in conflict areas. The dramatic escalation in censorship in an election year demonstrates that the governing authorities may not be shy to enact more censorial tactics to secure the election.
    • Arrests and intimidation: Activists, online journalists, and members of civil society face criminal charges for their online activities, particularly when criticizing the government, public officials, and the military. Violence and intimidation are especially common in relation to politically sensitive issues, such as the Rohingya crisis.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    Incident Alert

    Burmese election officials said the vote would go ahead as scheduled, following a request from the USDP to postpone it due a spike in COVID-19 cases. The rise in cases draws attention to the logistical challenges the pandemic poses for sound election administration. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Two political parties accused the UEC of censoring their campaign speeches before being broadcast on state TV and radio. The UEC allegedly removed politically sensitive topics related to ethnicity, socioeconomic issues, and government policy. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    The government deemed journalism a “nonessential business,” meaning journalists are subject to COVID-19 movement restrictions in many parts of the country, including Yangon. This restriction potentially limits journalists’ ability to report on developments during the electoral period. Read more.

    New Report

    Freedom House released the new edition of Freedom on the Net, which found that internet freedom in Myanmar declined dramatically as the government ramped up censorship ahead of the elections. Read the Myanmar report.

    Incident Alert

    A study released by Burma Human Rights Network reported 39 cases of hate speech and disinformation, some of which were shared over 2,000 times on various social media platforms, ahead of the elections. Anti-Muslim hate speech and disinformation featured prominently in these posts. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Myanmar’s government allegedly issued a directive to extend the mobile internet service restrictions in Rakhine and Chin states until the end of the year. The restriction was originally set to end on October 31st. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    The Union Election Commission removed the Union Democratic Party from the list of registered political parties due to alleged violation of party registration laws, preventing any of the party’s candidates from contesting the election. Read more.

    On Myanmar

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    • Global Freedom Score

      8 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      10 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      November 8, 2020
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      34.84%
    • Population

      54.0 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Nicaragua

    header1 Country Overview

    Incumbent presidential candidate Daniel Ortega and his allies launched an intensive assault on the opposition in the run-up to November’s general election. Empowered by the total control of Ortega’s ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) across government branches, the regime has arrested prospective candidates and opposition figures, dissolved competitive parties, limited international election observation, and empowered the National Police – known for their politicized and repressive tactics – with oversight of campaign activities. Under Nicaragua’s electoral system, a candidate can win the presidency with as low as a 35 percent plurality of the vote. The low vote threshold provides Ortega with a path to victory over the fragmented and stifled opposition. Alongside the presidency, all 92 seats of the National Assembly will be contested.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Ortega is running for a fourth consecutive and fifth overall term (he served one term from 1985-90). Since returning to office in 2007, he has overseen a period of democratic deterioration. Constitutional reforms passed by a majority-FSLN National Assembly in 2014 removed term limits, paving the way for Ortega’s reelection to a third consecutive term during deeply flawed elections in 2016. Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo, joined him as vice president in his third term and his children have been appointed to prominent positions in government. Mass antigovernment protests in 2018 were met with state violence that left at least 325 dead and ushered in a breakdown of the rule of law that has yet to recover. Independent media face censorship, violence and harassment, and legal penalties. Dozens of journalists have fled since 2018. In late 2020, congress passed two laws preventing “traitors” and those receiving foreign funding from running for public office. The former was used in June to arrest several presidential hopefuls. Separately, Cristina Chamorro, a prominent challenger to Ortega and the daughter of former President Violeta Chamorro, was placed under house arrest mere hours after announcing her intention to run as the presidential candidate for Citizen's Alliance, one of two main opposition coalitions. 



    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Removal of online content: Progovernment media outlets sometimes use copyright and Digital Millennium Copyright Act complaints as means of removing unwanted online content. Independent media are routinely barred from state events, including press conferences, and instead rely on footage from progovernment sources to provide comprehensive news coverage. In response, members of the government-aligned media leverage copyright complaints that trigger the removal of independent – and often critical – online content. Forced removal may further inhibit users’ already limited access to accurate and independent information ahead of the election.
    • Information manipulation: The Nicaraguan regime uses multiple strategies to manipulate the digital information sphere. Projects to artificially amplify progovernment narratives have been in progress since at least 2018, when Murillo reportedly first ordered the creation of “troll factories.” An operation exposed in early 2021 involves over 100 employees from various public institutions who were hired to post and comment on social media in defense of the regime. The initiative is housed in the Nicaraguan Post Office, though similar cells operate in other public buildings, and is directed by government officials. Officials also control online information through editorial pressure, directly threatening independent outlets and limiting their access to official information by barring them from state events. Manipulation of online information ahead of the election compounds existing barriers to accessing reliable information. 
    • Harassment and violence: Critical online reporters and outlets are frequently harassed, surveilled, and violently targeted by security forces and unknown actors in retaliation for their work. Journalists risk doxing, smear campaigns, and retribution against their family members. Everyday users are also at risk of intimidation and physical assault. In addition to causing direct harm to individuals, an escalation of these tactics ahead of the election day could encourage further self-censorship about political issues.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Online speech is punishable using multiple laws, including a cybercrimes law passed in 2020. The new Special Cybercrimes Law introduces punitive measures explicitly for online speech, including multi-year prison sentences for publishing “fake news” on social media or through news outlets. Authorities also levy unrelated charges in apparent retribution for digital activities. In July 2020, TikTok user Kevin Monzón was arrested and detained for five days for ostensibly threatening another person with a firearm. Analysts suspect his detention was related to antigovernment videos that police had previously warned him against posting. These new and politicized avenues of arrest raise the risk of legal repercussions for those who speak out during the electoral period.
    • Cyberattacks: Independent news outlets have been targeted with DDoS attacks during recent political events. Confidencial and La Prensa suffered simultaneous DDoS attacks during the 2018 protests. The perpetrators behind the attacks remain unknown, but press freedom advocates suggested that the goal was to stifle independent condemnation of the government. La Prensa also suffered a DDoS attack in May 2019, effectively slowing the site and preventing updates for more than 24 hours. Amid the ongoing crackdown on dissent, cyberattacks could be used to disrupt and silence remaining critical voices.    

    Nicaragua has a score of 36 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects an increasingly restricted political space where free expression is suppressed online and offline, independent media and civil society face physical and digital violence and harassment, and government corruption is unchecked. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 30 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. Nicaragua will be covered by Freedom on the Net 2021 for the first time, and the country report and internet freedom score will be available in September 2021. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Nicaragua country report in Freedom in the World.

    Download the pre-election assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Nicaragua

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    • Global Freedom Score

      16 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      42 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      November 7, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      38.85%
    • Population

      6.6 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Nigeria

    header1 Country Overview

    Nigeria will host one of its most high-stakes elections in decades on February 25, 2023. The country’s citizens will elect their new president, vice-president, and all 469 members of the Senate and House of Representatives. President Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressive Congress (APC) will be leaving office after eight years due to term limits, and public polls had not yet indicated a clear leader in the presidential race as of January. Separately on March 11, Nigerians will vote for state governors in 28 states and the legislatures of all 36 states of the federation. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    If successful—namely, if held without undue or violent interference—the 2023 election will be the first time during its 63 years of independence that Nigeria has secured three consecutive peaceful transitions of power. This marks an important indicator of how Nigerian democracy has progressed incrementally since 1999, when the military last ruled. An aborted election, or one fraught with violence and malpractice, would be a huge blow to Nigeria, already reeling from serious security threats, polarization, and economic challenges. It would also weaken Nigeria’s stature within the region, particularly its authority to take a stance against unconstitutional takeovers of powers elsewhere. 

    While peaceful and credible elections have never been a foregone conclusion in Nigeria, the 2023 election faces some unique threats. The biggest among them are the violent activities of several non-state armed groups who have publicly expressed a wish to scupper the country’s vulnerable democracy. For instance, militant groups have attacked local offices of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) throughout the country. Boko Haram, which has attempted to disrupt past elections and has expanded its operations since the last electoral cycle, remains a threat. Others – including the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and militant gangs known as “bandits” – have emerged with concerning sophistication and lethality. Previous Nigerian elections have triggered violence and widespread social unrest, as when over 800 people were killed in the aftermath of the 2011 general election. In 2023, this risk is heightened by the ruling APC’s selection of presidential and vice-presidential candidates drawn from the same faith, as well as the spread of false and misleading information on social media. 

    Conversely, new election reforms may bolster election preparedness, infrastructure, and transparency. The Electoral Act, which was enacted in February 2022, bolsters the INEC’s capacity for oversight and digitizes some components of polling, among other changes.

    Freedom House has identified the following key digital issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: False and misleading information surged online during the 2019 national election. Some internet users spread narratives that portrayed candidates as biased against specific ethnic and religious communities. Others sought to undermine candidates through allegations of corruption or, in the case of one popular fabrication about President Buhari, of being an impersonator hired to replace the candidate. Political officials sometimes spread those narratives further, and both the APC and the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) reportedly engaged networks of online commentators to spread favorable narratives throughout the 2019 election season. Similar influence operations may emerge ahead of the polling in February, with the potential to shape how people vote or to incite violence. Fact-checkers have identified concerning false claims circulating on social media, including misinformation alleging that the APC candidate Bola Tinubu called for supporters to seize ballot boxes and that PDP presidential candidate Atiku Abubakar traded bribes for endorsements. Groups like the Nigeria Fact Check Coalition and the Centre for Democracy and Development-West Africa have mobilized to counter the harms of election disinformation.
    • Blocking of platforms and websites: The government sometimes blocks online content and social media platforms for political aims. Authorities ordered Twitter blocked between June 2021 and January 2022 after the platform removed a tweet by President Buhari that seemed to threaten violence against Biafran secessionists. The government has also blocked websites associated with the #EndSARS movement against police brutality and sites promoting Biafran independence. Protests or political instability during the electoral period could prompt similar restrictions, limiting people’s access to reliable information about the election and independent commentary about candidates.  
    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activities: Bloggers and online commentators are occasionally arrested for their commentary on political leaders. For example, security forces arrested the founder of news site EaglesForeSight in May 2022 after the outlet republished an article detailing fraud allegations against the governor of Ogun State. Online journalists and other commentators reporting on the election may face similar retribution, limiting oversight of campaigning and undermining voters’ access to election-related information. 

    Nigeria has a score of 51 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects unprecedented insecurity throughout the country, including militant violence in northern states and civil unrest in the south, as well as restrictions on free assembly and online expression. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 43 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with a score of 57 out of 100. Scores and ratings for Nigeria in the Freedom in the World 2023 report, covering the 2022 calendar year, will be released in the spring of 2023. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Nigeria country reports for Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Nigeria

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    • Global Freedom Score

      44 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      60 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      February 25, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      40.40%
    • Population

      211.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Pakistan

    header1 Country Overview

    Pakistan’s next general election, in which voters will select all 342 National Assembly members, is currently scheduled for October 2023. Significant uncertainties remain ahead of the vote, including questions over the timing of the election itself, amid an escalating confrontation between former prime minister Imran Khan and Pakistan’s powerful military establishment. Tensions increased when paramilitary officers arrested Khan in May, prompting violent clashes between Khan’s supporters and the authorities. Within days of his arrest, the Supreme Court ordered Khan’s release on procedural grounds. In the weeks that followed, dozens of prominent officials quit Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, some after being arrested and others citing pressure from the military.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The incumbent coalition government is led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N). The coalition assumed power after the National Assembly removed Khan from office in an April 2022 no-confidence vote. Khan has blamed the military for his ouster and pressured the coalition government to hold early elections. As part of those efforts, the provincial governments of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa dissolved their assemblies in early 2023, with the aim of triggering snap elections to communicate the PTI’s strength in those provinces. As of early July, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) had repeatedly delayed the provincial elections, despite a Supreme Court order mandating that they be held within 90 days of the assemblies’ dissolution per the constitution.

    Khan’s eligibility to run in October 2023 is also unclear. In October 2022, the ECP barred Khan from public office for five years after a corruption investigation; Khan has contested the decision. The Islamabad High Court issued an arrest warrant for Khan in February 2023 over the case that prompted the ECP’s decision. The ruling coalition, meanwhile, is openly considering whether to ban the PTI entirely, citing the violent May protests.

    The ongoing political crisis is a manifestation of the intense political dysfunction and partisanship that have affected Pakistan in recent years. Pakistan holds regular elections under a competitive multiparty political system, and electoral laws are considered largely fair. However, the PTI, the PML-N, and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) have leveraged relationships with the military and the judiciary to manipulate the campaign environment in the past. During the most recent general election in 2018, experts identified widespread prepoll rigging as candidates were improperly disqualified and journalists reporting on the vote faced censorship, intimidation, and physical violence. The ECP was criticized for its failure to counter electoral manipulation efforts and for the collapse of its vote-tallying system on polling day.

    Security concerns also cast a shadow over the October 2023 election. The army could use its power to politically intervene ahead of the ballot. The potential for election-related violence remains high: Khan survived an assassination attempt in November 2022, while the May 2023 protests were marred by violence on the part of protesters and the use of excessive force by security officers. Separately, attacks by Islamist militants on religious minorities and other perceived opponents may further undermine the election environment, particularly given the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Internet shutdowns: Pakistani authorities frequently cite security concerns to disrupt telecommunications services during protests, elections, or other politically charged events. The Sharif government restricted connectivity across Pakistan for several days in May 2023 after Khan’s arrest, deploying a tactic that Khan himself had used to stifle the opposition while in office. Similarly, authorities cut internet service in several major cities amid widespread protests over Khan’s removal from office in May 2022. Such restrictions limit access to voting information, impede discussions about the election, and hinder Pakistanis as they conduct their everyday business.
    • Information manipulation: Pakistan’s political parties have weaponized the information space to galvanize supporters and undermine opponents. Mainstream parties maintain social media wings and employ looser networks that spread disinformation to attack their opponents and boost party narratives. These networks have been mobilized during the ongoing political crisis. After losing the April 2022 no-confidence vote, Khan thanked “social media warriors” who spread his allegations that the United States facilitated his ouster, a claim he later appeared to walk back. Meanwhile, PML-N officials alleged that automated accounts and impersonators manipulated criticism of the no-confidence vote. The coalition government has also mulled using communications regulators to target purportedly antimilitary social media activities. Information manipulation during the electoral period may further distort the already tumultuous online environment, obstructing access to reliable information about the polls.
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Authorities routinely pursue politically motivated prosecutions of political opponents and journalists for their online activities. For example, in February 2023, a court sentenced a PTI supporter to three years’ imprisonment over Twitter posts criticizing the military. Also in February, Federal Investigation Agency officers arrested journalist Imran Riaz Khan; in a video disseminated via social media, Riaz Khan had questioned a former army chief over claims that the military would distance itself from politics. Riaz Khan was again arrested in May 2023 but subsequently disappeared; his whereabouts remained unknown as of early July. Online journalists and other commentators reporting on the election or engaging with election-related topics may face retribution, undermining voters’ access to poll-related information.
    • Harassment and violence: Pakistan’s internet users face intimidation, blackmail, and violence in response to their online activities. In particular, women journalists—especially those who cover politically sensitive events—are often harassed and intimidated for their online reporting. Politicians have contributed to such hostility. For example, PTI officials have alternately downplayed or fueled targeted online threats of physical violence by their supporters. These coordinated online attacks, from both state and nonstate actors, may be lodged against women, LGBT+ people, religious minorities, and opposition parties during the fraught election period, potentially curtailing online discussion about the vote.
    • Website blocks and content removal: Pakistani authorities regularly block access to websites and pressure social media companies to remove content, including about political and social issues. For example, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) briefly restricted access to Wikipedia in February 2023 after the platform refused to remove content the PTA deemed “sacrilegious.” During the 2018 election, the PTA blocked the website of the left-leaning Awami Workers Party. Such restrictions limit access to independent commentary about the election, criticism of political parties, and information about voting. However, the extent to which such restrictions have been imposed during the political crisis and election period is unclear because the PTA’s operations are opaque.

    Pakistan has a score of 35 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a political system vulnerable to military influence and restrictions on civil rights alongside a restricted environment for online expression. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 37 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 26 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Pakistan country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Pakistan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      35 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      26 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      February 8, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      36.70%
    • Population

      235.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Peru

    header1 Country Overview

    Peru’s April election is seen as a test of stability following a political crisis that saw three presidents hold office over the course of one week in November 2020. The vote will determine the country’s fifth president in under five years and all 130 members of Congress. A highly fragmented political landscape consisting of generally unpopular political parties and a large, ideologically diverse candidate pool set expectations that the presidential election will progress to a runoff on June 6.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Peru has a history of generally credible and competitive elections, but an ongoing power struggle between the legislative and executive branches has disrupted the political landscape. Congress impeached President Martín Vizcarra in November 2020 over unproven allegations that he had received bribes during his time as governor. As president of Congress, Manuel Merino succeeded to power for five days before resigning under public pressure. The impeachment and Merino’s ascension prompted mass protests by Peruvians who viewed the impeachment as overtly political; demonstrations were further fueled by the killing of two protesters by the police. Congressman Francisco Sagasti was subsequently installed as interim president. Disillusionment with Peruvian governance will not be the only challenge to the country’s general elections; insufficient regulation of campaign financing, inadequate representation of indigenous groups, an alarmingly disproportionate level of deaths from COVID-19, and widespread corruption allegations against top officials may further chip away at public trust in the electoral landscape.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Harassment and violence for online activity: Digital journalists and online commentators sometimes receive death threats for reporting on links between the government and organized crime groups or for satirizing politicians. Political figures have instigated online harassment. In April 2019, a Congressman accused a news site director of being responsible for the suicide of a former president via a series of tweets. Intimidation by state and nonstate actors often leads to self-censorship, which could reduce the prevalence of critical and independent information ahead of the election. 
    • Laws criminalizing online activity: Peruvian law assigns criminal penalties and civil liabilities for a number of online activities, and sentences for defamation can be harsher for internet-related offenses. Though laws criminalizing online activity are rarely used in Peru, at least one investigative journalist was recently charged with defamation. The ongoing existence of these laws could contribute to self-censorship during electoral periods. 
    • Cyberattacks: Government institutions have succumbed to politicized cyberattacks in recent years. In November 2020, five days after Vizcarra’s removal, Anonymous hacked and temporarily shut down the website of the Peruvian Congress, reportedly in retaliation for police violence against protesters. Cyberattacks in Peru also have a history of tangible political repercussions. In July 2014, information taken from the Council of Minister’s network and shared online by a group known as “LulzSecPeru” helped launch a no-confidence vote against top Cabinet ministers. Reports of cyberattacks ahead of the election could disrupt the political landscape, impact the electoral administration, or undermine trust in the electoral process.

    Peru has a score of 75 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects unequal access to political processes for ethnic and cultural minorities, rule of law deficits, and a lack of government transparency regarding defense and security policies within a relatively vibrant, though tumultuous, political and electoral environment. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 72 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties. To learn more about annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Peru country reports in Freedom in the World

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Peru’s status declined from Free to Partly Free in the 2021 edition of Freedom in the World due to political clashes between the presidency and Congress that have disrupted governance and anticorruption efforts, strained the country’s constitutional order, and resulted in an irregular succession of four presidents within three years. Read the Peru report.

    On Peru

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    • Global Freedom Score

      66 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 11, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      62.29%
    • Population

      32. 8 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Philippines

    header1 Country Overview

    The Philippines approaches a crossroads in the May 2022 general election, as voters face a choice between dynastic power consolidation and reversal of the country’s democratic decline. President Rodrigo Duterte, who has presided over of an erosion of political and civil rights in the Philippines since 2016, is constitutionally prohibited from running for a second six-year term. Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, leads a crowded field of candidates to replace him, including Vice President Maria Leonor “Leni” Robredo, the primary progressive candidate and a pro-democracy activist. Marcos Jr.—who has been credibly linked to the endemic corruption of his father’s government and accused of minimizing the atrocities perpetrated under that regime—announced an alliance with vice-presidential candidate Sara Duterte-Carpio, the president’s daughter and mayor of Davao City. Alongside the presidency and vice presidency, the general election spans half of the Senate, the entire House of Representatives, and all local executive and parliamentary elected positions.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Although the Philippines transitioned from authoritarian rule in 1986, the rule of law and application of justice are haphazard and heavily favor political and economic elites. Long-term violent insurgencies have continued for decades, though their threat to the state has diminished in recent years. Impunity remains the norm for violent crimes against activists and journalists, and President Duterte’s war on drugs has led to thousands of extrajudicial killings since 2016.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: The Philippine online information landscape is distorted by accounts coordinated to share pro-government content. Coordinated efforts to shape social media narratives about the election have already proliferated. For example, Twitter removed a coordinated network of accounts promoting Marcos Jr. in December 2021, while fact-checkers have identified widespread networks of false or misleading content with negative messages about Vice President Robredo. Online content manipulation has featured heavily in recent elections, including the 2016 general election. Meanwhile, hyperpartisan online news outlets routinely proliferate misleading content. The election is likely to muddy the waters further: politically connected networks and outlets could mobilize to spread online narratives that favor certain candidates, limiting the reliability of online information and shaping online discussion. 
    • Harassment: Independent online media outlets, journalists, and social media users face sustained online harassment, at times for their reporting or critical commentary. In some cases, the harassment is coordinated by progovernment social media accounts or the authorities. Certain government officials and their supporters also employ red-tagging—a tactic of accusing targets of links to communist groups—to harass and intimidate journalists, celebrities, and everyday internet users. For example, President Duterte and other officials have conducted a prolonged red-tagging campaign against elected officials and activists affiliated with the progressive opposition coalition Makabayan. Such harassment could drive internet users to censor themselves or journalists to avoid reporting on electoral candidates and campaigns, further degrading access to reliable elections-related information.
    • Prosecutions: Politicians and business executives sometimes file libel cases against journalists and other internet users for their reporting or critical content. For instance, news outlet Rappler and its employees, including executive Maria Ressa, have faced several cyberlibel lawsuits in recent years. Candidates could file libel charges to silence online critics or challenge unfavorable news coverage during the election period. The risk of facing civil or criminal penalties could also incentivize journalists, civil society organizations, or voters to self-censor their discussions about the general election.
    • Cyberattacks: Technical attacks pose a threat to Philippine media groups, particularly those known for critical reporting on the government. For example, the news outlet Vera Files was briefly taken offline by a distributed denial-of-service attack in December 2021, likely linked to posts fact-checking claims made by Marcos Jr. Similar cyberattacks could impede access to credible reporting and fact-checking relating to the election. Separately, cyberattacks targeting elections infrastructure may compromise the integrity of digital vote counts, sensitive data, or access to information about voting, as with the breach of the Philippine election commission’s servers ahead of the 2016 general election.

    The Philippines has a score of 55 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a distorted online information environment and severe pressure on rule of law and the media, alongside routinely held elections marred by increasing harassment against opposition politicians. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 56 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and as Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 65. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Philippine country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Philippines

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    • Global Freedom Score

      58 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      61 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      May 9, 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      55.01%
    • Population

      109.6 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Poland

    header1 Country Overview

    In October or November 2023—depending on when the president sets the polling date—Poland will hold elections to the National Assembly. Voters will choose members of the 460-seat Sejm, the lower bicameral body, by proportional representation; members of the 100-seat Senate will be elected in single-member constituencies. Members of parliament serve four-year terms, and the party that wins the most seats in the Sejm typically forms the ruling coalition. Polls from July 2023 gave the populist, socially conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS), which heads the United Right Coalition, a 5 percent lead over Civic Platform (PO), which governed from 2007 to 2015 and leads the opposition.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    During 2019 elections, PiS won a record 43.6 percent of the popular vote and maintained its majority in the Sejm, but lost 51 Senate seats to the opposition. Monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which deployed a limited observation mission, reported issues including mistrust among some stakeholders in judicial institutions’ management of electoral complaints, and “media bias and intolerant rhetoric” during the campaign. However, the mission assessed the polls as generally competitive and administered transparently. Ahead of the 2023 election, five of the seven groups that sit in the European Parliament requested that the OSCE conduct a full observation mission, saying the elections “might not be held in the highest democratic standards.”

    Since taking power in 2015, a PiS-led coalition has exerted significant political influence over state institutions, inflicting damage to their democratic functioning. For instance, the PiS government has moved aggressively to assert control over the judiciary, passing legislation designed to curb the powers of Constitutional Tribunal (TK) and to install progovernment judges on its benches. It has meanwhile engaged in a lengthy battle with the European Union (EU) over these and other measures. A law on the Supreme Court created powerful new chambers, including the Disciplinary Chamber, which is widely perceived to be influenced by PiS and effectively allows the sanctioning of judges whose rulings contradict government policy. In response to its establishment, the EU issued a fine of €1 million daily against Poland in 2021, which the Polish government has refused to pay. In April 2023, the EU reduced the daily €1 million fine to €500,000 after the Polish parliament passed a law giving disciplinary responsibility to the Supreme Administrative Court—though critics argue that that court responds to government influence as well. In June 2023, the EU’s Court of Justice ruled that Poland’s judicial measures were in violation of EU law. The EU has also withheld €35 billion in COVID-19 recovery funds, saying they will be released when judicial independence is restored.

    Other PiS policies have also been criticized for infringing on fundamental freedoms. In May 2023, PiS introduced a law that would enable a commission to investigate anyone perceived to be under “Russian influence” and bar those found guilty from running in elections for up to 10 years. The law drew criticism from democratic governments, and is widely viewed as means to attack the opposition and PO leader Donald Tusk. At the beginning of June 2023, an estimated 500,000 people took to the streets in Warsaw to protest the PiS’s policies, including the “Russian influence” law—though the Sejm ultimately passed a somewhat watered-down version in late July. Separately, Poland’s criminalization of almost all abortions in 2021 once again spurred demonstrations in June 2023, when thousands across the country protested after a pregnant woman died as a result of sepsis.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues ahead of the election:

    • Harassment and intimidation: State-owned media outlets have a history of harassing journalists, members of the opposition, and their families. In October 2022, for example, the Polish state broadcaster TVP ran misleading video clips about an interview between Brussels-based Polsat correspondent Dorota Bawo?ek, and Donald Tusk, the head of PO. Soon after, she faced an online harassment campaign that included violent threats and claims that she was having an affair with Tusk. In another incident, the public broadcaster Radio Szczecin was denounced by opposition members over an early 2023 story that effectively identified the 15-year-old son of an opposition lawmaker as a victim of sexual assault. The criticism came in March, after the teenager’s family revealed that he had committed suicide. Targeted harassment of prominent journalists and members of the opposition could exacerbate online self-censorship, as a means of avoiding intimidation during the electoral period.
    • Information manipulation: Both foreign and domestic online influence operations could threaten Poland’s elections. For years, Poland has been targeted by extensive Russian propaganda, which increased further following Moscow’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Trolls with suspected links to Russia have spread disinformation about Ukrainian refugees and falsely claimed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was planning to use Polish soldiers as “cannon fodder” in the fighting, though the Polish government has not deployed any soldiers in Ukraine as of July 2023. On the domestic front, state-owned media outlets, including the public broadcaster TVP, spread misleading information ahead of the 2019 election. For instance, one state-owned television outlet reposted a doctored photo depicting climate activist Greta Thunberg alongside philanthropist George Soros, accompanied by false claims that Thunberg was part of a global conspiracy whose targets included PiS. An OSCE election monitoring report on the 2020 presidential election found that TVP acted as “a campaign vehicle for the incumbent.” In May 2023, several private media outlets released a joint statement condemning government efforts to influence the coverage of Wirtualna Polska and Onet, the country’s two most prominent news websites. Given the spread of false and misleading information from Kremlin-linked as well as domestic sources, voters should be wary of false narratives online ahead of the election. Recent years have also seen an increase in rhetoric targeting Muslim migrants and refugees, from both PiS figures and from Tusk, who has accused the PiS of facilitating the migration of Muslims into Poland. An increase in nationalist and discriminatory rhetoric and members of the LGBT+ community further skews the information landscape. 
    • Technical attacks: According to Poland’s security agency, the country has been a “constant target” of pro-Russian hackers since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Such attacks could have implications for the 2023 elections. Attacks have primarily impacted government services, private companies, and media organizations. In October 2022, Microsoft researchers discovered a coordinated ransomware campaign targeting the transportation and logistics sectors in Poland, likely conducted by the Russia-based hacking group Iridium. In another attack, Ghostwriter, a hacking operation that has been linked to both the Russian and Belarusian governments, attempted to gain access to social media accounts of prominent individuals in Poland in 2022. In May 2023, major independent or private Polish news sites suffered distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, which the government said could have originated from Russia. The attacks on state websites, individual public figures, and news sites suggest Russia-linked actors can employ similar tactics to disrupt the 2023 election.
    • Content removal: Journalists who have criticized politicians have been sued or ordered to remove content. In May 2022, Piotr Woyciechowski, the former head of the Polish Security Printing Works and a member of the Polish National Foundation, issued a prelitigation warning concerning alleged defamation to leading Polish daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and its journalist Agnieszka Kublik. The document demanded an article covering the testimony of Andrzej Malinowski, a politician and the former president of the Employers of the Republic of Poland, who had spoken about the use of Pegasus spyware in an April 2022 Senate hearing, be removed from the outlet’s website. The threat of content removal could be further weaponized in the lead-up to the election.
    • Arrests and prosecution for online activity: While Polish residents do not risk long-term detention or prison for online speech, there have been cases of legal threats and short-term detentions, particularly related to reporting on migration at the Polish border with Belarus. Though Poland has welcomed millions of refugees from Ukraine, those from other countries—usually with Muslim-majority populations—have been mistreated by border guards. In November 2021, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that at least seven journalists who had been covering migrants and refugees on the Polish border had been detained and had their phones confiscated. These past detentions of journalists covering sensitive issues raises concerns that authorities could take legal measures against those covering similarly sensitive topics during the election campaign.

    Poland has a score of 74 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a relatively open online environment, but one that is threatened by disinformation campaigns, technical attacks, and legal threats against government critics. Poland is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 81 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and as a Semi-Consolidated Democracy in Nations in Transit 2023, with a score of 59 out of 100 for democratic governance. Poland is not covered by Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Poland

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    • Global Freedom Score

      80 100 free
    • Date of Election

      October 15, 2023
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      88.40%
    • Population

      38 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Russia

    header1 Country Overview

    The September elections to Russia’s lower house of parliament, the State Duma, are an opportunity for United Russia to retain its grip on the country’s legislative body. United Russia, the pro-Putin party, has maintained majority control of the Duma since 2003, including winning supermajorities in the 2007 and 2016 elections. The opposition in Russia is divided into two factions: the systemic opposition, comprised of nominally rival parties to United Russia that agree to pose no real challenge in the Duma, and the genuine opposition, which lacks any representation in the parliament. The latter face not only barriers to registration and campaigning, but also rampant abuse of administrative resources by pro-regime forces and widespread propaganda efforts by state-run media.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Putin and United Russia depend on elections to provide a patina of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, but the electoral environment has become more unpredictable for the ruling elite due to the opposition’s innovative messaging and voting strategy. Despite the formal and informal advantages favoring United Russia, some opposition candidates have improved chances to win a seat in the Duma due to a “smart voting” strategy. The strategy, coordinated by the team of Alexei Navalny, Russia’s most influential opposition figure, identifies and informs citizens of the candidate most likely to defeat United Russia’s choice. In response to growing uncertainty, the regime’s repressive tactics against the opposition are gradually increasing in severity, including, most notably, the poisoning of Navalny in August 2020. Russian authorities arrested Navalny when he returned to Russia in January after recuperating abroad. Days later, his team at the Anti-Corruption Foundation published a YouTube video highlighting the scale of corruption of the Putin regime, which led to nationwide protests. The government typically restricts freedom of assembly and responded to the “unsanctioned” protests with mass arrests and use of force. In addition to the tight control over opposition activities, Russian voters face their own set of constraints during the election, ranging from pressure from employers and peers to limited ability to access reliable information. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Blocking of websites and social media: Sensitive political and social content is regularly blocked in Russia and access to small social media platforms or messaging apps is sometimes restricted. While wholesale blocks of major messaging platforms are not common practice and the two-year block of Telegram was lifted in June 2020, in March 2021 the telecoms regulator, Roskamandzor, threatened to block Twitter if it failed to remove “banned content” from its platform. Separately, in February 2021, the Duma passed a bill allowing the Central Election Commission (CEC) to require Roskomnadzor to block websites involved in “illegal campaigning.” If signed into law, the new regulation would allow the CEC to circumvent judicial oversight, which could make it easier and faster to block online content through the electoral period. 
    • Internet shutdowns: The government sometimes restricts internet connectivity during politically sensitive moments, including elections. Disruptions tend to be targeted and local, rather than blanket shutdowns affecting entire regions or the whole country. Amid mass protests in advance of the September 2019 regional elections, authorities briefly disabled fixed and mobile internet connections and public Wi-Fi hotpots in parts of Moscow. 
    • Influence operations: Authorities have significant influence over the online information environment through an array of state-run and state-aligned media outlets and the widespread use of paid commentators and automated accounts. As Russians increasingly get their news from social media, rather than traditional sources, the potential impact of online influence operations grows. Persistent influence operations ahead of the election may impact public discourse and prevent voters from accessing reliable information. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: A plethora of laws limit free expression, providing authorities with an adaptable toolkit to target people who speak out online. The range of criminal and administrative provisions includes penalties for sharing false news, for calling for extremism or separatism online, and for various forms of defamation and slander, including “defamation of power,” which prohibits spreading information that “exhibits blatant disrespect for society, government, official government symbols, constitution or governmental bodies of Russia.” In February, the editor of a media outlet who retweeted a satirical post that listed details about a pro-Navalny demonstration was arrested and sentenced to 15 days in jail for supporting an unauthorized protest. 
    • Cyberattacks: A range of actors are regularly targeted with cyberattacks, including independent media, civil society organizations, and opposition leaders. Cyberattacks in recent years have included DDoS attacks against media outlets and attempts to hack into Telegram and Gmail accounts associated with activists and journalists or media outlets. As pressure on critical voices grows ahead of the election, cyberattacks could be used to disrupt their reach or ability to function. 

    Russia has a score of 18 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a consolidated authoritarian system where political engagement, free expression on and offline, and government institutions are controlled and personalized. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 20 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 30 out of 100; and as a consolidated authoritarian regime in Nations in Transit 2020, with a score of 7 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Russia country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    In the news

    Key digital trends ahead of Russia's election include internet sovereignty, digital election interference, and tensions with technology companies. Listen to new Freedom House analysis on the Bear Market Brief podcast.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      13 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      21 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      September 19, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      80.25%
    • Population

      146.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Russia

    header1 Country Overview

    Russians will head to the polls for a presidential election held from March 15 to 17, 2024, the first national election since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. President Vladimir Putin, who initially served in the role from 2000 to 2008, remained the de facto paramount leader while assuming the premiership, and again became president in 2012, is expected to be reelected. Though President Putin operates as the de facto leader of the United Russia party, which holds a supermajority in the State Duma, he will once again run as an independent. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The 2018 presidential elections, in which President Putin won a reported 77.53 percent of the vote, “took place in an overly controlled legal and political environment marked by continued pressure on critical voices,” according to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s observation mission. In the years between the 2018 election and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Putin stifled Russia’s political opposition. During the January 2021 protests across the country in support of Alexei Navalny, the opposition politician who was poisoned in 2020 and arrested in 2021, law enforcement officials attacked protestors and detained over 1,500 people. In March 2022, a court sentenced Navalny to nine years in prison; he still faces additional charges. Navalny’s family, his colleagues at the Anti-Corruption Foundation, members of his legal defense team, and his supporters have been charged, imprisoned, or forced to flee the country. 

    President Putin has introduced a host of repressive measures to bolster support for the war. Individuals, news outlets, and other institutions have faced strict censorship and editorial pressure from the government. People within Russia must refer to the war as a “special military operation,” and can face up to 15 years in prison for “discrediting” or spreading “false information” about the Russian military or other actors supporting the war. Most independent news outlets have closed or relocated outside of Russia due to increasing legal and extralegal pressure applied by the state, including the designation of many outlets as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organizations.” There is little room for dissent concerning the war, economy, and President Putin himself: though some small anti-war protests occurred in the aftermath of the invasion and the mobilization of reservists, none matched the scale of the January 2021 protests.

    The war and the economic sanctions imposed in response loom large over the election; President Putin has made them central to his campaign messaging. The “partial mobilization” of the Russian military that President Putin implemented in September 2022, mandating the mobilization of 300,000 reservists, may shape voter perceptions of the war, especially after lawmakers moved to strengthen conscription measures in the spring of 2023. United States- and European Union-led sanctions continue to impact Russia’s economy. For example, people across Russia faced major issues with their heating systems in early 2024.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Website blocks and content removal: The Russian government’s widespread website blocking ramped up dramatically in the wake of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Roskomnadzor, the country’s internet regulator, and other state agencies have ordered the blocking of websites critical of the government, including independent Russian news sites, Ukrainian news sites, international news sites, websites of nongovernmental organizations, and the websites and servers of virtual private networks (VPNs). Moreover, in March 2022, the government blocked access to Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter for content moderation actions the platforms took against Russian-state affiliated accounts. The Kremlin continues to issue content removal orders and ensuing fines to the platforms that still operate in the country. State-owned VK and other platforms of domestic origin routinely comply with the state’s removal orders, which have increased since the full-scale invasion, and suppress critical content through moderation algorithms. Ahead of the election, the government could expand its website blocking practices, with a particular focus on VPNs, and block the remaining foreign platforms and messengers still operating in-country, such as Telegram, YouTube, and WhatsApp. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Individuals who criticize the Russian government or the invasion of Ukraine online are regularly punished with criminal sentences and administrative fines. The laws that criminalize discrediting and spreading false information about the Russian military and other private actors supporting the war have been used to suppress critical voices. In June 2023, Roman Ushakov, a popular Telegram blogger, was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison for allegedly spreading “false” news about the military, rehabilitating Nazism, and inciting hatred. According to The Online Freedoms Project, prosecutors opened 779 cases concerning online expression in 2022, a record in the project’s 15-year existence. Moreover, government agencies monitor social media applications for content critical of the government, and in some cases arrest users based on this surveillance. The stark increase in prosecutions over the past two years raises concern that those who dare to mobilize or speak out against President Putin could face imprisonment. 
    • Information manipulation: The Russian government routinely manipulates content and spreads online propaganda to advance its narratives both domestically and abroad. The government’s increased control over online media sources and Russian social media platforms, including VK, further enable it to curate the information space in its own favor. This practice extends to messaging applications: an October 2022 study from the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab found that nine of the ten most popular “political” Telegram channels in the country spewed pro-government propaganda. The government has also paid trolls to support its narratives. For instance, in March 2022, the Cyber ??Front Z Telegram channel, which was linked to the notorious Internet Research Agency, employed people to post comments on other platforms in support of the Russian army’s invasion of Ukraine. The government will likely continue to use a variety of means to manipulate the online environment ahead of the election. 
    • Internet shutdowns: In recent years, the Kremlin has refrained from shutting down the internet, instead opting to engage in the mass blocking of websites and social media platforms (The Kremlin most recently restricted local access to the internet in response to protests ahead of 2019 elections). The government continues to pursue the so-called “sovereign internet,” a project initiated in 2019 to cut Russia off from the global internet. Testing the sovereign internet’s ability to disconnect from global connections in the summer of 2023 appeared to fail, but subsequent advances in the Kremlin’s website blocking techniques suggest that the government could be closer to reaching its goal. Heightened tensions during the electoral period could compel the government to impose connectivity restrictions. 

    Russia has a score of 13 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects widespread website blocking, rampant disinformation, and repressive laws deployed to prosecute individuals for their online activities. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 16 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 21 out of 100; and as a Consolidated Authoritarian Regime in Nations in Transit 2023, with a score of 2 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Russia country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.
     

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Russia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      13 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      21 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      March 15-17, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      88.20%
    • Population

      146.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Rwanda

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      23 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      37 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      July 15-16, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      30.50%
    • Population

      14.1 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Serbia

    header1 Country Overview

    Serbia has a score of 64 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 64 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 71 out of 100; and as a transitional or hybrid regime in Nations in Transit 2021, with a score of 48 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Serbia country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

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    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      57 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      71 100 free
    • Date of Election

      April 3, 2022
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      78.21%
    • Population

      7 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Serbia

    header1 Country Overview

    In November 2023, President Aleksandar Vučić formally dissolved parliament and announced plans to hold snap elections for the unicameral, 250-seat National Assembly. The snap elections are set to be held on December 17, 2023, less than two years into the Assembly’s four-year term, and will coincide with local snap elections in some municipalities. This vote follows presidential and parliamentary elections that were held in April 2022, which saw Vučić elected to a second term with 60 percent of the vote while his populist Zajedno možemo sve (“Together We Can Do Everything”) coalition lost its majority in the National Assembly, although it won a major plurality of the votes. Ahead of the December snap elections, a wider swath of opposition parties has come together to challenge the coalition led by the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) compared to the last elections.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with competitive multiparty elections, but in recent years the ruling SNS has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which observed the April 2022 elections, found the ruling coalition urged government employees to support them and misused state resources to garner support. Though the European Union (EU) orchestrated an interparty dialogue ahead of the 2022 elections, which convened political party representatives to discuss electoral conditions, the 16 proposed measures did not make a significant impact on the electoral process. In the wake of election day, it took officials 93 days to finalize the results.

    The snap parliamentary elections come amidst a period of turmoil for Serbia. In May 2023, two mass shootings killed 19 people and inspired opposition-led “Serbia against violence” protests. In Belgrade, tens of thousands of protestors demanded the resignation of cabinet ministers, members of the Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media (REM), and members of state-owned broadcaster Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) for their role in allegedly promoting content that incited violence through both digital and traditional media. Protesters also urged the government to fully implement the OSCE mission’s recommendations from the 2022 elections. Separately, tension between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo has increased dramatically in the past two years, particularly after a shoot-out between a group of Serbian paramilitary fighters and Kosovar law enforcement officers in September 2023 resulted in several deaths. Serbia’s potential accession to the EU has also stagnated under Vučić, who claimed in January 2023 that Serbia was “not enthusiastic” about EU membership. The EU has been critical of Vučić's relationship with the Kremlin, his opposition to imposing sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, and the repression of media freedoms and freedom of expression in the country.

     

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Information manipulation: Manipulated content has plagued the online environment in Serbia for years, and social media platforms have removed inauthentic accounts linked to the ruling party. In February 2023, Meta announced it had removed over 5,000 inauthentic accounts on Facebook and 100 on Instagram that spread messages in support of the SNS and Vučić. According to the report, these accounts, which also operated across Twitter and YouTube, were linked to state employees and the SNS’s Internet Team, a group of employees who have previously operated networks of inauthentic social media accounts. In 2020, X, at the time known as Twitter, removed 8,500 inauthentic accounts that promoted narratives favoring Vučić and the SNS. A 2021 report from Reporters Without Borders detailed the rise of “ugly twin” websites, which mimicked the websites of popular independent media outlets, but posted content in support of the government. The Serbian public also remains a target of disinformation campaigns both homegrown and originating from Russia. Such campaigns often instrumentalize history, religion, and identity to inflame tensions between Serbia and its neighbors, most notably Kosovo. 
    • Harassment and intimidation: Individuals, including journalists, routinely face severe online harassment and occasional physical attacks for expressing their opinions online, which could escalate ahead of the election. The Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) documented 227 attacks against journalists, including 15 physical assaults, between January 2022 and June 2023. In December 2022, TV Nova S journalist Jelena Obućina faced a barrage of violent threats on X following a report from a pro-government tabloid that incorrectly claimed she had threatened Vučić. Prominent individuals who have supported the “Serbia against violence” protests have also experienced significant online harassment. Additionally, a November 2023 report from Access Now, SHARE Foundation, The Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy at the University of Toronto, and Amnesty International revealed that two civil society members had their devices compromised by an attack that resembled NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware. Routine intimidation could have a chilling effect on free speech ahead of the elections. 
    • Arrests and prosecution for online activity: While arrests for online speech protected under international human rights standards are rare, independent news outlets have faced a barrage of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) in recent years. Most notably, the prominent news outlet KRIK has been sued at least 12 times in recent years by government officials or prominent businesspeople concerning the outlet’s reporting on corruption. For instance, Nikola Petrović, President Vučić's godfather, sued KRIK over an April 2023 article that detailed his business dealings with a drug trafficker. The use of SLAPPs against independent media outlets could deter them from critical reporting ahead of, or in the wake of, the election. 
    • Technical attacks: Cyberattacks targeting both independent media outlets and state institutions are fairly common. JUGpress, an independent media outlet in southern Serbia, has routinely faced cyberattacks, including an attack in May 2023, which the outlet claimed was in retaliation for its objective reporting. Government websites have also been subject to cyberattacks; in January 2023, an array of government websites, including those of the Ministry of Health and the Serbian Army, suffered cyberattacks, for which social media accounts linked to hacking group Anonymous claimed responsibility. Cyberattacks on independent media outlets and government entities ahead of or after the election could limit people’s ability to access reliable electoral information, particularly given the length of time that may pass before the vote count is finalized.   

     

    Serbia has a score of 59 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects an online media environment rife with disinformation and harassment, as well as the repression of media freedoms. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 60 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 71 out of 100; and as a Technical or Hybrid Regime in Nations in Transit 2023, with a score of 46 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Serbia country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit

     

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      57 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      71 100 free
    • Date of Election

      December 17, 2023
    • Type of Election

      Snap parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      84.40%
    • Population

      6.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • South Africa

    header1 Country Overview

    On May 29, South Africans will vote for members of the 400-seat National Assembly, the lower house of the legislature and the body that elects the president, determining whether incumbent Cyril Ramaphosa will secure a second term. Voters will also choose members for each of the country’s nine provincial legislatures, which select members of the upper house of parliament, the National Council of Provinces. The African National Congress (ANC), which has won every national election since 1994, is seeking to hold on to its majority in both chambers. The country’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), hopes to unseat the ANC for the first time through a new coalition, the Multi-Party Charter for South Africa. Further threatening the ANC’s majority are increasingly popular party factions that split off to become new groups. These include the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), led by former ANC youth leader Julius Malema, and the Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) party, founded in December 2023 by ousted former president Jacob Zuma.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Thirty years after the end of apartheid, South Africa faces what may be its most highly contested election. Polling indicates that the once-dominant ANC could be on the verge of losing its majority in the National Assembly; if it does, it would need to form a national coalition government for the first time. In past election cycles, however, those unhappy with the ANC were just as likely to abstain from voting as they were to vote for an opposition party.

    South Africa is a constitutional democracy. Since the end of apartheid in 1994, it has been regarded globally as a proponent of human rights and a leader on the African continent. However, reports of corruption among government officials often emerge, and in recent years, the ANC has been accused of undermining state institutions to protect corrupt officials and preserve its power as its support base has begun to wane. In the face of such corruption scandals, high rates of youth unemployment, crime, and an electricity crisis that has resulted in years of extensive power cuts, many South Africans have grown disillusioned with not only the ANC, but with participation in establishment politics entirely. Seventy percent of South Africans report dissatisfaction with their democracy, and voter turnout has been on a steady decline in recent elections. While the country’s electoral framework is considered fair and the election management body, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), is largely considered independent, recent surveys indicate citizens view the commission with growing mistrust.

    South Africa scores a relatively high 82 out of 100 on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, where 100 represents the most resilience to digital election interference. This score reflects a pattern of free and fair elections and legal protections for free expression and press freedom, but also some enduring challenges to the rule of law.

    Despite this high level of resilience, Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Harassment and intimidation: South Africa’s 2019 election cycle was marked by a surge in online harassment against journalists. The Johannesburg High Court ruled that the EFF had violated the electoral code of conduct and created a “chilling effect” on the media after Julius Malema doxed a journalist on Twitter. Another increase in harassment and violent rhetoric against online journalists in 2024 could impact the availability of critical news coverage of political parties and candidates ahead of the vote.
    • Influence operations: Investigations from Media Monitoring Africa found that the ANC had established inauthentic accounts to spread messages online ahead of the 2019 elections. The same year, documents uncovered by the Daily Maverick revealed plans for an election interference campaign linked to Russia’s Internet Research Agency and Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the late leader of the private military company Wagner Group. While the impact of such information manipulation on public online discourse in past elections has been low, in part due to South Africa’s robust media environment, more sophisticated influence operations in 2024 could warp online discourse and undermine voters’ access to accurate and reliable information.
    • Arrests and fines: Arrests for online activity protected under international human rights standards are rare in South Africa, However, defamation is a crime, and the country’s Cybercrimes Act was used to prosecute individuals for social media posts connected to the outbreak of fatal riots in July 2021. Authorities announced that they would monitor social media for activity that could be considered incitement to violence ahead of the EFF’s national shutdown protests in 2023, while the Film and Publications Board (FPB) stated that those who share or repost inflammatory content online could also be prosecuted.

    South Africa is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2024, with a score of 79 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 73 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the South Africa country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On South Africa

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    • Global Freedom Score

      79 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      73 100 free
    • Date of Election

      May 29, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      72.30%
    • Population

      60.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • South Korea

    header1 Country Overview

    South Korea has a score of 75 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a stable democracy with regular rotations of power through elections and robust political pluralism. However, political rights and civil liberties are undermined by persistent corruption, the underrepresentation of women and citizens of non-Korean ethnicity, and struggles with minority rights and social integration. Internet freedom in South Korea suffers from authorities sometimes blocking or removing online political and social content, government affiliated actors manipulating online content for partisan purposes, and the widespread use of defamation and other laws that carry prison sentences for protected online activities. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 83 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 66 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the South Korea country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On South Korea

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    • Global Freedom Score

      83 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      67 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      March 9, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      94.25%
    • Population

      51.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • South Korea

    header1 Country Overview

    On April 10, 2024, South Korea will hold a legislative election for its unicameral National Assembly. The quadrennial elections are administered by the National Election Commission (NEC), an independent nine-member body appointed for six-year terms. Of the 300 National Assembly seats, 253 are elected in single-member constituencies and 47 through national party lists. The Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), the incumbent majority, currently holds 169 seats, and the People Power Party (PPP), the second largest party in the assembly and current holder of South Korea’s presidency, holds 115 seats. The remaining seats are held by other minority parties and independent politicians. While political parties have begun internal preparations for the election, official campaigning cannot commence until 14 days before the election date. Generally, elections in South Korea are considered free and fair.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Political polarization has increased in recent years, which can be attributed to the country’s rising housing costs, deepening inequality, corruption, and mounting tensions with North Korea. Additionally, due to a deadlock between the DPK-led legislative branch and the PPP-led executive branch, the government has made little progress in addressing these concerns. Additionally, there has been an increase in violent incidents targeting political figures. For example, in 2022, former DPK leader, Song Young-gil, was assaulted with a blunt object while the attacker shouted slogans opposing joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States. Most recently, in January 2023, current DPK leader, Lee Jae-myung, was stabbed in the neck, though the assailant’s motives remain unclear.

    South Koreans benefit from regular rotations of power and robust political pluralism. Civil liberties are generally respected, though the country struggles with minority rights and social integration. Legal bans on pro–North Korean activity affect legitimate political expression, and journalists can face pressure from the government over their coverage of or commentary on inter-Korean relations. Corruption and misogyny are persistent problems, with scandals implicating successive governments and company executives in recent years.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Harassment and intimidation: Individuals, notably journalists, routinely face online harassment and intimidation for expressing their opinions online, which could escalate ahead of the election. According to a 2021 Korean Press Foundation survey, more than 30 percent of journalists said they experienced online and offline harassment related to their work. Law enforcement officers have raided the homes of prominent journalists and the offices media outlets. For instance, in May 2023, police raided the home of journalist Lim Hyun-joo, who reported that President Yoon Suk-yeol allegedly disparaged members of the United States Congress. Similarly, ahead of the presidential election in September 2023, authorities raided the office of online news outlet Newstapa and the homes of two of its journalists in connection to an article about Yoon and corruption. The reaction to the reporting in both cases, which President Yoon labelled as disinformation, highlights the shrinking space for press freedom in the country.
    • Content removal: South Korea’s expansive legal and administrative framework, including the Public Official Election Act (POEA), enables authorities to restrict a wide range of online content. During the last legislative election cycle in 2020, the NEC requested that service providers remove over 50,000 online posts citing POEA violations. Likewise, in March 2022, ahead of the country’s presidential election, the NEC asked service providers to remove more than 86,000 online posts – the largest number of deletions requested during an election period in the country’s history – on the grounds that they included unauthorized public opinion polls, false information, and slander of candidates. Moreover, government officials are likely to employ POEA and other laws to remove content ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections.
    • Arrests and fines: In South Korea, defamation is a criminal offense. Under the Network Act, defamation that takes place online or via information and communication technologies (ICTs) is punishable by a maximum prison sentence of seven years or a maximum fine of 50 million won ($42,000). The POEA also boasts criminal provisions concerning “candidate slander” and “false election speech,” which have been used to curb criticism of political candidates and parties. For example, during the last parliamentary election cycle in 2020,  political candidate Na Kyung-won was fined 800,000 won ($373) under the act for allegedly staging a protest smearing a rival candidate. The risk of legal prosecution can contribute to self-censorship and limit legitimate political discourse about the election.
    • Technical attacks: The National Police Agency’s Cyber Bureau has recorded an increase in cyberattacks in recent years The North Korean government frequently launches cyberattacks against South Korean private enterprises and public institutions. Ahead of the upcoming election, a joint audit by the National Intelligence Service and Korea Internet and Security Agency identified vulnerabilities in the NEC’s election management network, the umbrella network for the country’s voting and ballot counting system. While the agencies did not detect any foreign government infiltrations, they noted the NEC has not adequately secured its systems, raising concerns ahead of the April vote.      

     

    South Korea has a score of 75 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a track record of elections that are generally free and fair, but coupled with an online environment characterized by censorship, harassment, and intimidation. The country is rated Free Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 83 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 67 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the South Korea country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On South Korea

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    • Global Freedom Score

      83 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      67 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 10, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      97.60%
    • Population

      51.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Sri Lanka

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Sri Lanka

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    • Global Freedom Score

      54 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      52 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      September 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      56.30%
    • Population

      22.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Taiwan

    header1 Country Overview

    Taiwanese voters will select a new president and all 113 members of the unicameral Legislative Yuan on January 13, 2024. Incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who took office in 2016, is term-limited, and the field to replace her is crowded. The winner of the presidential contest will serve a four-year term and can run for a second. A DPP-led coalition has held a legislative majority since 2016.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Four candidates are vying to succeed President Tsai. Vice President Lai Ching-te is running for the DPP, while New Taipei mayor Hou Yu-ih is the candidate of the Kuomintang (KMT), the main opposition party. The founder of the four-year-old Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), former Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je, is its first-ever presidential candidate. And Terry Gou, the founder of Hon Hai Precision Industry (better known as Foxconn), announced his independent campaign in August 2023, having previously sought the KMT nomination. Gou needed to collect about 290,000 voter signatures to make the ballot; he reportedly achieved this on November 1, but prosecutors are already investigating whether bribery tainted the collection effort. (Note: After this assessment was published, Gou withdrew from the election.)

    The presidential election is proving competitive. Lai enjoys a comfortable lead in the field of four candidates, according to opinion polls conducted throughout the summer and fall, but his margin slipped in an October poll. The KMT and TPP have reportedly explored a joint ticket, and Gou’s independent campaign adds complexity to the contest. The conclusion of that race will have consequences for the concurrent legislative elections, as voters will likely fill those ballots on a party-line basis.

    Foreign policy, especially regarding relations with China and the United States, will be a key issue in the election. The DPP has historically considered Taiwan a de facto independent nation and advocated for a separate national identity, while the KMT—which ruled Taiwan as a one-party authoritarian state for decades before democratic reform took hold in the 1980s and 90s—has favored unification with China. Lai has apparently moderated his rhetoric on cross-strait relations, while Hou, Ko, and Gou have expressed stances favoring varying levels of closeness to or communication with Beijing. Dissatisfaction over the economy, which contributed to the DPP’s lukewarm performance during the 2022 “nine-in-one” elections, may also impact the results in 2024.

    Taiwan’s vibrant and competitive democratic system has allowed for regular, peaceful transfers of power since 2000, and protections for civil liberties are generally robust. Ongoing concerns include inadequate safeguards against the exploitation of migrant workers and the Chinese government’s efforts to influence policymaking, media, and the democratic infrastructure.

     

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Information operations: Political disinformation is a significant problem in Taiwan, with voters being targeted by influence operations that support the Chinese government’s positions or are directly orchestrated by Chinese party-state actors. In December 2022, Doublethink Lab reported on an influence campaign that targeted voters during the nine-in-one elections. Those efforts relied on locally based influencers and nationalist Chinese netizens who spread pro-Beijing messages. In September 2023, the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center warned that Beijing-linked actors were trying to manipulate the information space to undermine US-Taiwan relations. Separately, the DPP, KMT, and TPP have accused each other of hiring or deploying commentators to manipulate online opinions, though the extent and effect of these efforts are unclear. Whether originating from foreign or domestic actors, influence operations may undermine voters’ access to reliable information about election-related issues, shaping their engagement at the polls. 
    • Cyberattacks: Taiwan faces frequent cyberattacks from overseas, particularly from China-based actors. These attacks often escalate when cross-strait political tensions are heightened. For instance, several government agencies faced distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks ahead of US lawmaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taiwan. Journalists have occasionally reported hacking attempts in previous years. DDoS attacks aimed at the electoral infrastructure ahead, during, or after the vote may undermine the balloting or confidence in the results, while cyberattacks against journalists and media organizations could undermine access to information about candidates and the voting process.  
    • Arrests and fines: People sometimes face criminal penalties for their online speech under the Social Order Maintenance Act (SOMA), which prohibits misinformation, and the criminal code, which bars defamation and slander. The Civil Servants Election and Recall Act, meanwhile, imposes criminal penalties on those who spread false information related to political proposals or the election of candidates. These legal threats may compel internet users to self-censor when discussing political or social issues online. That said, fewer criminal cases relating to online political speech were issued in 2023 than in previous years and courts are increasingly throwing SOMA cases out.

    Taiwan has a score of 87 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a competitive electoral system and strong protections for human rights, as well as legal restrictions on speech and vulnerability to cyberattacks and information operations. Taiwan is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 94 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2023, with an internet freedom score of 78 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Taiwan country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Taiwan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      94 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      78 100 free
    • Date of Election

      January 13, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      90.70%
    • Population

      23.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Thailand

    header1 Country Overview

    Thailand is preparing to hold general elections in May 2023. Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha has ruled the country since 2014, when he led a coup against the democratically elected government and assumed the premiership at the head of a military junta. The junta imposed a new constitution in 2017 and held elections in 2019, which were marred by political repression, censorship, and a lack of independent oversight by the national election commission. After the 2019 election, a promilitary coalition led by the Palang Pracharat Party (PPP) selected Prayuth to serve again as prime minister.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Now, Thai voters will participate in the second general election under the 2017 constitution and the first since the outbreak of mass prodemocracy demonstrations in 2020 and 2021. Voters will select all 500 members of the House of Representatives, 400 of whom are elected directly and 100 by nationwide party-line balloting. The 2017 constitution favors military control of the premiership: under a special system in place until 2024, the House jointly elects the prime minister with the Senate—all 250 members of which are appointed by the military—by simple majority.

    Public discontent with the military-backed government has been growing. In May 2022, an independent candidate won the Bangkok governor’s election in a landslide, and this year opposition parties appear positioned to capture a majority of seats in the House. Early polls show a wide margin of support for the opposition Pheu Thai Party (PTP), followed by the prodemocracy Move Forward Party. The PTP plans to nominate as prime minister its leader Paetongtarn “Ung-ing” Shinawatra, whose father (Thaksin Shinawatra) and aunt (Yingluck Shinawatra) both had served as prime minister before being ousted in the 2006 coup and days before the 2014 coup, respectively.

    However, electoral interference to undermine support for opposition parties or those otherwise not aligned with the military is likely. Though the PTP won the most votes in the 2019 general election, it was unable to form a coalition after the Electoral Commission of Thailand dissolved another prominent opposition party and changed its formula for distributing party-line votes to favor promilitary parties.

    Meanwhile, shifting allegiances in the ruling promilitary coalition may present a challenge for Prayuth’s hold on the premiership. In January 2023, Prayuth announced that he would join the United Thai Nation Party (RTSCP), a promilitary party formed in 2021. The decision marks a split with the PPP and its head, Prawit Wongsuwan, a fellow coup leader and now first deputy prime minister. Prawit is likely to seek the premiership himself. He briefly served as acting prime minister in late 2022, when the Constitutional Court suspended Prayuth while considering a lawsuit by opposition lawmakers alleging that Prayuth had violated term limit restrictions. The 2017 constitution sets an eight-year term limit for the premiership; Prayuth assumed the title of prime minister in 2014, after the year’s coup. The court eventually ruled that Prayuth’s term would be considered effective from the date of the constitution’s ratification in April 2017, effectively preserving his eligibility.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activity: People who criticize the monarchy or the government on social media risk arrest and conviction under Thailand’s repressive lèse-majesté and sedition laws, contributing to self-censorship among activists, political candidates, and ordinary civilians. Some prodemocracy activists, particularly those affiliated with the protest movement that began in 2020, face charges with cumulative sentences amounting to hundreds of years. In June 2022, Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, secretary general of the opposition Progressive Movement, was charged under the lèse-majesté law over a Twitter post calling for democratic reforms. During the 2019 election, opposition figures were prosecuted on charges of “uploading false information.”
    • Information manipulation: In 2021, a Thai lawmaker shared documents that appeared to show that authorities had spent millions of dollars employing personnel to disseminate progovernment views online, as well as to respond to antigovernment criticism and discredit opposition figures. Social media platforms like Twitter and Facebook have removed networks of military-linked accounts in recent years, including over similar activities aimed at smearing opposition figures. Though it is not yet clear to what extent the networks have mobilized ahead of the 2023 election, the structures to facilitate influence operations remain in place. The government is likely to manipulate existing concerns over false and misleading information to favor promilitary parties and progovernment opinions: for example, government initiatives against “fake news” have labeled legitimate criticism about policies as false. Such influence operations could limit peoples’ access to reliable information about voting and opposition parties.
    • Website blocks and content removals: The government has previously blocked online content that is deemed critical of the monarchy. For example, authorities intermittently blocked an online petition calling for the repeal of the lèse-majesté law in 2022. Meanwhile, a ministerial decree that entered into force in December 2022 empowers authorities to order internet service providers and social media platforms to remove content deemed unlawful within 24 hours. The decree specifically targets content barred under Section 14 of the Computer Crime Act, which is often broadly interpreted to target online dissent. If imposed, website blocks and content-removal orders targeting online content that criticizes the government or supports prodemocracy reform would limit access to information relevant to the balloting. 
    • Harassment and intimidation: Thai activists have faced online harassment, doxing, and offline violence in retaliation for their online activities. Opposition candidates and their supporters face these risks ahead of the election, potentially driving them to keep silent to stay safe.

    Thailand has a score of 30 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a semidemocratic election system designed to favor promilitary parties, strict laws criminalizing online expression, and few protections against human rights violations. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 29 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 39 out of 100. Scores and ratings for Thailand in the Freedom in the World 2023 report, covering the 2022 calendar year, will be released with the publication on March 9. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Thailand country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Thailand

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    • Global Freedom Score

      36 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      39 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      May 14, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      69.72%
    • Population

      66.7 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • The Gambia

    header1 Country Overview

    The Gambia has a score of 55 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects recent democratic progress after a surprise opposition victory in the 2016 presidential election ended decades of authoritarian rule; persistent rule of law deficits and pressures on civil society and media; and limits on the digital sphere, including content manipulation and risk of physical violence and harassment in response to online activity. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 46 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 49 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Gambia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On The Gambia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      50 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      56 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      December 4, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      21.18%
    • Population

      2.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • The Gambia

    header1 Country Overview

    The Gambia has a score of 57 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 46 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with an internet freedom score of 53 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Gambia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Note: This country received an abbreviated preelection assessment. For more information, please refer to the Election Vulnerability Index data and the annual country reports listed above.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On The Gambia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      50 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      56 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      April 9, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      21.18%
    • Population

      2.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Tunisia

    header1 Country Overview

    Tunisian voters will go to the polls on December 17 to elect new representatives to the Assembly of People’s Representatives. The elections will replace the parliament that was dismissed by President Kais Saïed during his July 2021 seizure of extraordinary powers. These are also the first elections to be held since Tunisia’s constitutional referendum on July 25, 2022, which was marked by low voter participation. The referendum passed and approved a constitution that gave President Saïed increased executive power and weakened checks and balances from Parliament and the judiciary. Independent experts have expressed broad concern over how the new constitution could weaken Tunisia’s democracy and erode respect for human rights and freedoms in the country.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The referendum was directly followed by Saïed’s decree of a new election law that significantly weakens the electoral system and the role that political parties play in it. The law abolishes the previous list-based system for seating members of Parliament; imposes organizational barriers to candidacy by removing public financing and requiring campaigns to self-finance or receive private financial support; and removes quotas that required an equal number of women and men candidates, as well as candidates under the age of 35. In response to the new election law, Tunisia’s main opposition alliance has indicated its intention to boycott the December polls. Foreign observers and Tunisian politicians, including some Saïed supporters, have identified the need for a new electoral law that facilitates broader participation in December’s elections.

    President Saïed’s September 2022 decree criminalizing the production and dissemination of “rumors and fake news” has also raised serious concerns about the criminalization of online content during this electoral period. Those found guilty of publishing or sharing “false news, false data, rumors, false documents, or documents that are falsified or falsely attributed to others” can be fined or imprisoned for up to five years. Prison terms increase to up to 10 years if the person targeted is a public official. The decree does not define or provide clarity on the terms “fake news” or “rumor,” allowing for security services and prosecutors to invoke an expansive definition of the terms so as to curtail political discourse and silence criticism of the government ahead of elections.

    Moreover, the new election law prevents anyone who has been charged with a legal violation from candidacy. Independent observers are concerned that Saïed could use the decree criminalizing rumors or fake news specifically to prevent those who have criticized him from running for office. Coupled with Saïed’s moves to consolidate power and rewrite the constitution, these developments have contributed to deep uncertainty about civic space and the future of Tunisian democracy.

    Freedom House has identified the following key digital issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Criminalization of Online Content: Since President Saïed’s July 2021 seizure of power, there has been an alarming increase in prosecutions against journalists, commentators, and users for their online content. In September 2022, security officers arrested Ghassen Ben Khelifa, the chief editor of a local independent news outlet. His arrest came after he published an opinion article that criticized the constitutional referendum. In July 2022, prominent blogger Oteyl Herzi was arrested by security forces after publishing a Facebook post criticizing local officials. In May 2022, the Court of First Instance in Tunis sentenced blogger Amina Mansour to six months in prison for satirical comments on Facebook in which she criticized President Saïed and his close associates.
    • Intimidation and Harassment: In addition to arrests and prosecutions, users, activists, and journalists have been subjected to extralegal attempts to silence critical voices ahead of the election. In September 2021, nine digital media journalists were targeted with violence by security forces at the first demonstration organized after the president’s seizure of extraordinary powers in July 2021. Additionally, a journalist from the Shems FM radio station, which has a strong online presence, was verbally attacked by a regional governor for requesting information about the national consultation process that the president had initiated as part of his plans to overhaul the constitution.
    • Disinformation: In the past, researchers and election monitoring organizations have identified progovernment propaganda and disinformation that has negatively impacted the integrity of online civic spaces ahead of elections. Research has found that since the political crisis began in July 2021, President Saïed and his government have taken measures to consolidate broader influence over online media spaces. In a report on political pluralism covering the period surrounding President Saïed’s seizure of power, the Independent High Authority for Audio-Visual Communication (HAICA) found that content published by the national broadcaster was “totally aligned” with the president’s views and excluded views from his critics. Ahead of the 2019 elections, the Tunisian Association for the Integrity of Elections (ATIDE) launched a project to monitor social media networks that found evidence of the coordinated use of Facebook pages to publish content praising or criticizing particular candidates in an inauthentic manner.

    Tunisia has a score of 66 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects problems with the most recent legislative elections and the president’s unilateral suspension of Parliament, laws criminalizing protected online activities, and harsh restrictions on civil liberties to suppress public dissent. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 64 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with a score of 61 out of 100. Tunisia’s Freedom in the World status declined from Free to Partly Free and the score declined by seven points in Freedom in the World 2022, which covered developments in the 2021 calendar year. Scores and ratings for Tunisia in the Freedom in the World 2023 report, covering the 2022 calendar year, will be released in the spring of 2023. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Tunisia country reports for Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Tunisia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      51 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      59 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      December 17, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      67.24%
    • Population

      11.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • Tunisia

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Tunisia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      51 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      59 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      October 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      79.60%
    • Population

      11.9 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Turkey

    header1 Country Overview

    General elections, which must be held by June 2023 as per Turkey’s constitution, could present major challenges to incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). President Erdogan—who has led Turkey as either prime minister or president since 2003—and his government have been strongly criticized for their heavy-handed response to a catastrophic earthquake that left over 43,000 people dead in southern Turkey in early February. President Erdogan issued a three-month state of emergency in 10 provinces that were heavily impacted, granting the government exceptional powers that allow it to restrict fundamental rights. The designation could allow authorities to limit campaign activities like rallies or the distribution of materials, including online materials, in areas where the state of emergency is in place, potentially curtailing opposition activities. Authorities also blocked Twitter for 12 hours in the earthquake’s aftermath, ostensibly to halt the spread of disinformation, and blocked popular social media platform Eksi Sözlük for its earthquake coverage. Elections are expected on May 14.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The AKP has ruled Turkey since 2002. In the second decade of the party’s dominance, President Erdogan marginalized other party leaders and placed himself at the center of government by altering the electoral framework, coopting the judiciary, and taking drastic steps to silence dissent. After initially passing some liberalizing reforms, the AKP government has pursued a wide-ranging crackdown on critics and opponents since 2016. Constitutional changes in 2017 transformed Turkey from a parliamentary system into a superpresidential one in which there is no prime minister, and the president appoints the government without parliamentary input or approval. The AKP’s low-interest economic policy has sent Turkey’s economy into a tailspin, with inflation reaching a 24-year high in 2022. 

    Turkey’s six-party opposition alliance, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Good Party (?Y?), have called for a radical departure from Erdogan’s policies. Public outrage over the ongoing economic crisis and inadequate government aid following the earthquake could bolster opposition parties and severely undermine Erdogan’s chances of reelection. However, disagreements within the opposition alliance may undermine their effort to oust Erdogan. Moreover, recent amendments to the electoral framework could leave smaller parties at a disadvantage: notably, the six-party alliance does not include the left-wing and pro-Kurdish rights Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the country’s second-largest opposition party, which is expected to run its own presidential candidate. The HDP has been vocal in criticizing the AKP’s handling of the earthquake and has accused the government of prioritizing aid distribution to areas with more AKP supporters, an issue that could influence Kurdish voters.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Website and social media blocks, and content removal: Thousands of websites are blocked in Turkey, including many independent media and citizen journalism outlets. This technical censorship hinders voters’ ability to access accurate and diverse sources of information ahead of the vote. In February 2022, Turkey’s High Council for Broadcasting (RTÜK), the media regulator, issued a 72-hour deadline for international news websites to obtain a national broadcast license or risk blocking; it then blocked the Turkish-language versions of Deutsche Welle and Voice of America that July, after the outlets refused to obtain licenses. Authorities have blocked access to social media during political and other crises. In February 2023, following the devastating earthquake, authorities blocked Twitter for 12 hours in response to “harmful disinformation” about the disaster. Authorities also blocked popular social media platform Eksi Sözlük after progovernment media outlets criticized the platform for its commentary lambasting the government’s response following the earthquake. While disinformation can pose a risk to electoral integrity, blocking websites or social media platforms under the guise of combatting disinformation limits access to independent journalism and improperly suppresses political speech. In addition to blocks on entire websites or platforms, the government can legally compel content hosts and intermediaries to limit access to individual pieces of content for Turkey-based users. For example, the 2020 Social Media Law has been used to force social media companies to comply with government-ordered content-removal requests. In the first year of its implementation, the law was used to remove at least 1,197 news articles, primarily about political issues.
    • Information manipulation: AKP-aligned public media outlets and government manipulation of social media content adversely impact the online information landscape, making it difficult for voters to access independent analysis of candidates or of the election campaign. The government uses a multipronged approach to skew the online narrative, claiming that misinformation is rampant and encouraging users to rely on government-issued information that favors the ruling party. Numerous reports have revealed that the AKP has enlisted an “army of trolls”—numbering around 6,000 individuals—to manipulate online discussions, drive political agendas, and combat government critics on social media. In May 2019, ahead of Istanbul’s repeat mayoral election, numerous progovernment social media accounts spread an altered video of opposition candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appearing to say that he would have terrorist groups run the country. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions: Many journalists, activists, and ordinary people face criminal penalties for criticizing, reporting on, or discussing government officials online, an environment likely to encourage self-censorship ahead of the vote. In recent years, thousands of people have been investigated for insulting President Erdogan, and numerous activists, journalists, and members of the political opposition have been charged with defamation. In August 2021, Canan Kaftancioglu, the Istanbul chair of the opposition CHP, was investigated for social media activities from nearly a decade beforehand and was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months in prison in May 2022. In February 2023, at least 24 social media users were arrested for criticizing the government’s handling of the earthquake, setting a dangerous precedent for dissent ahead of the election. The new Law on Combating Disinformation, which includes provisions that impose criminal penalties on anyone who deliberately shares content online deemed “fake,” could further be used to prosecute internet users and facilitate the AKP’s efforts to silence dissent ahead of the vote.
    • Harassment and intimidation: Harassment of journalists and online activists is rampant in Turkey, limiting free expression and the plurality of voices in the media. Reporters are occasionally subject to physical attacks, notably those who cover politics, corruption, or crime. In August 2021, political commentator Emre Ercis was shot in the leg and foot by an unidentified attacker; Ercis is known for his strident criticism of opposition groups and parties on Twitter. In February 2022, Güngör Arslan, the editor of local online newspaper Ses Kocaeli, was shot and killed. Arslan, who frequently reported on local politics, corruption, and fraud, had received death threats prior to his murder. In June 2021, journalist Ahmet Atmaca, a general reporter who covered crime, official events, and COVID-19 policies for the progovernment Demirören News Agency, was attacked as he visited a morgue while covering a murder case. Political candidates also face online harassment. In January 2022, CHP leader Kemal Kiliçdaroglu described an online harassment campaign against him that was orchestrated by thousands of pro-AKP Twitter trolls. 

    Turkey has a score of 33 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects an election system designed to concentrate government power, strict laws criminalizing online expression, and extralegal attempts to stifle independent journalism and silence dissent. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 32 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 32 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Turkey country reports in Freedom in the World, and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      33 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      30 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      May 14, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      76.48%
    • Population

      83.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-
  • Uganda

    header1 Country Overview

    Presidential candidate Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986. His National Resistance Movement (NRM) government has increasingly relied on the misuse of state resources, political patronage, and repression in order to maintain authority. Security forces have been heavily deployed during previous election periods in order to violently disperse protests and intimidate or arrest opposition supporters. Presidential candidate Robert Kyagulanyi, better known as Bobi Wine, and several other opposition personalities have been regularly targeted with physical and legal harassment, as well as surveillance. Journalists have routinely faced pressure and prosecution from the police and interference from the state media regulator, the Uganda Communications Commission.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Since public gatherings are banned due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the electoral commission has pushed candidates to conduct their campaigns online, leading Ugandans to dub the upcoming vote a “scientific election.” Social media, which was briefly blocked during the previous election, will again serve as an important source of diverse reporting and independent information. However, given that internet penetration is estimated at only 23 percent, the emphasis on online campaigning could exacerbate existing digital divides, particularly in rural areas.

    Uganda has a score of 43 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Uganda’s score reflects problems with the integrity of past elections and the political environment, degraded media freedom and rule of law, and shrinking space for protests and nongovernmental organizations. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 34 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2019, with an internet freedom score of 56 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Uganda country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Journalists and political activists are often arrested, prosecuted, or threatened with prosecution after criticizing the government online. There is potential for an uptick in arrests for political speech as the election approaches in order to silence opponents and others online.
    • Blocking social media: The government cut off access to Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp for four days during the 2016 elections. Though social media restrictions have not been repeated since then, the move may signal a willingness on the part of the government to implement similar restrictions on social media and messaging apps in the future, especially during the electoral period.
    • Hate speech: Hate speech, particularly along ethnic lines, is a concern heading into the electoral period. Voter and opposition intimidation have been a problem in the past, and an uptick in hate speech could contribute to an intimidating environment.
    • Influence operations: Researchers documented evidence of bot activity during the 2016 election to amplify posts in favor of President Museveni. There have been no confirmed reports of the government paying individuals to surreptitiously manipulate online discussions. However, this election could still see a rise in coordinated inauthentic behavior, given the booming and unregulated industry for such services around the continent.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    Incident Alert

    The UCC is moving forward with enforcing a regulation that requires “online data communication and broadcasting services” to register with commission. A UCC spokesperson said sites that fail to meet the October 5 registration deadline will be blocked. Read more.

    New Report

    Freedom House released the new edition of Freedom on the Net, which found that President Museveni’s government continues to tighten its grasp on internet users in Uganda through financial and regulatory constraints, as well as by prosecuting voices of dissent. Read the Uganda report.

    Incident Alert

    Opposition candidate Muhammed Ssegirinya was arrested while livestreaming outside of the police station where Bobi Wine was detained, and was charged with “inciting violence.” Ssegirinya’s lawyer said that the charges are for filming evidence of police violence during Bobi Wine’s arrest.” Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Four presidential candidates suspended their campaigns in protest of the arrest of two other candidates, Bobi Wine and Patrick Amuriat. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Anonymous reportedly hacked the Uganda Police Force website and took it offline in response to the violent police crackdown on protesters. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Numerous false and misleading claims about opposition candidate Bobi Wine have circulated on social media, including posts claiming that he has died, that President Barack Obama and President-elect Joe Biden have demanded his release, and that President Donald Trump has endorsed his candidacy.

    Incident Alert

    Bobi Wine indefinitely suspended his presidential campaign after an attack on his car. The decision follows a recent increase in repression and violence against his supporters. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Bobi Wine resumed his presidential campaign after suspending it in protest of violent repression of his supporters. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    The Media Council of Uganda revoked the accreditation of all foreign journalists, requiring them to re-register within seven days. Source.

    Incident Alert

    The Financial Intelligence Authority ordered a freeze on the bank accounts of multiple non-governmental organizations involved in good governance work over alleged terrorist financing. Sources report the move may be politically motivated. Source.

    Incident Alert

    The Facebook page for Ghetto TV, a pro-Bobi Wine online channel known for live-streaming his campaign activities, was reportedly hacked and deleted. The account was previously hacked in August. Source.

    Incident Alert

    Google rejected a request from the Uganda Communications Commission to remove over a dozen YouTube channels whose content is seen as sympathetic to opposition candidate Bobi Wine. Source.

    Incident Alert

    The Media Council of Uganda announced that local and foreign journalists must reapply for accreditation in order to cover the elections. Failure to register by the December 30 deadline could result in criminal charges. Source.

    Incident Alert

    Opposition presidential candidate Bobi Wine was arrested for allegedly violating a coronavirus campaign ban. However, the restrictions did not apply to the location where Wine was campaigning, suggesting that the arrest was politically motivated. Source.

    Incident Alert

    BBS TV journalist, Culton Scovia Nakamya, was arrested on December 30th alongside Bobi Wine and his campaign team. Nakamya later confirmed that police said she incited violence by posting updates about Bobi Wine’s arrest on social media. Source.

    Incident Alert

    On December 26, 2020, the Electoral Commission issued a statement prohibiting campaigning in Kampala and numerous other districts and cities due to rising COVID-19 infection rates. Analysts and opposition parties argue that the ban is intended to obstruct the opposition.

    Incident Alert

    Presidential candidate Patrick Amuriat was arrested and detained on alleged traffic charges. The Daily Monitor reports that it was his ninth arrest since the Forum for Democratic Change nominated him as their candidate. Source.

    Incident Alert

    Facebook removed a network of inauthentic accounts that was manipulating online discourse ahead of the election. The network was linked to the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, and several government officials’ accounts were removed, as were those of other progovernment figures. Source.

    Incident Alert

    The UCC ordered ISPs to block social media and messaging apps “until further notice.” Civil society organizations confirmed that restrictions on Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, and other platforms have been enacted. Source.

    Incident Alert

    Internet connectivity was disrupted nationwide as of 7 p.m. on the night before the election. Source.

    Press Release

    Suspension of Democratic Governance Facility Highlights Growing Concerns: President Yoweri Museveni's order to suspend the initiative comes as opposition parties bring allegations of electoral fraud to the Supreme Court. Read the full statement.

    On Uganda

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    • Global Freedom Score

      34 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      51 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      January 14, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      32.85%
    • Population

      44.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Ukraine

    header1 Country Overview

    Freedom House is closely monitoring for when elections for the Verkhovna Rada (originally scheduled for October 2023) and the presidency (scheduled for March 2024) may take place. Under the Ukrainian constitution, Ukraine is prohibited from holding elections while the country is under a state of martial law, which has been in force since February 24, 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion. There are also significant concerns that millions of Ukrainians, including those abroad, in the military, or under occupation, could not securely and meaningfully participate in elections if they are held during the war.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Ukraine

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    • Global Freedom Score

      49 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      59 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      March 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      79.20%
    • Population

      41 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • United Kingdom

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On United Kingdom

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    • Global Freedom Score

      91 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      79 100 free
    • Date of Election

      January 2025
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      97.80%
    • Population

      68.1 million
    • Election Year

      _2025-
  • United States

    header1 Country Overview

    The November vote is one of the most consequential in recent history for the well-being of American democracy. In the presidential contest, incumbent Donald Trump of the Republican Party is running for a second term against former vice president Joe Biden of the Democratic Party. All 435 seats in the Democrat-led lower chamber of Congress, the House of Representatives, are up for election, as are a third of the seats in the Republican-controlled upper chamber, the Senate.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Contributing to preelection tensions are the significant administrative challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and Trump’s repeated refusal to commit to respecting the outcome of the vote if he were to lose—a stance that is without precedent in the United States. A scenario in which two presidential candidates claim victory after a close or dysfunctional election could be destabilizing, potentially prompting clashes between protesters and police, extended court cases that leave election results in limbo beyond constitutional deadlines, false claims of fraud and disinformation about the integrity of vote totals, or even armed violence by extremist groups.

    The United States has experienced a multiyear decline in its democratic norms and institutions, with growing pressure on election integrity, judicial independence, and safeguards against corruption. Partisan manipulation of the electoral process is partly responsible for the degraded quality of elections. A swell of Republican-led efforts to alter voting rules—including onerous voter identification laws and changes in the number and location of polling sites—followed the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision to strike down a portion of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. This push is viewed by many experts as an attempt to suppress voting by demographic groups that are seen as likely to support Democratic candidates; the resulting disenfranchisement exacerbates a persistent problem that has historically centered on Black voters, but also affects Hispanic communities, Native Americans, students, low-income voters, and others.

    In addition to complicating the electoral process overall, inadequate adjustments to voting procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic may compound these existing disparities. Meanwhile, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which enforces campaign finance law in federal elections, has not been able to meet regularly for over a year due to multiple vacancies. The electoral environment has also been undermined by disinformation and other attempts to manipulate the information landscape by both domestic and foreign actors.

    The United States has a score of 79 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The US score reflects problems with past elections and with the rule of law, including judicial independence, due process, and equal treatment. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 86 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2019, with an internet freedom score of 77 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the United States country reports for Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • False or misleading information: Though there is a broad range of incorrect information online, false and misleading content about election integrity poses a direct threat to democracy. President Trump himself has fueled such narratives, engaging in baseless attacks on the security of mail-in voting and repeatedly alleging mass fraud without offering any credible evidence. Such claims, particularly by political leaders, undermine the public’s faith in the electoral process and set the stage for politicians and their supporters to reject the legitimacy of unfavorable results.
    • Incitement and violence: In response to clashes between protesters and police during racial justice demonstrations that ramped up in late May, the president issued a series of threatening posts on social media, including a warning that “when the looting starts, the shooting starts”—a phrase associated with police violence against civil rights protesters in the 1960s. Twitter flagged the post for “glorifying violence.” During the September 29 presidential debate, after the moderator urged Trump to tell white supremacist groups to “stand down” and not contribute to the protest-related violence, Trump called on one group to “stand back and stand by.” The organization in question reportedly interpreted the comment—which Trump amended under pressure in the following days—as a directive to prepare for action and touted it widely on social media. Trump frequently calls out journalists and prominent critics by name, often on Twitter. Those he identifies, as well as others who challenge him, are in many cases harassed, doxed, or threatened online by the president’s supporters. Such inflammatory remarks by the president, as well as other threatening online discourse, could encourage security forces or private militias and individuals to commit violent acts against protesters, voters, election workers, and other perceived opponents during the 2020 election period. QAnon, an online extremist movement centered on conspiracy theories that elevate Trump as a heroic leader against the forces of evil, has already been linked to multiple instances of violence.
    • Influence operations: Several domestic and foreign influence operations have already been identified online ahead of the elections. A domestic influence campaign using spam-like behavior to spread false content was uncovered in September. The accounts involved, a number of which have since been removed by Facebook and Twitter, were linked to teenagers in Arizona who were paid and managed by an affiliate of a prominent pro-Trump youth organization. In August, US intelligence services acknowledged suspected online influence operations by the regimes of Russia and Iran; Facebook and Twitter reported a Russian-backed network of fake accounts and a website purporting to be a left-wing news outlet the following month. These examples are similar to earlier influence campaigns that have gained prominence in US elections since 2016. Influence operations often rely on the exploitation of existing social and political divisions, and the increasingly tense electoral environment is fertile ground for further manipulation, especially in closely contested swing states where small changes in voter turnout can impact national races.
    • Cyberattacks: In September 2020, Microsoft reported hundreds of election-related cyberattacks originating in Russia, China, and Iran that targeted individuals and organizations, including people associated with both presidential campaigns. Hundreds of ransomware attacks on state and local governments as well as their contractors have also been reported during the year. Extensive cyberattacks were documented during the 2016 elections, including against the Democratic National Committee, Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, and electoral systems in all 50 states. Some steps have been taken to upgrade election security in the intervening years, but the efforts have been limited, and electoral infrastructure remains vulnerable to infiltration and interference. The full extent of cyberattacks may not be known ahead of the elections, but continued attacks on a range of targets are expected.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    Incident Alert

    Facebook announced new measures, including a ban on political and issue-based advertising after voting ends on November 3, in an attempt to address false and manipulative narratives that may arise in the post-election period. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Facebook expanded its efforts to limit QAnon on its platforms. QAnon has spread on Facebook despite an earlier ban on QAnon groups that called for violence. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    The FBI disrupted a plot by a militia to kidnap Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and overthrow the government. According to the affidavit, the FBI initially became aware of the plot when individuals were discussing it in a social media group earlier in the year. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    In an effort to address misinformation ahead of the election, Twitter announced that it would adjust certain features on the platform, including the retweet option and what tweets appear on users’ timelines. Read more.

    New Report

    Freedom House released the new edition of Freedom on the Net. Although the online environment in the United States remains largely free from state censorship, the US declined for the fourth straight year in our report. Read the United States report.

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    • Global Freedom Score

      83 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      November 3, 2020
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      91.13%
    • Population

      329.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • United States

    header1 Country Overview

    On November 8, US voters will choose representatives for all 435 seats in the House of Representatives, the lower chamber of Congress, and 35 seats in the upper chamber, the Senate, both of which are currently controlled by the Democratic Party. Additionally, voters in multiple states will elect governors, secretaries of state, and attorneys general, offices that have considerable power over the administration and certification of elections and functioning of local democracy. The 2022 midterms will determine the balance of power in Congress for the next two years of President Joe Biden’s term.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Former president Donald Trump and his allies continue to promote and assert the false claim that Trump won the 2020 presidential election, despite repeated judicial rulings repudiating cases based on that contention. Disproven theories about voter fraud motivated the effort to overturn the 2020 election results, including the January 6 attack on the Capitol, and some Republican officials and candidates continue to propagate rhetoric about the 2022 midterms that conflates potential vulnerabilities in voting systems and procedures with unwarranted certainty of fraud. These false claims have also provided the justification for legislative efforts to change how elections are administered at local and state levels in ways that suppress popular participation. The false characterization of the 2020 election as fraudulent and stolen—a conspiracy theory advanced by former President Trump and his supporters—has been persistently amplified by Republican candidates and members of congress. 

    More than 100 Republican candidates for Congress or statewide office have repeated this election denialism. Some Republican candidates have preemptively questioned, without credible evidence, whether this year’s vote will be legitimate in states that saw close contests in 2020. According to the Washington Post, 54 of 87 of the party’s nominees for state positions that play a role in the election certification process—including through control over local policies for counting and certifying votes—are election deniers. Ambiguities that are a product of the decentralized US electoral system, in which localities may implement their own counting and certification procedures, also in effect allow these officials greater control.

    Moreover, the effort to protect election integrity has itself been politicized, with some Republican candidates who support former President Trump’s false claims of voter fraud invoking election integrity as their reason for doing so. Media reports suggest that factions within the Republican Party are preparing attempts to undermine the 2022 midterms at the precinct level by staffing election offices and polling sites with partisan observers and poll workers instructed to “target and potentially overturn votes in Democratic precincts.” These operatives plan to overwhelm election officials with legal challenges to votes, voters, and voting machines. At a broader administrative level, appeals for protecting election security have been used as a pretext for rolling back electoral safeguards, as was the case with Louisiana’s withdrawal from the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), a bipartisan tool for sharing voter-registration data across state lines and between government agencies. The data-sharing facilitated by ERIC allows for states to maintain more accurate voter rolls. These efforts, undertaken in the name of “election security,” have the effect of making elections less secure. 

    The protection of election security is an important aspect of any free and fair election and citizens’ trust in elections. Claims of voter fraud, such as voter impersonation, dead people voting, and double voting, are not new. Studies of US elections back to 2006 have consistently shown that the number of proven violations are, in the case of voter impersonation, statistically insignificant and, in the case of dead people voting and double voting, vastly inflated. False narratives about supposed flaws in US voting systems and procedures contribute to flagging trust in elections and American democracy more generally, and will impact voter confidence for years to come. A CNN poll released in September 2021, for example, found that 78 percent of Republicans believed that President Biden did not win the 2020 election, and 52 percent of Americans lacked confidence that elections reflect the will of the people. False narratives also set the stage for politicians and their supporters to reject the legitimacy of results with which they don’t agree.

    The United States has experienced a multiyear decline in its democratic norms and institutions, with growing pressure on election integrity, judicial independence, and safeguards against corruption, according to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World report. Partisan manipulation of the electoral process is partly responsible for the degraded quality of elections. A swell of Republican-led efforts to alter voting rules—including changes to the number, locations, and hours of polling sites—followed the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision to strike down Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which required states with a history of voter discrimination along racial lines to obtain approval, or “preclearance,” from federal authorities for any voting changes. These efforts have intensified at the state level since the 2020 election. In 2021, 19 states passed 34 laws restricting access to voting, and 6 states have passed 9 laws making it more difficult to vote in 2022. These changes have disproportionately impacted Black, Hispanic, and Native Americans communities, as well as students and low-income voters, making it harder for them to vote.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Disinformation: False and misleading information about election integrity and voting processes, especially that which is focused on false claims of electoral fraud in 2020 and supposed fraud in 2022 and 2024, continues to be a significant problem and is increasing. More than 100 Republican candidates for office have spread such narratives, undermining confidence in the machinery of US elections and preemptively alleging fraud without offering credible evidence. Such criticism is typically aimed at electronic voting machines, counting procedures, vote-by-mail procedures, and ballot-drop boxes. Misleading information about voting locations and requirements could be used as a voter-suppression tactic.
    • Violence and incitement: The midterms are a possible flashpoint for political violence coordinated through online activities. While the number of far-right groups operating has declined since January 6, some of the most prominent remaining groups have increased their activity and adapted their tactics, including by shifting their communications to alternative, less-regulated platforms like Telegram, Gab, Odysee, Rumble, and Gettr, and focusing content production there on video products that are more difficult to moderate. The rise of armed protests, particularly at government facilities suggests that, as in 2020, facilities that collect and count votes could be at risk for targeting, intimidation, and possible violence stemming from online coordination. The January 6 hearings revealed links between far-right groups and Trump allies occupying official government positions, and it is possible that such groups could be mobilized to election sites under the false and dangerous pretext of providing “security” through public calls to action on social media, including by candidates, or covert online organizing. These efforts are likely to amount to illegal voter intimidation, and must not be permitted to supplant existing legal mechanisms for election oversight and ensuring public security.
    • Online harassment and threats: Government employees, poll workers, and other election officials are at risk for targeted online harassment. For example, Georgia election worker Wandrea “Shaye” Moss went into hiding and changed her appearance after receiving death threats and other forms of online harassment following the 2020 election. Her case, as well as those of numerous other local election workers who have faced similar attacks, showcases the risk of violence and the lack of protections in place to mitigate online harassment and threats against local election workers. While online harassment has been shown to lead to self-censorship and act as a barrier to political participation for voters and candidates, since 2020 it has also driven election workers to leave their jobs and has made staffing critical election oversight positions difficult.
    • Influence operations: US national security officials have repeatedly warned about the ongoing threat of influence operations from Russia, China, and Iran that seek to change the outcome of elections. Unlike presidential elections, where influence operations can focus on a single candidate who holds direct sway over domestic and foreign policy, the nationwide field of candidates in midterm contests offers a multitude of targets. The large number of candidates also makes influence operations more difficult to identify. Analysts believe that Chinese state influence operations could focus on promoting a subset of candidates deemed favorable to Chinese authorities’ economic and political interests around Taiwan or technology, or, as was the case in the last provincial elections in Canada, discouraging Chinese-Americans from voting for particular candidates or parties via targeted influence operations on WeChat. The Russian government or state-affiliated actors, meanwhile, may focus their efforts on promoting candidates and media figures who support the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Influence operations from foreign manipulators often rely on the exploitation of existing social and political divisions, and the increasingly tense electoral environment is fertile ground for manipulation claiming that the 2020 election was fraudulent. The strategic objectives of influence operations can be as broad as sowing doubt in democracy itself. Electoral disinformation could be leveraged to exploit these divisions and advance an agenda that is aimed at the broad strategic objective of destabilizing institutions of American democracy. 
    • Cyberattacks: The midterm elections come in the wake of a series of cyberattacks, including the 2020 SolarWinds breach, in which Russian intelligence compromised several US federal agencies, and the 2021 Colonial Pipeline attack, in which a nonstate group shut down one of the United States’ largest oil pipelines. Critical electoral infrastructure remains vulnerable to infiltration and interference, despite some attempts to upgrade election security since the 2016 elections, when extensive cyberattacks targeted the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, and electoral systems in all 50 states. Election officials and cybersecurity experts have expressed concerns that a cyberattack could target a local jurisdiction in a key race or swing state, and be used to exacerbate concerns over election integrity that have been continually stoked via ongoing disinformation campaigns.

    On Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability index, the United States has a score of 77 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity. This index is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The US score reflects problems with past elections and with the rule of law, including judicial independence, political polarization, due process, and equal treatment. The country is rated Free in Freedom in the World 2022, with a score of 83 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Free in Freedom on the Net 2021, with a score of 75 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the United States country reports for Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

     

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

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    • Global Freedom Score

      83 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      November 8, 2022
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      90.17%
    • Population

      332.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2022-
  • United States

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On United States

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    • Global Freedom Score

      83 100 free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      76 100 free
    • Date of Election

      November 5, 2024
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      97.10%
    • Population

      335 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Uzbekistan

    header1 Country Overview

    The October presidential election comes amid a stalled reform agenda and continued repression of opposition forces. Shavkat Mirziyoyev is expected to run for a second term after replacing Islam Karimov, who died in 2016 after more than two decades in power. Despite some moves to devolve executive power, genuine political competition remains sparse. In May 2021, the Justice Ministry rejected the registration of the Truth and Development Social Democratic Party, preventing well-known critic Khidirnazar Allaqulov from running in the presidential election. All existing political parties generally toe the line of the ruling Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    President Mirziyoyev’s tenure has included some positive reforms to the country’s authoritarian governance. The 2019 parliamentary elections featured more open debate among parliamentary candidates, lawmakers, and independent journalists, and there has been incremental progress on judicial independence. Progress on media freedom and government oversight was stifled, however, after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the May 2020 collapse of the Sardoba dam, which displaced over 100,000 people in Uzbekistan and neighboring Kazakhstan. Mirziyoyev enacted new penalties for disseminating “false information” related to the pandemic, as well for online “insult and slander” of the president. These trends raise concerns about politicized targeting of online journalism ahead of the election.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Legal actions against bloggers, journalists, and ordinary individuals could disrupt access to information and encourage self-censorship ahead of the election. Numerous vague laws permit the government to prosecute legitimate online activity, including prohibitions on threatening the constitutional order; inciting ethnic, national, racial, or religious hatred; and threatening public security. In May 2021, an Uzbekistan court sentenced blogger Otabek Sattoriy, who frequently reported on government corruption, to six and a half years in prison for allegedly extorting a mobile phone from the owner of a local market.
    • Forced deletion of content: Continued removal of sensitive political content in the coming months could undermine voters’ access to independent information related to the election. In May 2020, Jamoliddin Babajanov and Bobur Akmalov, the editor and lead director of television channel Sport, criticized state broadcaster Ozbekistan 24’s coverage of the Sardoba dam collapse. A recorded video of the argument was later taken down from the website where it was initially published. Additionally, a reporter from the Uzbekistan National News Agency deleted a Facebook post, which mentioned that a resident had been told not to comment on the collapse, after she received “calls from above” pressuring her to remove the post because it could be viewed as a criticism of the president. The push for journalists to delete content extends beyond the collapse of the dam; in July 2020, the editors of three media outlets in the autonomous region of deleted stories about the death of Musa Yerniyazov, the chairman of the parliament of Karakalpakstan who passed away in July 2021, after they were summoned to the prosecutor’s office. 
    • Harassment and violence: Journalists and critics of the government regularly face attacks, including violent assaults, in response to their online activities. In March 2021, blogger Miraziz Bazarov was beaten by a mob, hospitalized, and subsequently placed in house arrest. Bazarov had publicly supported LGBTQ+ rights and questioned the government’s spending of COVID-19 relief funds. Social media users who speak out about sensitive topics, notably LGBT+ rights, are subject to hate speech, intimidation, and offline violence. 
    • Cyberattacks: Prominent bloggers have faced attempted hacks in the past year. In August 2020, four administrators of popular Telegram channels were allegedly targeted by a coordinated phishing attack. The previous year, over 170 activists and journalists based inside and outside of the country faced a barrage of phishing attacks. Online news sites, including those critical of the government, have also been subject to DDoS attacks in recent years. Digital security remains a potential vulnerability ahead of the 2021 election and breaches could disrupt the reach or operations of activists and journalists who are targeted.
    • Blocking of platforms and websites: The government blocks a number of websites, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Russian and Uzbek services, as well as public opinion platforms Avaaz and Change.org. In a small sign of progress, the websites of several independent media outlets, human rights groups, and platforms were unblocked in 2019. However, in June 2020, the government blocked access to Durakchi, a satirical website, and users reportedly had trouble accessing Facebook and Telegram throughout that summer. Moreover, the government maintains control over the country’s internet infrastructure and could restrict access to additional websites and platforms ahead of the election. 

    Uzbekistan has a score of 22 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a tightly controlled environment for expression and political engagement on and offline, as well as legislative and judicial branches that are subservient to the executive. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2021, with a score of 11 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties; Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 27 out of 100; and as a consolidated authoritarian regime in Nations in Transit 2021, with a score of 4 out of 100 for the country’s democratic progress. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Uzbekistan country reports in Freedom in the World, Freedom on the Net, and Nations in Transit.

    Download the pre-election assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Uzbekistan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      12 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      25 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      October 24, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      53.48%
    • Population

      34.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Uzbekistan

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Uzbekistan

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    • Global Freedom Score

      12 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      25 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      December 2024
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      83.30%
    • Population

      36.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Venezuela

    header1 Country Overview

    Venezuela’s de facto leader, Nicolás Maduro, was sworn in as president after a snap 2018 election that failed to meet minimum international standards and was widely condemned as illegitimate. The democratically elected National Assembly declared its head, Juan Guaidó, to be Venezuela’s interim president in line with the country’s constitution. Guaidó has since received the backing of more than 50 countries, including the United States. Maduro, however, has refused to relinquish power. Since Guaidó’s legal mandate expires at the end of this legislative term, the December 2020 elections have a direct bearing on the future of the political opposition.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    As in 2018, the upcoming elections for the National Assembly in December 2020 are highly vulnerable to interference and do not meet minimum conditions for credibility. Over 25 opposition parties have declared that they will boycott the vote, citing clear instances of political interference by Maduro and his allies. The Supreme Court side-stepped the constitution by assigning directors of the National Electoral Council, a body normally appointed by the National Assembly to oversee the election. The court has also interfered with opposition parties, including by ordering that party leadership be replaced with Maduro sympathizers. Meanwhile, the authorities have closed off virtually all channels for political dissent by restricting civil liberties and prosecuting perceived opponents without regard for due process, as well as through enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings.

    Venezuela has a score of 17 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. Venezuela’s score reflects a poor performance across all categories, including the political environment and past elections, as well as broad failure to respect human rights. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 16 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2019, with an internet freedom score of 30 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Venezuela country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Influence operations: There is extensive evidence that the regime of Nicolas Maduro has manipulated online discussions through state-run media and covert influence campaigns. State officials, public agencies, party activists, semi-automated accounts, and bots harassed the opposition and spread misinformation on Twitter during the May 2018 election. The broader digital environment will likely see increased manipulation ahead of the December vote, including narratives aimed at dividing the opposition.
    • Blocking social media: Social media and livestreaming platforms such as Twitter, Periscope, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube are frequently blocked during sensitive political events. The state-owned provider CANTV blocked platforms in November 2019 during protests for fair elections, and again in January 2020 when the opposition-controlled National Assembly was scheduled to swear in new leadership. Shutdowns may occur before, during, or after the December vote, particularly if the regime feels threatened by digital activism and online reporting, which is likely to increase both within the country and among the diaspora.
    • Arrests and intimidation: Political activists, journalists, and low-profile individuals are routinely harassed, arrested or arbitrarily detained, and violently targeted for their online writing. As tensions rise and the regime seeks to control the information landscape, users may face an uptick in legal and extralegal repercussions for social media posts and online reporting.
    • Cyberattacks: Digital media outlets and human rights organizations have faced widespread phishing campaigns, DDoS attacks, and other attempts to disrupt their activities and gain access to sensitive information. Observers strongly suspect the actions are sponsored by or linked to the state, given that attacks often coincide with politically sensitive issues, including the publication of an interview about the “secrets of the Maduro government” in 2018 and Guaidó’s return to the country in 2019. Digital insecurity remains a major vulnerability in the pre-election period.



      Download the preelection assessment PDF. 

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    In the new edition of Freedom on the Net, internet freedom in Venezuela suffered as internet connectivity was frequently disrupted, service providers blocked key sources of independent news and information, and independent online journalists increasingly self-censored. Read the Venezuela report.

    Incident Alert

    Government-owned ISP CANTV blocked 30 websites between October 11 and October 16, including media outlets, sites containing information on COVID-19 offered by the interim government, opposition websites, and streaming platforms. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    The National Electoral Council published new campaign regulations less than a week before the official start of the campaign period. Last minute changes to campaign rules often create confusion and can place opposition candidates at a disadvantage. Read the regulations.

    Incident Alert

    A sustained homophobic smear campaign against Roland Carreño, a journalist and the coordinator of Voluntad Popular, continued when pictures of him that were obtained without his consent were posted on Twitter. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Opposition leaders, human rights activists and relevant opposition digital influencers reposted a video taken in 2016, portraying it as having been taken in 2020. The video is of a meeting where attendees are instructed to vote alongside staff who will ensure they vote in the favor of the governing party. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Interim president Juan Guaidó and other opposition leaders will boycott the election on the basis that it will not be a free and fair contest. The opposition instead plans to hold its own referendum on Nicolás Maduro’s rule. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    Nicolás Maduro claimed victory in Venezuela’s election, which had low turnout and was boycotted by the opposition after a preelection period marred by political interference. Read more.

    Incident Alert

    A fact-checking group found that some hashtags used during the election period, especially those promoted by the Ministry of Communication and Information, came from accounts with high rates of inauthentic behavior - sometimes as high as 79%. Read their thread.

    Incident Alert

    On election day, some voters reportedly found polling places to be closed or delayed in opening without warning. Unforeseen changes to voting centers’ schedules and functioning can directly disenfranchise voters.

    Incident Alert

    Election results were announced in a non-transparent way that at times appear inconsistent with the electoral framework. For example, National Assembly candidate Luis Parra won a seat that he was not nominated for, but later claimed he had changed races without notifying the public. Source.

    On Venezuela

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    • Global Freedom Score

      15 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      29 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      December 6, 2020
    • Type of Election

      Parliamentary
    • Internet Penetration

      66%
    • Population

      28.5 million
    • Election Year

      _2020-
  • Venezuela

    header1 Country Overview

    The assessment for this country will be published as soon as it becomes available.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Preelection assessment coming soon...

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Venezuela

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    • Global Freedom Score

      15 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      29 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      July 28, 2024
    • Type of Election

      Presidential
    • Internet Penetration

      61.60%
    • Population

      28.8 million
    • Election Year

      _2024-
  • Vietnam

    header1 Country Overview

    Vietnam is a one-party state ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), where elections serve as a ritual reaffirmation of the CPV’s decades-old political monopoly. The upcoming National Assembly election will determine the 500 members of Vietnam’s legislative body. The National Assembly is largely subservient to the CPV, following the party lead on the legislative agenda and in appointing government officials. At the CPV’s Party Congress in January, Nguyễn Phú Trọng was reelected as CPV general secretary, defying the party’s two-term leadership rule. 

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Elections are carefully orchestrated by the CPV to ensure regime stability and the absence of popular participation. Candidates on the CPV list are handpicked by the party and made public only weeks before the vote. No other parties are authorized to take part. Independent candidates must be vetted by the CPV, which resulted in the disqualification of over 100 individuals—including prominent members of civil society—during the 2016 election. The CPV won 473 out of 500 seats. The vote-counting process is closed to the public and independent observers. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Authorities use numerous vaguely worded decrees and articles to bring charges against activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens for their online activities. In January 2021, Phạm Chí Dũng, founder of the Independent Journalists Association of Vietnam (IJAVN), was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of creating and disseminating anti-state propaganda in part for articles he published online. Authorities convicted two fellow journalists for the online publication on similar charges, handing them 11-year prison sentences. The crackdown was seen by civil society as an attempt to squash debate on the country’s leadership ahead of the CPV’s 13th Party Congress that month. Heightened repression is likely during the electoral period in order to maintain the CPV’s domination over the political narrative. 
    • Influence operations: The Vietnamese government manipulates the online information space and public discourse through an electronic army of paid commentators. A unit of approximately 10,000 people hired by the government, known as Force 47, disseminates propaganda, harasses dissidents, and attacks opposition figures on social media, notably Facebook and YouTube. Separately, “public opinion shapers” engage in similar tactics on a voluntary basis. These two cyber forces significantly expand authorities’ capacity to disrupt and distort the online information landscape ahead of the National Assembly elections beyond more traditional forms of media manipulation, which are also prevalent in the country.
    • Forced deletion of content: Government officials routinely pressure social media companies, content hosts, online publications, and individual users themselves to remove content that the state deems critical or “toxic.” In April 2020, full access to Facebook’s local servers was restored reportedly only after the company agreed to remove significantly more “anti-state” content. Separately, Force 47 is believed to mass report anti-state content to social media companies for removal. The forced removal of content deemed unsavory by the government further restricts the already severely curtailed ability of civil society, independent news platforms, and ordinary people to create online space for informed debate.

    Vietnam has a score of 18 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a monopolized political sphere, a punitive online media environment, and severely restricted space for civil society. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 20 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Not Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 22 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Vietnam country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Vietnam’s one-point overall score decline in Freedom in the World 2021 report reflected new lows for the country’s media environment, exemplified by the arrest of a journalist with charges carrying a 20-year maximum prison sentence. Read the Vietnam report.

    In the news

    New analysis in The Diplomat discusses how Vietnam's ruling party is flagrantly abusing human rights online and increasingly pressuring social media platforms to secure its monopoly on power. Read the article.

    On Vietnam

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    • Global Freedom Score

      19 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      22 100 not free
    • Date of Election

      May 23, 2021
    • Type of Election

      Legislative
    • Internet Penetration

      66.54%
    • Population

      96.2 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Zambia

    header1 Country Overview

    Zambia will hold general elections in August as the country’s democracy comes under increasing strain. President Edward Lungu’s tenure has featured pressure on democratic institutions and civic space, including a failed attempt to pass constitutional amendments that would vest the presidency with increased powers over election processes and the judiciary. Lungu, who leads the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party, assumed office in 2014 upon the death of his predecessor and was reelected in 2016. Zambia’s highest court—composed entirely of Lungu appointees—ruled in 2018 that he was eligible to contest the 2021 elections and that constitutional provisions limiting a president to two five-year terms did not apply. Lungu’s main challenger in the August elections is perennial presidential candidate Hakainde Hichilema, the head of the United Party for National Development (UPND), the primary opposition party. The election is expected to be highly contested: Lungu won re-election in the 2016 general elections with only 13,000 votes over the required 50 percent margin. Alongside the presidency, 156 of the 167 National Assembly seats will be contested.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Serious concerns over the administration and credibility of the 2021 elections have already emerged. In 2020, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) announced that registered voters would be required to re-certify their registrations, reversing a 15-year-old policy of retaining voter rolls. Hichilema and others in the opposition have criticized a provisional voter register published in March 2021 that, when compared to the 2016 register, contained over 266,000 more voters in provinces that have historically supported the PF and almost 100,000 fewer voters in provinces that have historically supported the UPND. Meanwhile, PF officials accused Hichilema of corruption in late 2020 related to his 2004 purchase of a farm, leading to a police investigation that sparked rumors of Hichilema’s impending arrest. The 2016 elections were marred by restrictions on opposition-aligned media, misuse of public resources by the PF, election-related violence between PF and UPND supporters, and restrictions on opposition rallies. Following the PF’s victory in 2016, Hichilema was arrested on politicized charges of treason and Lungu imposed a state of emergency that constrained media freedom and empowered law enforcement. 

    Freedom House has identified the following as key issues to watch ahead of election day:

    • Arrests and prosecutions: Arrests and prosecutions for online activities are common in Zambia, particularly for defaming Lungu. Social media users have also been arrested on charges of publishing false news and seditious publication with intent to cause fear and alarm. In March 2021, Lungu signed a cybercrime law that establishes expansive new provisions for online speech, as well as broad authority for online surveillance. The new law, which includes a ban on publication of “obscene” content and disclosure of information about criminal investigations, further adds to the arsenal of legal tools that the government may use to silence online critics during the electoral period, particularly journalists.
    • Internet shutdowns: Widespread connectivity disruptions were reported alongside mass protests over the outcome of the disputed 2016 presidential election. The disruptions, which lasted between 48 and 72 hours, were localized to areas with strong opposition support, leading to strong suspicions of government interference. Opposition-led protests ahead of or after the elections could prompt similar restrictions on connectivity.  
    • Influence operations: Media reports and statements from officials indicate that the PF has invested in efforts to shape the online media environment. Both progovernment and pro-opposition social media accounts have been known to spread false news stories online. Reporting in 2020 alleged that the PF’s strategic plan for 2018 to 2021 included the establishment of a media intelligence unit for covert operations consisting of bloggers, hackers, and reporters to influence media narratives. The heightened tensions of the elections season may make the online media landscape more prone to manipulation by domestic political actors. 

    Zambia has a score of 59 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a history of regular multiparty elections marred by alleged irregularities, and a trend of restrictions on media freedom and human rights. The country is rated Partly Free in Freedom in the World 2020, with a score of 54 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2020, with an internet freedom score of 59 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Zambia country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    Download the preelection assessment PDF.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    News and Updates
    New Report

    Zambia earned a two-point decline in Freedom in the World 2021, reflecting a failure to prosecute senior officials despite evidence of corruption, as well as opacity surrounding public funds and the country’s economic management. Read the Zambia report.

    On Zambia

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    • Global Freedom Score

      54 100 partly free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      59 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      August 12, 2021
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      26.79%
    • Population

      18.4 million
    • Election Year

      _2021-
  • Zimbabwe

    header1 Country Overview

    On August 23, 2023, Zimbabwe’s citizens will cast votes in both presidential and legislative elections. President Emerson Mnangagwa is seeking reelection, nominated again by the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Nelson Chamisa, who narrowly lost the 2018 presidential election to Mnangagwa, is running for the newly created Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC). The presidency is decided by absolute majority; for the legislature, the National Assembly, 210 of the 270 total seats are single-member constituencies. The remaining 60 seats are reserved for women parliamentarians and are awarded proportionally. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) is responsible for administering the vote.

    header2 Preelection assessment

    Following the ouster of former president Robert Mugabe in a 2017 military coup that brought Mnangagwa to power, the 2018 elections fell short of delivering progress towards a democratic transition. A lack of transparency around the ZEC’s decision-making and its inadequate consultation with opposition parties in the preelection period reduced confidence in the body’s independence. After the Constitutional Court rejected a petition from the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), challenging the 2018 presidential election results, popular belief in the political independence of electoral institutions further eroded. Security forces violently cracked down on protesters demanding results after vote-counting delays raised fears of manipulation; none of the perpetrators of the violence were held to account. These still-unaddressed challenges of the 2018 polls have driven fears that the 2023 elections, too, will be marked by violence and repression.

    Given the lack of meaningful reforms to ensure the ZEC’s independence and the uneven playing field for political parties, international rights groups and bodies have expressed concerns over the potential for Zimbabwe to hold credible elections in 2023. ZANU-PF continues to misuse state resources for campaigning, and in 2022, relatives of ruling party politicians and loyalists were appointed to the ZEC as election commissioners. Police block opposition party meetings and rallies, and public broadcasters give preferential coverage to ZANU-PF. In rural districts, the ruling party distributes land and food aid to secure support. Escalating political violence and intimidation against opposition politicians and their supporters also forebode of violence during the election period.

    While it is highly unlikely that this year’s elections would allow for an opposition victory, Mnangagwa and other ruling party officials have an interest in overseeing a peaceful and credible electoral process. Faced with hyperinflation, high unemployment, and other economic crises, the government and ruling party have sought greater international legitimacy to attract aid, investments, and economic relief through the lifting of targeted sanctions. ZANU-PF likely sees the 2023 elections as an opportunity to both consolidate power and further exploit divisions that have plagued Zimbabwe’s opposition since the death of longtime MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai. 

    Since taking power in 1980, ZANU-PF has carried out severe crackdowns on the political opposition, critical media, and other sources of dissent. President Mnangagwa’s administration has largely retained the legal, administrative, and security architecture inherited from the Mugabe regime, and after an initial period of improvement, stepped up repression to consolidate its authority. Endemic corruption, weak rule of law, and poor protections for workers’ and land rights remain among Zimbabwe’s critical challenges.

     

    Freedom House has identified the following as key digital interference issues to watch ahead of election day: 

    • Internet shutdowns: Network disruptions and the intentional degradation of internet quality are major concerns for Zimbabwe’s elections. Internet speeds have regularly been slowed in response to political events, including opposition rallies in February 2022, protests in 2020 over poor economic conditions and government mismanagement of COVID-19, and protests over fuel prices in 2019, during which the government ordered a national shutdown. If ordered by the government in this year’s elections, the throttling or full shutdown of internet connectivity in Zimbabwe would inhibit media and civil society groups’ abilities to report on electoral conditions, undermining transparency of the electoral process and decreasing public faith in the vote. Shutdowns and degradation of service could also allow cover for security services to act with impunity and meet protesters with violence in the event of unrest following the vote.
    • Blocks on websites and social media platforms: Access to independent online sources of information has been limited during political moments in Zimbabwe on multiple occasions. In the aftermath of the 2018 elections, state-owned internet service provider (ISP) TelOne blocked a website providing election information after it published the voters’ roll online. In response to fuel protests in 2019, blocks were imposed on social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Reddit, in addition to the ordered internet shutdown. Blocks on websites and social media in 2023 could hinder transparency of the electoral process, preventing people from accessing accurate electoral information, discussing their views and campaigning, and communicating about conditions at local polling stations.
    • Harassment and intimidation: Journalists, activists, and members of the opposition and their supporters are likely to face online harassment ahead of and during the election period, including from ZANU-PF supporters. During the 2018 elections, Mnangagwa encouraged young ZANU-PF supporters to dominate the digital space, and called again for supporters to fight critics on social media in 2019. These statements have emboldened trolls who seek to harass, intimidate, and undermine the credibility of journalists, opposition leaders, human rights activists, and others who criticize the ruling party, increasing the frequency and intensity of such online harassment. Journalists and activists have been threatened with, and in some cases, victims of abduction and torture in retaliation for online activity. Pervasive online and offline harassment of critical voices, coupled with the dominance of progovernment narratives online, could lead to greater self-censorship and limit the diversity of viewpoints and independent information available to citizens ahead of election day in 2023. 
    • Arrests and prosecutions for online activities: Online criticism of government officials or members of state security services has been met with arrests, fines, and imprisonment. The Cyber and Data Protection Act, enacted in December 2021, imposed new criminal penalties on online speech, and has been used to arrest journalists due to their reporting and social media users for criticizing political figures and security officials. Some prominent critics of the government arrested for online activity have been released on the condition they agree to government restrictions on their social media use. Legal repercussions for online speech can contribute to widespread self-censorship, and fears of reprisals—against those who speak out online or those who share information about conditions at local polling stations—could limit transparency, enable greater electoral irregularities, and undermine the credibility of election results.
    • Technical attacks: Cyberattacks could be a vector for digital interference in Zimbabwe’s elections. In 2018, the ZEC’s website was hacked and defaced following deadly police attacks on protesters after election results were announced. Cyber forensic analysis well after the incident revealed that the ZEC’s site still had critical security deficiencies that allowed the initial attack to occur. There is no evidence that officials have taken steps to address vulnerabilities that hackers may exploit during the 2023 elections. While the 2018 hack was an overt defacement, more subtle attacks in the future could sow confusion about the accuracy of election information and further undermine the credibility of official election results. 

    Zimbabwe has a score of 39 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity, on Freedom House’s Election Vulnerability Index, which is based on a selection of key election-related indicators. The score reflects a restrictive online and offline environment for opposition groups, human rights activists, and journalists, a history of network interference and restricted connectivity during political events, and both legal criminal penalties and extralegal retaliation for critical online speech. The country is rated Not Free in Freedom in the World 2023, with a score of 28 out of 100 with respect to its political rights and civil liberties, and Partly Free in Freedom on the Net 2022, with an internet freedom score of 49 out of 100. To learn more about these annual Freedom House assessments, please visit the Zimbabwe country reports in Freedom in the World and Freedom on the Net.

    A Digital Sphere

    B Electoral System and Political Participation

    C Human Rights

    On Zimbabwe

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    • Global Freedom Score

      27 100 not free
    • Internet Freedom Score

      51 100 partly free
    • Date of Election

      August 23, 2023
    • Type of Election

      General
    • Internet Penetration

      34.80%
    • Population

      16.3 million
    • Election Year

      _2023-